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Abstract 
The theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer will be examined for its potential to address the problem 
of God and world, i.e. to provide a conception of the transcendent God’s immanence in reality 
faithful to the revelation of God in Christ. Promeity is developed as the description of a 
pattern of thought in Bonhoeffer’s work originating in his christological commitment to the 
priority of Christus praesens. The pattern of Bonhoeffer’s usage forms a preliminary 
definition for promeity not only as a christological axiom, but as a theological method, as the 
repeated attempt to return our theological language to its origin in the revelation of God in 
Christ while taking seriously Christ’s freedom to define his own being as given to reality. 
Promeity as method is refined by comparing and contrasting it with various other interpretive 
attempts since the 1960’s to develop a Bonhoefferian approach to the God-world problem. 
The logic of promeity is further developed by considering its radical claim to subordinate all 
definitions to the priority of the Incarnate God-human. The manifestations of this claim in 
Bonhoeffer’s 1933 Christology lectures and Ethics manuscript are explored. Finally, the logic 
of promeity will be further extended and supplemented with additional resources in 
Bonhoeffer’s work to consider its implications for the problem of God and world in its 
ontological, epistemological, and ethical aspects. 
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Opsomming 
Hierdie studie verken die potensiaal van Dietrich Bonhoeffer se teologie om die sogenaamde 
“God-wêreld probleem” aan te spreek. Laasgenoemde verwys na die uitdaging om die 
transendente God se immanensie in die werklikheid só te konseptualiseer dat dit getrou bly 
aan die openbaring van God in Christus. Met hierdie doel voor oë word die term, “promeïteit” 
(promeity, van die Latyn pro me, “vir my”) aangewend om ’n spesifieke denkpatroon in 
Bonhoeffer se Christologiese werk te beskryf. Die bron van hierdie patroon of logika lê 
gesetel in die prioriteit wat Bonhoeffer deurlopend aan Christus praesens skenk. ’n Werkende 
definisie van promeïteit begin in Bonhoeffer se gebruik daarvan vorm aanneem – nie net as ’n 
Christologiese grondstelling nie – maar as ’n teologiese metodologie; of anders gestel, as die 
voortdurende poging om ons teologiese taal te herlei na haar bron: die openbaring van God in 
Christus, terwyl Christus se vryheid om sy eie synswyse as ’n gegewe te definieer deurlopend 
ernstig opgeneem word. Promeïteit word vêrder as metode verskerp deur dit met verskeie 
ander interpretatiewe pogings wat sedert die 1960’s tot stand gekom het te vergelyk en te 
kontrasteer, om sodoende ’n benadering tot die God-wêreld probleem te ontwikkel wat 
eiesoortig aan Bonhoeffer se teologie beskou kon word. Die logika van promeïteit word 
hiervandaan verder ontwikkel deur die radikale stelling, naamlik, dat alle definisies 
ondergeskik aan die vleesgeworde God-mens behoort te wees, van nader te beskou. Verskeie 
verskynsels van hierdie oortuiging word in Bonhoeffer se Christologie-lesings asook sy Etiek 
manuskrip verken. Laastens, word die logika van promeïteit verder uitgebrei en toegevoeg 
deur addisionele bronne in Bonhoeffer se werk op die ontologiese, epistemologiese en etiese 
aspekte van die God-wêreld probleem in aanraking te bring. 
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. . .Destruction of all things on which 
that reflection fed, 
of vegetable and bird; 
erosion of all rocks 
from the holiest mountain 
to the least stone; 
evaporation of all seas, 
the extinction of heavenly bodies— 
until, at last, offense 
was not to be found 
in that silence without bound. 
 
Only then was I fit for human society. 
 
-Derek Mahon, “Matthew 5 v. 29-30” 
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Chapter 1 
God, World, and Christological Promeity 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis proposes to take the German theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s christological 
claim—that God’s self-disclosure in Christ immediately reveals the pro-me structure of 
Christ’s being—as the starting point for an inquiry into God’s relationship to the world. 
Promeity will thus be treated not only as a claim about Christ, but as a method for theological 
thought containing its own logical movement. Applied to the problem of God and world, the 
revelation of the Incarnate God-human as “the Real One”1 forms the basis not only for 
definitions of ‘God’ and ‘world,’ but for all concepts. As such, the intention is to define 
promeity as a method by following the sequence of Bonhoeffer’s own thought, but then to 
turn this same sequence towards other questions, specifically, the ontological, 
epistemological, and ethical aspects of the transcendent God’s immanence in reality. This 
thesis will explore various other attempts to make sense of God and world following after 
Bonhoeffer, but only for the sake of more carefully illuminating the trail set by the promeity 
of revelation. The ultimate aim of this thesis is to extend a Bonhoefferian logic beyond the 
specific concerns of Bonhoeffer’s own writing in order to consider the theological and 
philosophical implications of a commitment to christological promeity. 
  
 
1.2 The God-world problem 
In the early 21st century, metaphysics has been dead for so long that no one can now seem to 
recall where the body is buried. Philosophy is left with conjecture and rumours of rumours—
perhaps metaphysics is properly mouldering in a forgotten grave, perhaps it never died, 
perhaps it goes now by another name or—just perhaps—it has stepped out of its tomb. Any 
one of these possibilities and its variants has implications for a philosophical conception of 
God, divinity, or spirit as remote, above, in, behind, or simply never there in relation to the 
world. For philosophy, metaphysics was relatively easy to discard when it was conceived of 
as a self-evident ontotheology—as an abstract inquiry into the essence of being and God—
                                                            
1 DBWE 6, 263. 
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precisely because it has turned out to be less self-evident than previously supposed.2 The 
current ambiguous state of metaphysics is at least partly due, however, to the fact that the 
ramifications of its demise were not limited to philosophical theology. Anthropology also had 
to be rethought. The loss of metaphysics cost us the notion of “man as microcosm . . .  as the 
world in miniature,” man as a participant in “every stratum of being in the cosmos,” in 
Wolfhart Pannenberg’s words.3 Without metaphysics, anthropology finds a clear self-
conception also ambiguously absent, leaving room for something new. It is not yet clear 
whether this new conception should be desired or feared. With the reanimation of a half-dead 
metaphysics, philosophy may mitigate the worst of what is feared, but it cannot easily regain 
the confidence possessed by a pre-modern anthropology. 
 
Theology would be wise neither to dismiss these philosophical developments, nor allow itself 
to be utterly shaken by them. Instead, they should be received gratefully, as an immensely 
useful reminder to re-examine the integrity of theology’s own seemingly self-evident 
foundations. Of course, upon reflection, theology may find itself far too indebted to an 
ossified metaphysical hierarchy. This is problematic—not to the extent that it is 
unfashionable—but to the extent that it turns out to be unfaithful to the God whom theology 
serves. Theology inevitably finds itself making use of words carrying certain presuppositions 
about God, humanity, the world, and their relation. Where should these notions come from, in 
a theological account, and how should they interrelate?  
 
This essay sets out to examine the problem of God and world, which refers broadly to the 
attempt to develop a theologically faithful account of the Creator God’s relationship to 
creation. Put in one way, what we are seeking is an ontological account of the transcendent 
God’s immanence in reality which can fund an understanding of humanity’s own being in 
relation to God, one another, and the world. What we are asking about is divine alterity and 
divine familiarity, difference and analogy, distance and closeness, the insurmountable Kantian 
barrier between noumena and phenomena versus the Hegelian unfolding of the Absolute in 
history. Put another way, however, we are simply asking what it means to live faithfully as 
Christians worshipping God while living in the world, to allow our preaching and action to 
                                                            
2 For an excellent work on the nature and critique of ontotheology from a philosophical perspective useful to 
theology, see Merold Westphal, Overcoming Onto-Theology: Toward a Post-Modern Christian Faith (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2001). 
3 Wolfhart Pannenberg, What is Man? Contemporary Anthropology in Contemporary Perspective, trans. Duane 
A. Priebe (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1962), 2. 
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draw from an answer to the question, “Who is Christ actually for us today?”4 This thesis seeks 
a fundamental ontology which takes this question as seriously as possible.5 
 
 
1.3 Bonhoeffer’s contribution 
This question—who is Christ actually for us today?—famously belongs to Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer, whose theological contribution to the problem of God and world will be 
considered in this thesis. Bonhoeffer is somewhat uniquely positioned to contribute to this 
question, as individual strands of his thought can be woven into a wide variety of answers, as 
we shall see. 
  
No attempt will be made in this essay to examine or even elucidate the theology of Karl 
Barth, although, inevitably, he will emerge as a point of comparison and contrast. This essay 
will explicitly take for granted what Bonhoeffer’s theology implicitly takes for granted—an 
immediate theological landscape permanently altered by Barth’s theology of crisis and, more 
broadly, altered by what can be termed dialectical theology. Fuller and better-considered 
accounts of Bonhoeffer’s relation to Barth have already been written.6 Still, it is unavoidable 
that Barth—as the only thinker whose “every word” Bonhoeffer claimed to have read7—will 
be frequently mentioned insofar as the comparison highlights Bonhoeffer’s commitments, 
while nonetheless remaining unexamined. 
 
                                                            
4 DBWE 8, 362. 
5 There are various ways to understand what the descriptive ‘fundamental’ might entail for ontology. 
Bonhoeffer’s own approach to the nature of being bears some resemblance—as we shall see—to Heidegger’s 
question about the meaning of being in opposition to the traditional question of codifying being by interrogating 
that which is versus that which is not. (For more on this distinction, see Taylor Carman, Heidegger’s Analytic: 
Interpretation, Discourse, and Authenticity in Being and Time, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.) 
This Heideggerian approach, however, cannot be separated in Bonhoeffer’s thought from the revelation of God 
in Christ. Therefore, a fundamental ontology in a Bonhoefferian sense is an account of what divine and human 
being means in light of the revelation that Christ firstly is. 
6 The most thorough account of Bonhoeffer’s relationship to Barth is found in Andreas Pangritz, Karl Barth in 
the Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, trans. Barbara Rumscheidt and Martin Rumscheidt (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2000). Other scholars who consider the personal and theological relationship between Barth and 
Bonhoeffer in detail include John Godsey, The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (London: SCM Press, 1960) and 
Charles Marsh, Reclaiming Dietrich Bonhoeffer: The Promise of His Theology (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1994). 
7 Bonhoeffer’s claim to have read every word of Barth’s was made to his friend Wilhelm Rott. See Wilhelm 
Rott, “Something Always Occurred to Him,” in I Knew Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Reminiscences of his Friends, eds. 
Wolf-Dieter Zimmerman and Ronald G. Smith, trans. Kathe G. Smith (London: Collins, 1966), 133. Although 
unproven, it is interesting to note that, besides Barth, the only other candidate for such an honour—i.e. whose 
every word Bonhoeffer may have read—is most likely Friedrich Nietzsche. See Peter Frick, “Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s Aphorisms and Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Theology,” in Bonhoeffer’s Intellectual Formation: Theology 
and Philosophy in His Thought, ed. Peter Frick (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 176. 
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If Barth is arguably the greatest influence on Bonhoeffer, it is worth considering one of 
Bonhoeffer’s earliest silent protests against him. Barth’s Die christliche Dogmatik im Entwurf 
was published in 1927 as Bonhoeffer prepared for his doctoral examinations. While reading 
the third chapter on “Holy Scripture,” Bonhoeffer noted that Barth characterised “oral and 
written human communication” as “only an accident of the word of God.”8 Bonhoeffer could 
not restrain himself from immediately interjecting in his notes, “Does not make sense! The 
church exists only in this way.”9 
 
There—captured in an instinctive reaction—is the abiding tension between Bonhoeffer’s 
admiration for dialectical theology’s disruptive potential and his simultaneous desire to 
account for the praxis of Christian life in its messy particularity. A variety of questions are 
embedded in these twin impulses—each question caught up in both the very foundations of 
theology and the very ordinary reality of everyday Christians. How do we preserve the words 
our tradition speaks about God without giving them priority over God’s own speech? How 
can we act decisively as Christians without pre-empting God’s infinite freedom to act ahead 
of us in surprising ways? How does the hidden God enter our social and ethical existence 
truly and concretely or, inversely, how do we speak authoritatively about enculturated 
Christian existence without suddenly realising we have been praying to a golden calf all 
along? How can we point to God’s revelation objectively without turning God into mere 
object?  
 
As we shall see, Bonhoeffer does take up the problem of God and world in its philosophical 
and theological dimensions. Ultimately, however, his own approach to the question of the 
transcendent God’s immanence in reality is rooted in questions that are more like these 
practical considerations. Given the transcendent priority of God’s revelation in Christ, how do 
we nonetheless make sense of God’s immanence in Christian life, in the fellowship of the 
church, in preaching, in the assemblies of synods and ecumenical councils, in Christian action 
and witness? Later, in Act and Being, Bonhoeffer articulates his initial hesitation about 
Barth’s theology in terms of a confusion about “how the religious act of human beings and 
God’s action in faith are to be thought . . . without suspending either the subjectivity of God 
or the fact that human beings were encountered in their existence.”10 That God’s radical 
otherness should nonetheless be concretely understood as abiding in our midst, bringing its 
                                                            
8 DBWE 9, 437. 
9 Ibid.  
10 DBWE 2, 93. 
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transformative weight to bear on empirical existence—this serves as a basic agenda for a 
Bonhoefferian approach to the problem of God and world. In Bonhoeffer’s work, a variety of 
ideas orbit these central questions. Inevitably, however, each of these secondary ideas inhabits 
a perspective from one side of the divide between God’s eternal subjectivity and God’s freely-
given objectivity, and so each idea finds itself bound to a seeming antithesis: grace and law, 
act and being, freedom and responsibility, individual and community, kerygma and 
receptivity, resistance and formation, confession and confessio.  
 
 
1.4 Recent developments in Bonhoeffer interpretation 
Bonhoeffer’s final contribution to an understanding of transcendence and immanence is 
muddled for a variety of reasons—the breadth of his interests, his deep attentiveness to 
particular circumstances, and, of course, the sudden abbreviation of his untimely death. 
Furthermore, the best way to extend Bonhoeffer’s contribution remains muddled, in part 
because the theoretical background and underpinnings which gave rise to his insights remain 
disputed. Bonhoeffer’s theology is, depending on one’s perspective, fundamentally closest to 
Brunner11, or closest to Barth12 or to Bultmann13 or to a perfect middle between the two;14 he 
has been described as Hegelian15 and Heideggerian16 and “proto-postmodern.”17 All of these 
claims are, at least in some limited sense, true. Recent Bonhoeffer scholarship has shown an 
increasing interest since the 1990’s on the various theological and philosophical influences 
which contributed to Bonhoeffer’s intellectual formation. A man widely-read and perpetually 
curious, Bonhoeffer’s work bears the marks of seminal German thinkers—from Kant and 
Hegel to 19th century historiographers like Ernst Troeltsch and Wilhelm Dilthey—and even 
more disparate influences from Augustine of Hippo to Thomas à Kempis. Recent scholarship 
has only begun to unearth the full range of these influences on Bonhoeffer’s own 
                                                            
11 Robin W Lovin, Christian Faith and Public Choices: The Social Ethics of Barth, Brunner, and Bonhoeffer 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 133. 
12 Hans Pfeifer, “The Forms of Justification: On the Question of the Structure in Bonhoeffer’s Theology,” in A 
Bonhoeffer Legacy: Essays in Understanding, ed. A. J. Klassen (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981), 17. 
13 John A. T. Robinson, Honest to God (London: SCM Press, 1963), 25. 
14 André Dumas, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Theologian of Reality, trans. R.M. Brown (London: SCM Press, 1971), 
18.  
15 Marsh, Reclaiming Bonhoeffer, 80. 
16 This characterisation comes from Wilhelm Lütgert, who supervised Bonhoeffer’s habilitationsschrift.  In a 
1933 letter recommending Bonhoeffer for the pastorate, Lütgert commented in passing that—after writing his 
doctorate under the direction of Reinhold Seeberg—Bonhoeffer “developed his own independent thinking under 
Heidegger’s influence” (DBWE 12, 154). 
17 Wayne Floyd, “Encounter with an Other: Immanuel Kant and G.W.F. Hegel in the Theology of Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer,” in Bonhoeffer’s Intellectual Formation, 116. 
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development.18 Furthermore, however, attentiveness to Bonhoeffer’s intellectual formation 
has only highlighted the depth of Bonhoeffer’s engagement with the philosophical problems 
of his day, and so recent scholarship has also taken an interest in comparing and contrasting 
Bonhoeffer’s work with 20th century continental philosophers like Martin Heidegger, Theodor 
Adorno, and Emmanuel Levinas.19   
 
Broadly, this thesis fits into the larger trend of interest in Bonhoeffer’s intellectual formation 
and the dialogues—both internal and literal—he carried on with his various influences. There 
is great merit to placing Bonhoeffer in conversation with these thinkers, and Bonhoeffer’s 
theological and philosophical astuteness is easily overlooked in the portrait of him as a martyr 
and political hero. Even in the throes of the Kirchenkampf  he was attuned to the implications 
which battles fought in mud could effect in the theological stratosphere, and vice versa. This 
thesis shares an interest in the ideas made manifest in Bonhoeffer’s action, rather than the 
circumstances which gave rise to his ideas. While bearing in mind the forces which formed 
Bonhoeffer’s intellect, the greater emphasis here is on delineating the actual form 
Bonhoeffer’s intellect took. Thus, in a sense, none of these affinities with other thinkers will 
be able to fully capture Bonhoeffer’s contribution to any debate. In part, this is a credit to 
Bonhoeffer’s uniqueness as a thinker, but also a credit to his reluctance to be defined as 
merely a thinker. His inclination was always towards concretion rather than abstraction, away 
from mental exercises and towards the intersection of theology and lived existence. Franklin 
Littell’s early assessment of Bonhoeffer has only been reinforced by subsequent 
interpretations: “From the beginning he was stubbornly opposed to mere abstraction, to 
Christian principles, ideals, or proclamations separated from a community of witness, 
divorced from the concrete realities of the historical situation.”20 Bonhoeffer’s desire—
                                                            
18 Much of the scholarship on Bonhoeffer’s theological and philosophical influences has been gathered together 
in the aforementioned volume: Peter Frick, ed., Bonhoeffer’s Intellectual Formation: Theology and Philosophy 
in His Thought (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008).  
19 Recent volumes considering these intersections include: Brian Gregor and Jens Zimmerman, eds., Bonhoeffer 
and Continental Thought: Cruciform Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009); Adam C. Clark 
and Michael Mawson, eds., Ontology and Ethics: Bonhoeffer and Contemporary Scholarship (Eugene: 
Pickwick, 2013); Ralf K. Wüstenberg and Jens Zimmerman, eds., God Speaks to Us: Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s 
Biblical Hermeneutics (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2013); Jens Zimmerman and Brian Gregor, eds., Being Human, 
Becoming Human: Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Social Thought (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2010). Earlier individual 
essays on relevant philosophers include Robert R. Vosloo, “The Feeling of Time: Bonhoeffer on Temporality 
and the Fully Human Life,” Scriptura: International Journal of Bible, Religion, and Theology in Southern Africa 
99 (2008): 337-349; Elias Bongmba, “The Priority of the Other: Ethics in Africa, Perspectives from Bonhoeffer 
and Levinas,” in Bonhoeffer for a New Day: Theology in a Time of Transition, ed. John W. de Gruchy (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 190-208; Wayne W. Floyd, “Style and the Critique of Metaphysics: The Letter as 
Form in Bonhoeffer and Adorno,” in Theology and the Practice of Responsibility: Essays on Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer, eds. Wayne W. Floyd and Charles Marsh (Valley Forge: Trinity Press, 1994), 239-251. 
20 Franklin H. Littell, “The Question: Who is Christ for Us Today?” in The Place of Bonhoeffer: Problems and 
Possibilities in His Thought, ed. Martin E. Marty (New York: Association Press, 1962), 28. 
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expressed in his Ethics manuscript—for a theology that could supply “concrete speech to 
concrete human beings” could well serve as a manifesto writ small for his entire theological 
enterprise.21 As preface to this thesis, it is worth pausing for a moment to clarify what this 
bias towards concretion means and does not mean. 
 
 
1.5 Concretion and idealism 
Concretion and idealism emerge as contrasting terms across Bonhoeffer’s work, although he 
neither fully defines them nor explicitly places them at odds with one another. It is important 
to hazard some definition now, however, as he uses each in a significant and slightly 
unexpected way. In Bonhoeffer’s hands, these two labels emerge not as mere qualities of 
thought, nor as descriptions of philosophical schools, but as two entirely different habitus—
concretion being the form of consciousness interrupted by revelation, idealism the form of 
consciousness left to its own devices. 
 
We would misunderstand Bonhoeffer if we allowed concretion to merely signify some 
privilege accorded to the immediate experience of the human self. It should not be understood 
as an assumption that the appearance of the empirical world should be prior to our ethical or 
philosophical reflection. It is not a bias in favour of mere at-handedness, nor in favour of 
practice over theory, nor in favour of simplicity over complexity. Rather, concretion demands 
that every idea, no matter how theoretical, must become sufficiently sharp and precise that it 
can adequately address the reality of the world without subjecting it to some other 
burdensome delusion. Given the inescapable influence of Barth in Bonhoeffer’s theology, we 
should understand concretion forming at the point where existence becomes subject to 
revelation. In the words of Philip Ziegler, assessing Bonhoeffer’s conviction: “Christian 
theology attains to the concreteness demanded of it by acknowledging the prevenient 
dynamism of God’s self-giving in Christ.”22 Concretion in theology only gives primacy to our 
lived understanding of the world insofar as theology is for the sake of this world—the scalpel 
which wounds our understanding even as it heals this reality. As such, Bonhoeffer is not 
attempting to write a theology that sings a fully human song, but to write a theology that 
articulates not only the melody of God’s song, but the power of this melody to stir vibrations 
in lived existence. Concretion is the moment when revelation’s note induces a kind of 
                                                            
21 DBWE 6, 378. 
22 Philip Ziegler, “Christ For Us Today: Promeity in the Christologies of Bonhoeffer and Kierkegaard,” 
International Journal of Systematic Theology 15.1 (2013): 28-29. 
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harmonic resonance in the world, and thus reveals a more fully-human tune than we could 
have composed ourselves.  
 
Concretion become clearer when juxtaposed with another concern central in Bonhoeffer’s 
work. The menacing adversary to his theology is idealism, which ought to be understood as 
related but categorically broader than the 19th century German philosophy of the same name. 
Certainly, philosophical Idealism introduced to Bonhoeffer an argument that subordinated 
reality to the unfolding and self-producing consciousness. This characterisation is most 
accurately applied to Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, whose dictum “the self posits itself” served 
for Bonhoeffer as the origin and, in a sense, the nadir of Idealist philosophy.23 Bonhoeffer, 
however, repeatedly applies the ‘idealist’ label to Hegel and most post-Hegelian philosophy, 
which seems to gloss over the clear differences between Hegel and Fichte. Wayne Floyd has 
argued that this is a function of Bonhoeffer’s limited reading of Hegel in the years of his early 
dissertations, with Bonhoeffer’s appreciation of Hegel’s nuance growing with time and 
familiarity.24 This is likely true, and yet Bonhoeffer continued to classify Hegel as an idealist, 
even to the extent that he showed some modicum of respect for Hegelianism.25  
 
Rather than interpreting Bonhoeffer’s critique of idealism as narrowly aimed at German 
Idealism, and then disputing Bonhoeffer’s casual inclusion of Hegel in this school, the 
position taken here is that ‘idealism’ is a fairly expansive term in Bonhoeffer’s vocabulary, 
equally encompassing not only Fichte and Hegel, but nominalism, cultural romanticism, 
political historicism, and even Comtean positivism. Philosophically, then, Bonhoeffer’s usage 
seems ill-attuned to a number of important distinctions. But Bonhoeffer’s antagonism towards 
‘idealism’ is first theological. Idealism is not problematic because it is derived from some 
fallacious premise, but because it appears as the philosophical manifestation of Adam’s sin. 
Christiane Tietz echoes Bonhoeffer when she writes that “sin starts with the wish to gain an 
autonomous knowledge about God.”26 Before the Fall, “Adam has life in the unity of 
unbroken obedience to the Creator—has life just because Adam lives from the center of life, 
                                                            
23 DBWE 1, 42ff. For the original quote, see Johann G. Fichte, The Science of Knowledge, eds. and trans. Peter 
Heath and John Lachs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 97. 
24 Floyd, “Encounter with an Other,” 112. In Floyd’s understanding, it is Bonhoeffer’s very opposition to 
idealism which eventually takes on a Hegelian form, thus mimicking Hegel’s subversion of Fichte which 
Bonhoeffer never entirely appreciated. 
25 Consider, as example, Bonhoeffer’s assertion as late as 1944 that “the concept of history as a continuum” 
remains “idealistic” because it “comes basically from Hegel, who saw the whole course of history as culminating 
in ‘modernity,’ that is, in his own philosophical system” (DBWE 8, 321).  
26 Christiane Tietz, “The Mysteries of Knowledge, Sin, and Shame,” in Mysteries in the Theology of Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer: A Copenhagen Bonhoffer Symposium, eds. Kirsten B. Nielsen, Ulrik Nissen, and Christiane Tietz 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007), 28. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 9 
 
and is oriented toward the center of life, without placing Adam’s own life at the center.”27 
What the serpent offers, however, is  
 
somehow to know about the depths of the true God beyond this given word 
of God—about the true God who is so badly misrepresented in this human 
word. He claims to know more about God than the human being who 
depends on God’s word alone.28  
 
Here lies the origin of idealism, in Bonhoeffer’s usage. It covers any attempt to usurp God as 
the rightful “center of life” by making the human logos into its own locus of autonomous 
understanding. At core, it is simply a way of describing human thought before it has been 
confronted by revelation, and thus human thought when it continues on its own course, 
trapped within the boundaries of its self-generated representations. These representations may 
be understood as internal creations or external perceptions, but so long as they orbit the 
human centre, they are illusions symptomatic of the cor curvum in se. After taking the 
serpent’s bait, Bonhoeffer writes, “humankind stands in the middle . . . living from its own 
resources and no longer from the center.”29 The original limiting factor is the prohibition on 
eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, a restriction which is liberating and 
makes “even the threat of death” into “yet another gift of God.”30 Idealism is thought 
surpassing this prohibition and thus, in Hans Pfeifer’s reading of Bonhoeffer, “idealism was 
the prime example of thought in sin.”31 German Idealism is relevant as the paradigmatic case 
of this broader notion of idealism, but it is important to ground Bonhoeffer’s response to the  
19th-century philosophical school. Bonhoeffer disputes it not because it is first logically 
suspect, but because it is philosophy’s manifestation of the forbidden fruit. Standing east of 
Eden, Bonhoeffer sees in Fichte’s declaration—“That I exist for myself, is a fact”32—not a 
liberated self-confidence, but the absolute despair arising from humanity under sin.  
 
The specific temptations associated with idealism will appear frequently throughout this 
thesis, and it will benefit the reader to understand them not as references to philosophical 
axioms, but as the opposite of concretion, as the helpless confusion of existence apart from 
                                                            
27 DBWE 3, 84. 
28 Ibid., 106. 
29 Ibid., 115. 
30 Niels H. Gregersen, “The Mysteries of Christ and Creation: ‘Center’ and ‘Limit’ in Bonhoeffer’s Creation and 
Fall and Christology Lectures,” in Mysteries in the Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 148. 
31 Pfeifer, “Forms of Justification,” 22. 
32 Fichte, Science of Knowledge, 35. 
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revelation, as the fantastical result of humanity’s attempt to generate perception, meaning, and 
knowledge for itself. It is integral to Bonhoeffer’s theology that thought’s self-proclaimed 
mastery of truth must be confronted by the being of revelation. All attempts to extrapolate 
universals from within the domain of consciousness are doomed to fail, as “God is something 
entirely different from so-called eternal truth. The latter is still merely our own self-
conceived, desired understanding of eternity.”33 
 
 
1.6 The problem of continuity in Bonhoeffer’s work 
Admittedly, in speaking of ‘Bonhoeffer’s theology,’ we have already taken for granted that 
there is a system of thought easily captured by that label. Asking about the contribution of 
Bonhoeffer’s theology to the problem of God and world means first asking what this label 
denotes. What can be said of Bonhoeffer’s theology in sum, especially as it relates to 
immanence? Faced with the choice, is Bonhoeffer’s instinct to preserve God’s transcendent 
aseity, or to preserve the loving God’s immanent givenness to reality? Superficially, on the 
one hand, Bonhoeffer’s Barthian background seems to suggest the former. Equally 
superficially, on the other hand, Bonhoeffer’s prison-era correspondence—which first brought 
him to a larger audience—suggests the latter. 
  
 The prison letters leave us with a series of provocative phrases built around the hunch that 
“God is being increasingly pushed out of a world come of age.”34 The instinct of the church 
might be to “mov[e] against this self-confidence,”35 yet Bonhoeffer sees instead an 
opportunity to be yet more faithful to “the suffering God”36 in embracing the demise of the 
metaphysical God-as-concept—the “stopgap for our embarrassments”37—and instead finding 
God at humanity’s “center, not in weakness but in strength,”38 opening up the possibility of 
living as “‘religionless-worldly’ Christians.”39 These concepts—striking in their originality 
and freshness—are of course a significant part of what raises the issue of continuity in the 
first place. At first glance, they appear at odds with Bonhoeffer’s earlier, orthodox, deeply 
ecclesial formulations. It is tempting, then, to believe that—ever since the publication of the 
prison letters—“the crucial question became the degree of continuity in Bonhoeffer’s 
                                                            
33 DBWE 14, 168. 
34 DBWE 8, 450. 
35 Ibid., 425. 
36 Ibid., 479. 
37 Ibid., 500. 
38 Ibid., 366. 
39 Ibid., 365. 
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thought.”40 John Godsey speaks on behalf of many of Bonhoeffer’s readers when he writes: 
“The problem of Bonhoeffer’s theology lies in its development during the final period . . . Are 
the fragmentary insights of the third period continuous or discontinuous with the development 
of his theology up to that time?”41  
  
In terms of content—in the bare usage of words and the concerns which informed them—it is 
simultaneously difficult to point to any stark rupture in Bonhoeffer’s thought and yet also 
hard to avoid the impression that his agenda shifted over time, perhaps quite significantly. On 
the one hand, those formulations which supposedly erupt in the prison letters are present in 
Bonhoeffer’s writing from the earliest days. For instance, Bonhoeffer critiques “religion” as a 
category as early as his congregational lectures in Barcelona late in 1928,42 sympathising with 
the ordinary secular humans he meets “far from the masquerade of the ‘Christian world,’”43 
finding them “more under grace than under wrath” while “it is precisely the Christian world 
that stands more under wrath than under grace.”44 Words that serve very much as counterpart 
to the prison letters arise in his Barcelona lectures,  
 
We are twentieth-century people and, like it or not, must come to terms with 
that fact; indeed, even more, we should have so much love for this 
contemporary world of ours, for our fellow human beings, that we should 
declare our solidarity with it in its crisis as well as in its hope.45  
 
Suffice to say that, while these are small examples, there is very little in Bonhoeffer’s prison 
letters which is not foreshadowed somewhere in his earlier writings. The general trajectory of 
                                                            
40 Stephen R. Haynes, The Bonhoeffer Phenomenon: Portraits of a Protestant Saint (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
2004), 21. 
41 Godsey, Theology of Bonhoeffer, 260. The “third period” here refers to the common way of dividing 
Bonhoeffer’s intellectual life into three phases: the first incorporating his early studies and interest in 
philosophical theology, c. 1923-31; the second incorporating his involvement in the German church struggle as 
academic, pastor, and director at the Finkenwalde preachers’ seminary, c. 1932-1939; the third incorporating his 
decreased public writing, his increased involvement in the political struggle against Hitler’s regime, and his 
subsequent imprisonment, c. 1940-1945. This way of dividing Bonhoeffer’s life finds its origin in the structure 
of Eberhard Bethge’s authoritative biography. See Eberhard Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Theologian, Christian, 
Contemporary, 4th ed., trans. Eric Mosbacher, et al. (London: Collins, 1985).  
42 “To be religious means to recognize that one can never be religious; to have God means to realize that human 
beings can never have God” (DBWE 10, 336). 
43 DBWE 10, 126. 
44 Ibid., 127. 
45 Ibid., 325-6. 
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Bonhoeffer scholarship since the 1960’s has moved in this direction, affirming “that there is 
remarkable continuity in Bonhoeffer’s theology from beginning to end.”46 
 
On the other hand, one cannot avoid Bonhoeffer’s own estimation that his theology evolved 
through various phases during his lifetime. One self-acknowledged shift, for instance, occurs 
after his trip to Union Theological Seminary, his encounter with Jean Lasserre47 and the 
“great liberation” of his intense focus on the Sermon on the Mount beginning in 1931.48 The 
immediate practical effect of this shift was to turn Bonhoeffer away from academia, first 
towards the pastorate, then towards the dream of a “Protestant monastic community” which 
could ground a renewal of Christian witness in unsettled times.49 This new understanding of 
the theological task led directly to his involvement with the preachers’ seminary at 
Finkenwalde, his experiment with communal living and his fervent insistence on 
discipleship—interests which largely shaped his life and work between 1933 and 1939. Years 
later, while in prison—writing on July 21, 1944, the day after the failed attempt on Hitler’s 
life sealed his fate—Bonhoeffer reflected again on Lasserre and the Finkenwalde 
experiment.50 Looking backward through the lens of his participation in the conspiracy, 
Bonhoeffer seems to understand his early 1930’s shift also giving way to another, more recent 
movement towards “the profound this-worldliness of Christianity.”51 These phases are 
simultaneously continuous in Bonhoeffer’s mind as alternating experiments in “learn[ing] to 
have faith” and yet discontinuous in their methods: the 1930’s characterised by a quasi-
monastic reformation of the sanctorum communio’s inner life; the 1940’s by an effort extra 
muros at “living fully in the midst of life’s tasks.”52 Consequently, the Bonhoeffer of 1944 
says of his Finkenwalde-era devotional writing in Cost of Discipleship: “I clearly see the 
dangers of that book, though I still stand by it.”53 
 
                                                            
46 John W. De Gruchy, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Witness to Jesus Christ (London: Collins, 1988), 37. The movement 
in favour of Bonhoeffer’s continuity has largely been motivated by an increasing sense that individual themes 
can be read across his entire corpus. For examples of those interests which transcend a particular phase of his 
life, see Part Two of John W. de Gruchy, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Dietrich Bonhoeffer (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
47 For more on Bonhoeffer’s relationship to Jean Lasserre, see Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 112. As influential 
as Lasserre was during Bonhoeffer’s period at Union, the seeds of Bonhoeffer’s theological shift may have been 
equally planted during that same time by his friendship with Frank Fischer, which then exposed him to the life 
and worship of Harlem’s Abyssinian Baptist Church. See Reggie L. Williams, Bonhoeffer’s Black Jesus: Harlem 
Renaissance Theology and an Ethic of Resistance (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2014).  
48 DBWE 14, 134. 
49 DBWE 12, 172. 
50 DBWE 8, 485. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid., 486. 
53 Ibid. 
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The ambiguity of Bonhoeffer’s own prison-era reflection is precisely the interpreter’s puzzle. 
Asking whether Bonhoeffer’s thought is continuous or not only throws us further back to the 
question of what it means for any person’s thought to be continuous over time. What manner 
or degree of change would constitute discontinuity? Added to this is the inherently 
fragmentary and occasional nature of Bonhoeffer’s total corpus. Further complicating the 
issue is Bonhoeffer’s own manner of addressing the circumstances at hand with urgent 
attentiveness, and thus with a kind of guileless shrug at his own previous writings. There is a 
grain of truth in the comments of one early German commentator when he says that,  
 
The attempt to systematize Bonhoeffer’s thought and then to work out its 
application is doomed from the start to failure, for his ideas were impulsive 
reactions to a peculiar set of circumstances. They are so impetuous and so 
conditioned by the situation in which Bonhoeffer found himself that one 
could almost speak of them as prophetic oracles.54  
 
An even further complication, which only reinforces Bonhoeffer’s prophetic tenor, is a 
stylistic tendency in his theological writing towards immensely creative, coiled, counter-
intuitive proclamations—each sentence a compelling epigram inside of which an entire 
argument could unfold, each paragraph bursting forward into a new line of thought like a 
chain of explosions, each clause at once easy to quote and easy to misconstrue, difficult to 
contextualise even when the context is at hand. One can see in his writing the habit of a 
man—as his friend Gerhard Jacobi described him—with “the most divergent thoughts.”55 
After Bonhoeffer’s death, Jacobi remembered the provocative, almost experimental way 
Bonhoeffer “would express opinions that were both interesting and odd, then abandon them 
when it could be proved from biblical passages that the New Testament as a whole followed a 
different line of thought on this particular question.”56 The map of Bonhoeffer’s mental 
topography is not improved by his tendency to leap from one peak to the next. One 
sympathises with André Dumas’ lament:  
 
Bonhoeffer observes certain partial truths in reality, each of which he 
discusses in depth. And when he has done so, he virtually forgets them in 
his concern for what comes next. When he re-reads what he wrote earlier, 
                                                            
54 From a 1961 lecture by Eckhard Minthe, as quoted in David H. Hopper, A Dissent on Bonhoeffer 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1975), 26. 
55 Gerhard Jacobi, “Drawn Towards Suffering,” in I Knew Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 71. 
56 Ibid., 72. 
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his words sometimes seem to him to be truths with dangerous consequences, 
without however ceasing to have been, and in a real sense to remain, 
necessary truths.57   
 
Perhaps, then, we have no choice but to agree with Barth’s later assessment: “very softly I 
venture to doubt whether theological systematics . . . was [Bonhoeffer’s] real strength.”58 Or, 
perhaps it is the fragmentary nature of Bonhoeffer’s thought which is his greatest 
consistency—the borderless mosaic of his ideas a counter-idealist subversion of systematic 
theology’s totalising pretensions.59 Either way, there is no end to the creative possibilities for 
unifying Bonhoeffer’s theology thematically. “Everyone works the vein that enriches his own 
understanding of his issues;”60 every interpreter will find herself trying to a draw a preferred 
line-of-best-fit through the plot of Bonhoeffer’s scattered interests.  
 
With respect to the problem of God and world, however, this hasty intellectual sketch is used 
to measure the two bases which anyone trying to join the unfinished arch of Bonhoeffer’s 
thought will have to build from. There is the Barthian impulse towards the freedom and 
priority of God’s revelation in Christ. There is equally the expectation that the most whole-
hearted Christian commitment to the world is a mere shadow of Christ’s prior, deeper, 
perhaps even logically and ontologically necessary givenness to the world. Bonhoeffer’s own 
approach to the problem of God and world is better understood by Dumas’ helpful 
formulation: “What kind of relationship is possible between a theology of the Word and a 
theology of ontological presence?”61  
 
 
1.7 The methodology and argument of this study 
While acknowledging that continuity represents a serious and important question for 
Bonhoeffer scholarship, it is nonetheless a question I will treat with a certain “benign neglect” 
in this present thesis.62 The question of which theme best reveals the dialectical movement in 
                                                            
57 Dumas, Theologian of Reality, 138. 
58 Barth expressed this sentiment in a 1967 letter to Eberhard Bethge after reading Bethge’s biography of 
Bonhoeffer. See Karl Barth, Letters, 1961-1968, eds. Jürgen Fangmeier and Hinrich Stoevesandt, trans. Geoffrey 
W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981), 252. 
59 Floyd, “Encounter with an Other,” 111. 
60 Dumas, Theologian of Reality, 15. 
61 Ibid., 168. 
62 This phrase originally belongs to Richard Rorty as a way of describing the attitude towards prior theories 
necessary for generating new answers to old questions. It was brought to my attention, however, by Charles 
Marsh as his description of Barth’s opinion of the way theology should treats its philosophical counterparts. See 
Marsh, Reclaiming Bonhoeffer, 52. 
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Bonhoeffer’s thought or which phase of his theological development ought to be considered 
his true and sacrosanct position will suffer the same neglect. Although there may well be 
broader hermeneutical implications for this thesis’ treatment of Bonhoeffer, it is not primarily 
intended to be an argument in favour of a particular best way of reading his work. 
Furthermore, there will be very little consideration of Bonhoeffer’s biography. Instead, the 
intention is to examine the heuristic patterns of his thought, the recurring ways of framing and 
resolving questions which Bonhoeffer applies to a variety of theological arguments. In this 
sense, the goal is to step slightly back from Bonhoeffer’s circumstances, not ignoring his 
context, but not being overly concerned with reconciling disparate usages of particular words 
or particular content in his theology.  
 
Instead, I will attempt to examine the theological method he uses to arrive at particular 
insights, focusing especially on the methods used to address the specific issues surrounding 
God’s immanence in reality. In this way, I hope to take seriously the continuity of Bonhoeffer 
the man, whatever continuity may be lacking in his vocabulary over time. This thesis is thus 
an attempt to truly think alongside Bonhoeffer, to put on his theological habitus, and thus to 
consider what it would look like to imitate his manner of thinking with respect to the ongoing 
questions of God’s relationship to reality. As a result, it is not Bonhoeffer’s specific answers 
to the dilemmas of transcendence and immanence which are of greatest interest here—
answers I believe remain, at any rate, incomplete at the time of his death—rather, the focus 
will be on the presumptions and inductive patterns he used to approach these questions. The 
hope is not to distort Bonhoeffer’s theology, but to appropriate something of use for the 
present, though hopefully in a way he would approve. It may indeed turn out “that our 
apparent going beyond Bonhoeffer is simply catching up with him.”63 
 
Chief among the patterns of thought we will examine—as the title of this thesis suggests—is 
promeity. Immediately, this claim should seem slightly odd. The use of ‘promeity’ here is not 
primarily referring to a christological belief or doctrine, which might be most obviously the 
sense in which Bonhoeffer intends it in the 1933 Christology lectures. Instead, this thesis will 
try to understand the implications of promeity as the description of a method, as the repeated 
attempt to let our own language be dashed to pieces by the revelation of God in Christ while 
taking seriously Christ’s freedom to define for us the givenness of his own being to reality. 
                                                            
63 John W. de Gruchy, “With Bonhoeffer, Beyond Bonhoeffer: Transmitting Bonhoeffer’s Legacy,” in Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer’s Theology Today: A Way between Fundamentalism and Secularism?, eds. John W. de Gruchy, 
Stephen Plant, and Christiane Tietz (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2009), 404. 
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This thesis aims to develop this method and inquire as to the implications of applying it to the 
problem of God and world.64 
  
Furthermore, in the Bonhoefferian spirit of concretion, this thesis will attempt to develop 
Bonhoeffer’s insights with greater clarity and precision using resources from within his own 
thought. To set the agenda, precision immediately requires us to recognise that the problem of 
God’s relationship to the world takes on three aspects. First, it takes on an ontological aspect: 
How should God’s own being be understood in relation to the being of the created world? 
Second, it takes on an epistemological aspect: If God bears some relation to the world, how 
can we know where and in what way God is disclosed, and what does this say about the 
possibilities and problems of all knowledge? Finally, the problem of God and world takes on 
an ethical aspect: How can we—facing very particular decisions—act according to the 
intention of this invisible God? Precision further requires acknowledging that these questions 
have implications for one another and yet are sufficiently distinct that certainty in one area 
does not necessarily guarantee certainty in the others. Bonhoeffer ruminated independently on 
all of these questions in some form and at some length. As we shall see, others have 
endeavoured to expand on these ruminations. This thesis is certainly not the first to take up a 
Bonhoefferian approach to the relation between God and world. But our central agenda here is 
to consider this variety of interpretations with the intention of refining what has been said and 
projecting forward into fresh possibilities for even further refinement. 
 
Bearing this agenda in mind, this thesis will proceed as follows. Promeity will be described as 
a method entailing four stages. Chapter 2 will offer a preliminary definition of promeity by 
briefly considering the first three stages of the method. First, promeity requires beginning all 
over again with the priority of Christ, manifest in the present encounter with the Incarnate 
God-human. This encounter necessarily entails the next two steps: second, that Christ 
addresses us as transcendent ‘who’-ness, and therefore as free person, exterior to the 
epistemological ego. Third, that precisely in addressing us, this personal ‘who’-ness is 
present, revealing himself as ontologically given to be pro-me, and therefore as abiding 
presence. In this sense, steps two and three will turn out not to be sequential stages at all, but 
an inseparable pair of facts which ground all further reflection.   
 
                                                            
64 Where necessary, I have tried to distinguish my usage of ‘promeity’ from Bonhoeffer’s usage of ‘promeity’ by 
referring to ‘promeity as method’ as the centre of this thesis’ inquiry. 
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Chapter 3 will consider three different strategies which have been taken up by Bonhoeffer’s 
interpreters to extend a Bonhoefferian account of God’s relationship to the world. All three, in 
their own way, acknowledge the precedence of promeity and make their own attempt to 
reconcile the first three steps of our method. The first strategy, which will be called the 
immanentist strategy, encapsulates the efforts of some of Bonhoeffer’s earliest interpreters. 
The second strategy, which will be developed only briefly, will be called the dialectical 
strategy, hinted at in the early days of Bonhoeffer reception as a preliminary response to the 
immanentist strategy. The third strategy represents the most thorough response to the 
immanentist strategy, and will be developed at great length, as it seems to offer the most 
promising Bonhoefferian resolution to the problem of God and world. This third strategy will 
be referred to as the social-anthropological strategy.  
 
Ultimately, however, each of the three strategies explored in Chapter 3 will be unable to fully 
accommodate promeity as method, as each, in their own way, fail to take seriously the 
preliminary stages described in Chapter 2. This will provoke a return to the logic of promeity 
in Chapter 4, looking at the ways in which Bonhoeffer radically extends the method with a 
fourth step: redefining all theological and philosophical definitions in the a priori unity of the 
present, personal Christ-Reality. A closer reading of the 1933 Christology lectures and Ethics 
will explore the seriousness with which Bonhoeffer understands, in Charles Marsh’s words, 
revelation as “its own donor, its own knowing, and its own being.”65 
 
As conclusion, Chapter 5 will consider three additional patterns in Bonhoeffer’s thought, 
distinct from the pattern of promeity. These three additional patterns will be brought to bear in 
a probing attempt to refine answers to the ontological, epistemological, and ethical aspects of 
the God world problem mentioned above. First, we will consider the Lutheran/Heideggerian 
pattern in Bonhoeffer’s thought of using the language of justification to define human 
existence ‘in-reference-to’. Second, we will consider the pattern of Bonhoeffer’s reflections 
on eternity and futurity as a means of concretely resolving the epistemological aspect of the 
God-world problem. Third, we will consider the pattern of Bonhoeffer’s mimetic 
understanding of ethical existence.  
   
Bonhoeffer presents a paradox. It would be difficult to imagine someone whose work is more 
contextually rooted and simultaneously out of sync with the Geist of his own era. This 
paradox makes Bonhoeffer seem unusually attentive to the concerns of his day and yet 
                                                            
65 Marsh, Reclaiming Bonhoeffer, 8. 
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startlingly modern. It presses those who read him to consider our own moment, and yet to do 
so from the same vantage provided by the radical conviction that Christ is at work in the 
present. The best service to reality is not to repeat Bonhoeffer, but to apply the movement of 
his thought to understand our world truly, to speak to it precisely, and to love it sacrificially 
exactly as we find ourselves at all points preceded in these efforts by Christ. 
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Chapter 2 
Marking Promeity’s Initial Steps 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will offer a brief preliminary definition of promeity by considering the first three 
steps of the encounter with revelation, as Bonhoeffer understands it. These first three steps 
contain a kind of logical sequence, and yet should be understood as one instantaneous and 
unified response to the Incarnation. In that respect, they are not truly stages at all, but an 
undifferentiated actus directus originating in the ‘who’ of revelation as the ground of all 
thought. Thus, while considered reflectively as a sequence, promeity is perhaps more 
accurately understood as an encounter with revelation bearing three immediate implications: 
that revelation can begin with nothing other than the Incarnation, that revelation must be 
acknowledged as person, and that, simultaneously, revelation must be acknowledged as 
abiding presence. A full understanding of promeity as an intellectual method—in the way this 
thesis understands it—will not be possible until we consider in Chapter 4 the application of 
promeity’s consequences beyond Christology. The first three implications of promeity 
presented in this chapter, however, are sufficient for a basic understanding of how promeity 
arises in Bonhoeffer’s Christology and how it begins to form the shape of a method. This will 
permit us, in Chapter 3, to compare and contrast promeity’s commitments with various other 
interpretative strategies for understanding a Bonhoefferian approach to the problem of God 
and world. 
 
 
2.2 Beginning again with revelation 
The pattern of thought which provides a prolegomenon to Bonhoeffer’s theology is his deeply 
Protestant willingness to repeatedly return ad fontes, to “continually begin again at the 
beginning in every point,” in Barth’s words.1 It is a trait that overlaps with both the dialectical 
and the liberal qualities of his theology. It makes him open to the sudden emergence of a 
                                                            
1 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics I/2, The Doctrine of the Word of God, eds. Geoffrey W. Bromiley and Thomas 
F. Torrance, trans. George T. Thomson and Harold Knight (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1980), 868. 
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radical antithesis, to see in the ‘not-God’ which follows after ‘God’ less a reversal than a fresh 
possibility. Yet it also gives him a liberal wariness of dialectics as an end unto itself, alert to 
the danger that dialectics becomes mere rhetorical play rather than a teleological excavation 
of the ground for all knowledge. Bonhoeffer owes enough to Barth that, for him as well, 
returning to the beginning means starting with God’s self-revelation, which necessarily means 
starting again with Christ. Yet, it’s also a measure of Bonhoeffer’s independence that—as we 
will see more clearly in Chapter 5—he refuses to allow even Barth, who so clearly articulated 
for Bonhoeffer the priority of revelation in his commentary on Romans, to categorically 
define the nature and scope of revelation.  
 
Moreover, Bonhoeffer’s willingness to start over again with Christ means refusing even to 
allow his own prior theology to set the agenda. Instead, only Christ himself can be expected to 
define the content and form of revelation. One finds the young Bonhoeffer placing the priority 
of God’s revelation in Christ before his congregation, asking “whether in our own day Christ 
still stands in the place where decisions are made concerning the most profound matters we 
are facing,” chastising himself and the church for not properly attending to Christ, instead 
allowing that “Christ, instead of being the center of our lives, has become a thing of the 
church, or of the religiosity of a group of people.”2 Yet, fifteen years later, among the last few 
surviving letters from prison, one finds the older Bonhoeffer revisiting the priority of Christ 
all over again:  
 
I think everything depends on the words ‘in Him.’ Everything we may with 
some good reason expect or beg of God is to be found in Jesus Christ. What 
we imagine a God could and should do—the God of Jesus Christ has 
nothing to do with all that. We must immerse ourselves again and again, for 
a long time and quite calmly, in Jesus’s life, his sayings, actions, suffering, 
and dying in order to recognize what God promises and fulfils.3 
 
The unusual, unrelenting christocentricity of Bonhoeffer’s theology has been noticed and 
remarked upon since the earliest days of his reception. Christology has been described as “the 
center of his concern and the terminus a quo of his thinking,”4 as the “cantus firmus”5 of his 
                                                            
2 DBWE 10, 342. 
3 DBWE 8, 515. 
4 Godsey, Theology of Bonhoeffer, 17. 
5 Christiane Tietz, “Bonhoeffer on the Ontological Structure of the Church,” in Ontology and Ethics, 32. 
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theology, as “the golden thread which ties his works from first to last.”6 Different 
interpreters—trying to make sense of the shifting foci of Bonhoeffer’s interests—have argued 
that Christology arises as a concern only in the middle period of his theology, following on 
his early theses in ecclesiology,7 or that Christology cedes ground to anthropology in his later 
thought.8 Others, while acknowledging the centrality of Christology in Bonhoeffer’s theology, 
argue that Bonhoeffer’s own understanding of the doctrine changes over time, perhaps in such 
a way to make his later views inherently incompatible with his earlier views.9 Nonetheless, 
virtually all paths in Bonhoeffer’s theology eventually wind their way back to an implicit 
doctrine of Christ. Every rough or polished facet of his theology is lit christologically, no 
matter how refracted or dispersed the colours appear in the final image. The first step to take 
in following Bonhoeffer’s theological method, then, is to begin again with Christ.  
 
Any attempt to understand the contribution of “the most uncompromising christological 
theologian” to the question of God’s relationship to the world really begins as a question 
about his understanding of the Incarnation.10 If one of the abiding questions of Bonhoeffer’s 
theology is whether he “turns out to be a Hegelian by default,”11 then that resemblance begins 
here. For Bonhoeffer, as for Hegel, it will be the Incarnation that provides the basis for any 
discussion of the interplay between divine and human, of God’s immanence in history. It is 
for this reason that Ernst Feil, for instance, writes that “Bonhoeffer’s understanding of the 
world can only be legitimately apprehended within the framework of his Christology.”12 
 
 
2.3 The Incarnation as concretissimum 
What does it mean, then, to start over again with the Incarnate God-human? The answer is not 
immediately self-evident. And, indeed, it ought not to be self-evident if we take seriously 
Bonhoeffer’s claim that starting with Christ means starting with a “who” rather than a 
“how.”13 The Christology lectures famously begin with this distinction. The ‘how’ questions 
are symptomatic of the voracious human consciousness consuming all that is other to it, 
                                                            
6 James W. Woelfel, Bonhoeffer’s Theology: Classical and Revolutionary (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1970), 
134. 
7 John W. de Gruchy, “Editor’s Introduction to the English Edition,” in DBWE 3, 10. 
8 Hopper, Dissent, 145. 
9 John A. Phillips, Christ for Us in the Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 28. 
10 Eberhard Bethge, “The Challenge of Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Life and Theology,” in World Come of Age, ed. 
Ronald G. Smith (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967), 75. 
11 Marsh, Reclaiming Bonhoeffer, 80. 
12 Ernst Feil, The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, trans. Martin Rumscheidt (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1985), xxi. 
13 DBWE 12, 303. 
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turning revelation into an object and thereby into something that can be “defined, recognized, 
and understood by means of its possibilities, by means of its ‘how,’ by the immanent logos of 
human beings.”14 Revelation is the “counter Logos,” negatively delimiting the bounds of the 
human logos while positively meeting the inquiring human self from the outside, as a 
transcendent “who,” as “Being.”15 It is in this positive sense that Christology finds its 
grounds—“only after the self-revelation of the other to whom one puts the question has 
already taken place.”16 To assume, then, that beginning with Christ leads self-evidently to a 
particular starting point is to already have in mind a method for discerning ‘how’ Christ is 
incarnate. But the ‘who’ question resists assimilation into the “human logos.”17 Indeed, the 
‘who’ question cannot even be asked at all until “the self-revelation of the other to whom one 
puts the question has already taken place.”18 In the words of Russel Botman: “Christology is 
about the person, it is known to us by revelation as a personal-ethical and not as an 
epistemological concept.”19 Insofar as it can be described as a method, promeity thus begins 
as the anti-method, the manner of attempting to free the ‘who’ of revelation from any prior 
method at all. 
 
What can be said—attempting to clarify what it means to start with Christ—is that, for 
Bonhoeffer, the force of the Incarnation lies in its having happened in Jesus of Nazareth. 
“Everything,” he says in the Christology lectures, “depends on Jesus’s existence in history.”20 
This fact precedes all reflection, even the reflection of Christian theology. “It is wrong to 
derive the God’s becoming human from an idea,” even from a seeming fundament of 
Christian theology “such as the idea of the Trinity.”21 This specificity means that the actual 
content—not merely the form—of God becoming human is Bonhoeffer’s starting point. The 
Incarnation, for Bonhoeffer, does not establish in theory a particular notion of divine 
immanence, such that God becomes human “out of necessity” as “the realization of some 
human principle.”22 One cannot extract from it a dogmatic statement locating God in respect 
to creation, history, society, or the individual. The Incarnation is the bodily existence of 
Christ, the God-human, who establishes the definition not only of ‘incarnate’ as the 
description of one person, but of ‘divine’ and ‘human’ as the description of two natures. All 
                                                            
14 DBWE 12, 302. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 303. 
17 Ibid., 302. 
18 Ibid., 303. 
19 H. Russel Botman, “Discipleship as Transformation? Towards a Theology of Transformation” (PhD diss., 
University of the Western Cape, 1993), 83. 
20 DBWE 12, 336. 
21 Ibid., 355. 
22 Ibid., 338. 
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other starting points are caught up in the boundless pretensions of the epistemological subject, 
the all-knowing, all-consuming I which is the epitome of the cor curvum in se.23  Counter to 
this danger, the “once-ness” of God’s appearing in history “is always anew a challenge” to 
idealism, preventing Christology from being subsumed into a “system of ideas.”24 
Bonhoeffer’s attentiveness to the concretissimum of the Incarnation also explains why—for 
such a major feature of his theology—he rarely engages in the actual dogmatic work of 
Christology in the vein of creedal or doctrinal debates. Across his works, in place of extended 
reflection on the categories of traditional Christology, one finds instead a great deal of 
reflection on Christ. This is fully appropriate to his anti-method. Even orthodox 
Christology—as a hermeneutical mode of reflecting on the ‘how’ of the Incarnation even for 
the sake of the ‘who’—perpetually risks over-reach, attempting to sneak “behind” the 
Incarnation to concepts it assumes to be more fundamental.25 Even doctors of the church, it 
seems, must find themselves confronted over and over again by the ‘who’ of revelation. 
 
To start with Christ means to start with the ‘once-ness’ of the historical Christ. And yet, for 
Bonhoeffer, it is significant that this ‘once-ness’ is both historical and yet not temporally 
limited. To start with the ‘who’ of revelation is not to start with a past historical figure, but to 
be confronted from outside oneself by a present person, by the “counter Logos”26 which “rises 
up to meet its murderers and rushes at them again, appearing as the Resurrected One.”27 In 
this sense, ‘once-ness’ is an expression of logical priority rather than historical completion. 
This is Bonhoeffer’s starkest contrast with his own liberal heritage, that beginning with Christ 
does not forever place theology in the position of trailing after the historical Christ, refining 
again and again its understanding of a particular Galilean’s bodily life. The Incarnation 
happened once, and yet the history of this one event does not end with the Crucifixion or even 
the Ascension—we live today alongside the “ongoing presence of the synoptic Jesus 
Christ.”28 Hence, Bonhoeffer returns constantly to the language of Christus praesens. The 
church-community is most frequently—but not uniquely—designated as the location of 
Christ’s presence today, not as “ideal but rather reality.”29 Bonhoeffer insists in Sanctorum 
Communio: “The church is the presence of Christ in the same way that Christ is the presence 
                                                            
23 DBWE 10, 399. 
24 Ibid., 457. 
25 DBWE 12, 313. 
26 Ibid., 302. 
27 Ibid., 305. 
28 DBWE 4, 206. 
29 DBWE 11, 328.  
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of God.”30 This is not an affirmation in virtue of any quality of the empirical church, 
Bonhoeffer clarifies in Act and Being, but only because “God reveals the divine self in the 
church as person.”31 Later, in the early days of the church struggle, Bonhoeffer asks and 
answers a pressing question: “By which authority does the church speak? Because the church 
is Christus praesens.”32 Lecturing to his students at Finkenwalde on the kingdom of God, he 
tells them that since the Ascension, “now [Christ] is the Almighty and All-Present One who 
invites us into his kingdom.”33 Bonhoeffer’s limited affirmation of Hegelianism to Theodor 
Litt in 1939 is focused on this point, that it represents the “greatest secularization precisely of 
this Christian truth,” namely, “the doctrine of Christ’s real presence.”34 In section 3.5.1 we 
will revisit the variety of language Bonhoeffer uses in connection to the presence of Christ 
and attempt to clarify it with respect to ecclesiology. For now, however, the significant matter 
is to simply note the persistence of Bonhoeffer’s assumption that the counter Logos is both 
entirely synonymous with the Christ of history and nonetheless present between Ascension 
and parousia.  
 
Even this assumption, however, does not precede the Incarnation. The language of Christus 
praesens is valuable in the context of a preliminary definition of promeity, not because it 
provides background to Bonhoeffer’s christological method, but because it is one of the most 
direct and frequent manifestations of Christ’s ontological promeity as Bonhoeffer understands 
it in the 1933 Christology lectures. Christus praesens is the most obvious implication of 
having been addressed by the ‘who’ of revelation in our present existence: “It is the Christ of 
history, the whole Christ, whom we ask and who answers.”35 But to understand how promeity 
grounds even the language of Christus praesens, we must turn to Bonhoeffer’s most explicit 
writings on dogmatic Christology. 
 
 
2.4 Promeity as the disclosure of Christ’s being  
 “As the Crucified and Risen One,” Bonhoeffer says in the 1933 Christology lectures, “Jesus 
is at the same time the Christ who is present now.”36 This statement, so significant in its 
application to the rest of Bonhoeffer’s theology, is presented in the 1933 lectures as but one 
                                                            
30 DBWE 1, 140-1. 
31 DBWE 2, 112. 
32 DBWE 11, 370. 
33 DBWE 14, 634. 
34 DBWE 15, 112. 
35 DBWE 12, 310. 
36 Ibid. 
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implication of an even deeper commitment. Intrinsic to revelation itself—to the very act of 
God’s self-giving to humanity in the Incarnation—is the assurance that Christ is pro nobis, 
the one for us. To truly start with Christ—to truly permit the Incarnation the freedom of its 
own self-definition—means seeing here more than an expression of God’s good will. Christ is 
for me—pro me—a statement which in other hands might be mere sentimentality. For 
Bonhoeffer, however, it is “fundamentally ontological,” something which “properly 
characterizes Christ’s very person.”37  
 
That Christ’s promeity should function as an ontological category is not immediately 
intuitive—it would be natural to presume that existence precedes action—but it is the 
necessary implication of locating the definition of Christ’s ontology in the priority of 
revelation, i.e. the Incarnation. It is in this sense that Bonhoeffer will speak of Christ’s “pro-
me structure.”38 Promeity has become not merely a description of Christ’s being, but the 
foundational substance of Christ’s being from which all other qualities will arise. “The 
presence of Christ as the pro-me,” Bonhoeffer writes, “is his real being-for-me.”39 To speak 
of Christ is immediately to speak of Christ pro-me. As such, promeity is a measure not only 
of Christ’s intention to be for us, but of his givenness to us. Because of his ontological 
promeity, Bonhoeffer says, “I can never think of Jesus Christ in his being-in-himself, but only 
in his relatedness to me.”40 Promeity takes seriously that Christ’s very nature is to be 
vicariously representative of humanity, “he takes their place and stands in their stead before 
God.”41 For this to be truly definitive of Christ’s being, it cannot function as a merely 
soteriological description, but as a real description of Christ’s intrinsic relatedness to the 
existence of “new humanity.”42 
 
As an argument untimely born, the assumptions resulting from promeity appear in the early 
dissertations, even though Bonhoeffer does not speak explicitly about promeity until the 1933 
lectures. Indeed, it is because Bonhoeffer intuits Christ’s pro-me structure that it even makes 
sense to ask—as his habilitation thesis does—about “the problem of act and being within the 
concept of revelation.”43 Bonhoeffer writes in Act and Being: 
 
                                                            
37 Ziegler, “Christ For Us Today,” 29. 
38 DBWE 12, 315. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., 314. 
41 Ibid., 315. 
42 Ibid. 
43 DBWE 2, 79. 
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In revelation it is not so much a question of the freedom of God—eternally 
remaining within the divine self, aseity—on the other side of revelation, as 
it is of God’s coming out of God’s own self in revelation . . . It is a question 
of the freedom of God, which finds its strongest evidence precisely in that 
God freely chose to be bound to historical human beings and to be placed at 
the disposal of human beings. God is free not from human beings but for 
them. . . God is present, that is, not in eternal nonobjectivity but—to put it 
quite provisionally for now—‘haveable’, graspable in the Word within the 
church.44 
 
From the perspective of revelation, ontological promeity is precisely what holds out the 
possibility of God’s being “‘haveable’, graspable” rather than residing behind the neo-Kantian 
barrier in “eternal nonobjectivity.”45 It is thus promeity which makes it possible to hope for a 
reconciling “synthesis” between God’s revelation in act and God’s revelation in being.46 As 
much as the radical actualism of Barth’s early work influenced Bonhoeffer’s christocentrism 
and his interest in Christ’s unfettered action in history, it is at the same time the continuity of 
Christ the “historical figure” and Christ “the Risen One”47 guaranteed by promeity which 
makes Bonhoeffer uneasy with Barth’s “supratemporal”48 relation of eternity to history. 
Permitting the Incarnate God-human to define Christ’s being means acknowledging the 
ontological promeity of Christ, and promeity means allowing Christ to determine the nature of 
his own givenness to history, guaranteeing that “the Christ who is present today is the 
historical Christ.”49 
 
There is far more to say about the implications of promeity in Bonhoeffer’s Christology, 
which we will revisit at greater length in Chapter 4. The relevant point for the moment, 
however, is that a preliminary definition of promeity as a method means taking seriously the 
priority of Christ’s presence. This presence retains freedom, including the freedom to define 
his own being. Promeity thus acknowledges that Christ’s self-definition describes an 
ontological givenness to the world. This givenness is ontological not only in the sense that it 
describes Christ’s very being, but in the sense that it entails some measure of connection 
                                                            
44 DBWE 2, 90-1. 
45 Ibid., 91. 
46 Ibid., 120. 
47 DBWE 12, 331. 
48 DBWE 2, 84. 
49 DBWE 12, 328. 
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between Christ—whose “nature” it is “to be in the center”—and reality.50 Furthermore, it 
suggests that this immanence—as a description of Christ’s own being—has risen from mere 
contingency into necessity. 
 
 
2.5 Language of immanence in Bonhoeffer’s theology 
This latter emphasis—Christ as the centre of reality—is most often associated with 
Bonhoeffer’s later theology. Certainly, the givenness of Christ to reality is a theme which 
recurs often in Bonhoeffer’s writing during the 1940’s. “I’d like to speak of God not at the 
boundaries but in the center,” he writes from prison, “not in weakness but in strength, thus not 
in death and guilt but in human life and human goodness. . . God’s ‘beyond’ is not what is 
beyond our cognition! . . . God is the beyond in the midst of our lives.”51 In Robert Vosloo’s 
words, “Bonhoeffer has no interest in supporting the edifice of theism that separates vague 
and abstract notions of God’s attributes from Christological embodiment.”52 As Bonhoeffer 
wrestles with the full extent to which beyond-ness has entered our midst, he goes so far as to 
suggest a level of epistemological access to Christ through the empirical world, that God 
could be “grasped by us not in unsolved questions but in those that have been solved.”53 This, 
he suggests, “is true of the relation between God and scientific knowledge, but it is also true 
of the universal human questions about death, suffering, and guilt.”54  
 
At its depths, promeity suggests that Christ is so fully given to reality that to follow Christ 
means that “we must really live in that godless world and not try to cover up or transfigure its 
godlessness somehow with religion.”55 Reality does not require Christ to strike from the 
outside. He is ontologically committed to it, and so its eschatological end is a movement back 
to itself, an acknowledgement that, “The spirit and goal of Christ’s dominion is not to 
Christianize the worldly order or turn it into a church but to liberate it for genuine 
worldliness.”56  
 
This kind of language, however, does not emerge ex nihilo in Bonhoeffer’s later work. The 
seriousness with which Bonhoeffer explores the implications of Christ’s promeity in the 
                                                            
50 DBWE 12, 324. 
51 DBWE 8, 366-7. 
52 Robert Vosloo, “Bonhoeffer, Transcendence, and the ‘Turn to Religion’,” in Culture and Transcendence: A 
Typology of Transcendence, eds. Wessel Stoker and W. L. van der Merwe (Leuven: Peeters, 2012), 52. 
53 DBWE 8, 406. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid., 480. 
56 DBWE 16, 549. 
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prison letters is equally matched by his early lectures, even prior to 1933. In his early vocation 
as a lecturer, Bonhoeffer’s students record him elaborating on revelation’s inherent 
worldliness. It is precisely because of Christ’s promeity that “the gospel and the 
commandment must engage the concrete contemporary situation. Otherwise it would not be 
the word of Christ praesens.”57 Earlier, Bonhoeffer affirms that “the proclamation [of 
revelation] must be a ‘present’ one,”58 and this commitment manifests to his students as an 
admonition that those who preach must understand “the fact that the proclamation of the 
commandment becomes concrete through the deepest realization of reality.”59 Thus, kerygma 
“must include the respective situation within the form of the commandment, so that the 
commandment is relevant to the real situation.”60 Revelation which is not present to reality 
cannot find its origin in the Christ who is pro me.  
 
The superficial difference between these early and later formulations of Christ’s givenness to 
reality is the primacy of ecclesiology in Bonhoeffer’s early work, with the church as “the 
center of the world.”61 Yet, with respect to the broader problem of God and world, this 
difference is not as significant as it might seem. Even when Bonhoeffer appears to possess the 
highest degree of confidence that “Christ is present in his church today,” he nonetheless 
wrestles with the relationship of this affirmation to the plain and broken existence of the 
empirical church.62 “[The] worldliness of the church,” he immediately admits, “is real, not 
only illusion.”63 Just as Bonhoeffer’s later theology struggles to more precisely locate Christ 
ontologically with respect to the world, so his early theology attempts the same task with 
respect to the church. In this respect, they are parallel manifestations of the same basic 
question. As an example, the language of Kirche and Gemeinde serves this struggle in 
Sanctorum Communio, with Bonhoeffer qualifying that it is only the “Kirche in which the 
word is preached and the sacraments celebrated” which God has made “to be God’s own 
Gemeinde” and, properly speaking, it is the Gemeinde rather than the Kirche which “is the 
body of Christ, Christ’s presence in the world.”64 Asserting that the church is Christ’s 
presence in the world does not spare us from further reflection on the extent of Christ’s 
givenness to reality as we perceive it. 
 
                                                            
57 DBWE 11, 370, emphasis in original. 
58 DBWE 2, 110. 
59 DBWE 11, 371. 
60 Ibid., 360. 
61 Ibid., 281. 
62 Ibid., 328. 
63 Ibid. 
64 DBWE 1, 280. 
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The point here is twofold. First, Bonhoeffer’s early theology shares with his late theology an 
ongoing struggle to speak of Christ’s presence objectively in the world. Whether the struggle 
is locating Christus praesens in relation to the empirical church or to the empirical world 
makes little difference ontologically. Both the empirical church and the empirical world find 
themselves—to borrow Lessing’s phrase—on the same side of the ‘ugly broad ditch’ 
separating historical contingency from the thing-in-itself. Christ’s presence to the Kirche 
requires no less accommodation of immanence than his presence to all of reality. 
 
The second point is that, even for Bonhoeffer’s early theology, the implication of Christ’s 
pro-me structure presses revelation into a necessary rather than contingent relationship to 
reality. Thus, from another angle, church and world once again find themselves in the same 
camp, but this time as equal recipients of Christ’s intention to be present to them, unified in 
God’s “embrac[ing] the whole reality of the world in this narrow space [of the church] and 
reveal[ing] its ultimate foundations.”65 So Bonhoeffer in 1932 can exclaim in his lecture 
series on “The Nature of the Church” that “God penetrates the entire everyday reality and 
must be felt in everything!”66 just as Bonhoeffer in his Ethics manuscript can assert that, “In 
Jesus Christ, the Real One, all reality is taken on and summed up; Christ is its origin, essence, 
and goal.”67 Bonhoeffer in 1932 can urge the church to a “renunciation of purity, a return to 
solidarity with the sinful world!”68 while Bonhoeffer in 1940 can advise that “what is 
Christian cannot be had otherwise than in what is worldly, the ‘supernatural’ only in the 
natural, the holy only in the profane, the revelational only in the rational.”69 The nature of 
Bonhoeffer’s ecclesiology will be revisited at greater length in Chapters 3 and 4. Suffice to 
say that, as far as a Bonhoefferian approach to God and world is concerned, the empirical 
Kirche is not sufficiently distinct from the rest of reality that it can easily provide a location 
for Christus praesens without quickly raising wider implications.  
 
As a preliminary definition, then, promeity as a strategy for speaking about God and world 
requires beginning all over again with a foundation which appears at first to be a twofold 
conviction: 1) that God is transcendently free not only in self-disclosure, but in defining the 
very terms and meaning of what self-disclosure entails and 2) that God’s revelation in the 
Incarnation of Christ discloses an abiding immanence that binds God necessarily rather than 
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contingently to reality, not subordinating God to a pre-existing necessity, but simply 
acknowledging that God has disclosed God’s being in no other way. Furthermore, however, 
promeity requires seeing these two statements not as paradoxical facts, indeed, not even as 
separate facts at all, but as one face of God’s revelation in Christ—the presence who is person 
and the person who is present. To the extent that these statements might be regarded as 
contradictory, promeity requires a re-evaluation of the very terms we might be inclined to see 
in opposition to one another, a point which will be further elaborated in Chapter 4. 
 
This brief preliminary sketch of promeity leaves us with numerous unanswered questions and 
a portrait of God’s relationship to the world which is far too vague to be of any real benefit. It 
does not nearly do justice to the full complexity of Bonhoeffer’s writings, yet it does sketch 
the basic shape of the problem. Such is Bonhoeffer’s elusiveness that the wider landscape of 
his thought is captured in a mural no less impressionistic than this miniature. We are left, 
confusingly, with a God who is independently free enough to reveal God’s self as 
ontologically bound. We are left, ambiguously, with a reality granted some necessary but still 
imprecise relationship to the divine. What guideposts does Bonhoeffer’s legacy leave us for 
thinking about the relationship of the transcendent God to reality? How can we also answer 
“the question as to how revelation becomes concrete?”70   
   
                                                            
70 Joachim von Soosten, “Editor’s Afterword to the German Edition,” in DBWE 1, 302. 
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Chapter 3 
Strategies for a Bonhoefferian Approach to 
the God-World Problem 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Most of Bonhoeffer’s interpreters have recognised to some degree the significance of 
christological promeity in Bonhoeffer’s work, or at least acknowledged that the christocentric 
impulses explicitly expressed in promeity are manifest in his thinking at every stage. In 
attempting to extend this christological insight into a more fundamental conception of God’s 
being in relation to the world, the history of Bonhoeffer’s reception is understood in two 
phases. The first wave of Bonhoeffer’s interpreters in the English-speaking world—from the 
1960’s through the early 1980’s—found themselves provoked by the formulations of the 
prison letters, their subsequent interpretations weighted by the need to articulate Christ’s 
immanence in “a world come of age.” The second wave, beginning in the 1980’s, turned its 
attention more fully upon the scope of Bonhoeffer’s works, drawing especially from his early 
theses to establish a more comprehensive interpretive framework.  
 
Classifying Bonhoeffer’s interpreters so simply does not capture the full nuance and variety 
of their work. The purpose for this thesis, however, is to consider the way these two broad 
movements can fund various strategies for extending a Bonhoefferian understanding of 
transcendence and immanence. Three strategies will be discussed in this chapter. The 
immanentist strategy and the dialectical strategy will be considered as contrasting 
possibilities arising from the first wave of interpretation. The social-anthropological strategy 
arises as a possibility arising from the second wave of interpretation. All three will be 
explored, with the bulk of the chapter considering the strong potential of the social-
anthropological strategy at great length, incorporating a close reading of the early 
dissertations to refine a set of Bonhoefferian concerns with respect to transcendence and 
immanence. 
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None of these three strategies is dominated by a single thinker. The purpose of considering 
them as strategies is to draw from the best instincts of a number of different interpreters to 
consider the overall shape of a fundamental ontology that might draw from related works. In 
this respect, the intention is not to reject these thinkers, indeed, the intention is not even to 
articulate the full range of their interests. Nor is the intention, per se, to prove or disprove the 
merits of the strategies drawn from their work. Instead, the focus remains on developing 
promeity as method, contrasted against the slightly diverging interests of each strategy. It is 
important to note, then, that the very central standard for evaluation in this chapter is not 
whether each strategy is right or wrong—either with respect to theology or with respect to 
interpreting Bonhoeffer—but to consider how each stands with or against the sketch of 
promeity offered in Chapter 2. Considering the lines of questioning—however slender—left 
unaddressed by each strategy, or their contradictions—however subtle—with respect to the 
commitments of Christ pro-me will serve to set the angle at which promeity diverges. This 
trajectory informs the path down which promeity leads the God-world problem, a path further 
advanced in Chapters 4 and 5 in the spirit of greater concretion. 
  
 
3.2 The immanentist strategy 
3.2.1 Bonhoeffer and the death of God 
The English-speaking theological world of the 1960’s quickly embraced promeity’s 
implications for God’s givenness to reality, recognising that Bonhoeffer had described the 
necessary union between “the two-fold reality of God and of the world, which is given to us 
in the unity of Christ.”1 What Bonhoeffer truly offered, in this reading, was a “theology of 
secular culture,” a theology in which the union of Christ and reality was total, a theology 
which immersed the transcendent claims of traditional Christian belief fully into the world’s 
secularity.2 So total was the collapse of Christus praesens into the empirical world that any 
notion of God a se vanished entirely at the distant horizon. This appropriation of Bonhoeffer 
by so-called ‘death-of-God’ theology—most famously in John Robinson’s seminal Honest to 
God3—has been called a “creative misuse”4 and a “distortion”5 of Bonhoeffer’s legacy.  
 
                                                            
1 Ronald G. Smith, “Introduction,” in World Come of Age, 20. 
2 William Hamilton, “‘The Letters are a particular Thorn,’” in World Come of Age, 159. 
3 Robinson, Honest to God. 
4 de Gruchy, Witness to Jesus Christ, 36. 
5 Paul L Lehmann, “Faith and Worldliness in Bonhoeffer’s Thought,” Union Seminary Quarterly Review 23.1 
(1967): 32. 
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Robinson’s appropriation of Bonhoeffer, while roundly criticised, did capture the post-
religious and post-metaphysical sensibility of the prison letters. By summoning Bonhoeffer as 
a tacit endorser of his project, however, Robinson excluded two important elements of 
Bonhoeffer’s thought. The first is that Bonhoeffer, even in the prison letters, was never fully 
post-mythological nor post-supernatural in Robinson’s sense,6 as evidenced by Bonhoeffer’s 
prison-era critique of Bultmannn’s de-mythologising project as going “not far enough.”7 To 
take an empirical experience of the world as a priori—and, presumptively, to therefore be 
most ‘honest’ about the world—is not actually to benefit the world. For Bonhoeffer, what is 
beyond is still necessary precisely because “what is beyond this world is meant, in the gospel, 
to be there for this world.”8 This leads to the second, broader point that Robinson’s 
appropriation glosses over: Bonhoeffer’s understanding of empiricism as functionally idealist, 
as not merely an honest assessment of ‘what is’, but as an ideologically-bounded projection of 
the self-centred human ego. For Bonhoeffer, we are most faithful to the world when our 
understanding is transcended, when we do not merely start with what seems most obvious to 
us. It is in this sense in which Bultmann has not gone far enough, in not fully admitting that 
the critical faculties we use against mythology generate their own internal mythos which must 
be transcended. We are faithful to the world when we see it not as it is, but as it ought to be 
and therefore as it will be in light of revelation. 
 
While it is true that Robinson and his cohort were guilty of an excessively narrow reading of 
the prison letters, it should be acknowledged that even later interpreters—remaining open to 
the complexity of Bonhoeffer’s thought—nonetheless believed that promeity implied a 
fundamental correlation between empirical existence and the content of revelation. This first 
strategy for extending Bonhoeffer’s understanding of God and world is what will be referred 
to as the immanentist strategy. The immanentist strategy is distinct from the death-of-God 
interpretation in its attempt to be more strictly faithful to Bonhoeffer. The two bear a relation 
in emphasising Bonhoeffer’s late post-metaphysical inclinations, but the immanentist readings 
more accurately retain some of the counter-idealist concerns which Robinson tended to 
ignore. In the immanentist reading, Christ’s ontological promeity is a declaration of the 
essential divinity located in empirical reality, even while averring that divinity may not be 
fully exhausted in empirical reality. Further reflection on the nature of Christus praesens must 
begin with the assumption that Christ pro-me has already revealed the underlying unity of his 
                                                            
6 For more on this emphasis in Robinson’s thought, see Robinson, Honest to God, 29-35. 
7 DBWE 8, 372. 
8 Ibid., 373, emphasis in original. 
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being with the being of empirical existence. Christ, in this reading, is the skeletal support 
beneath the world’s flesh and blood. Broadly, this is a strategy associated with some of the 
later theologians who could still be considered among the first generation of Bonhoeffer’s 
interpreters. 
 
3.2.2 Dumas, Rasmussen, and the epistemological dilemma 
André Dumas is exemplary of this view in all respects, both as representative of its potential 
and as a model for a thorough and reasoned engagement with Bonhoeffer’s major themes. To 
be sure, few interpreters have more carefully drawn readers’ attention to Bonhoeffer’s 
recurring usage of the word Gestalt and its variants. Keenly aware of the primacy of the 
Incarnation, Dumas understands Bonhoeffer’s Christology as “the fulfilment of the ‘great 
promise’ to which Barth refers . . . that God and reality are united in Jesus Christ through the 
incarnation.”9 Reading Bonhoeffer with the structuralism of Claude Levi-Strauss in mind,10 
Dumas understands “structuring (Gestaltung)” to be the “formal principle” of this union.11 
Thus, the logic of ontological promeity locates Christ as “the center and the responsible 
structure of reality . . . neither beyond the world nor in the depths of being, but at the center of 
the empirical world.”12 The Incarnation as Christ’s ontological self-definition becomes an 
ontological definition of all reality—this is merely “the application of the Chalcedonian 
formula about the person of Christ to reality.”13 Thus, God’s givenness to reality in 
christological promeity is such that as soon as one speaks of the world, one is speaking of “a 
world already inhabited by the incarnate Christ.”14 Therefore, “Bonhoeffer’s central theme—
Christ present—thus stands for the presence of God in reality and the presence of reality to 
God.”15 One follows after the logic of promeity by sharing in Bonhoeffer’s “one concern: to 
hold onto the world around him, since God is found in the concrete.”16 
 
In the formal principle of divine immanence, Dumas sees Hegel as the philosophical Virgil to 
Bonhoeffer’s theological Dante. This is not to confuse Bonhoeffer with Hegel, but to 
recognise that Bonhoeffer’s antipathy to Kantian transcendentalism necessarily leads him 
                                                            
9 Dumas, Theologian of Reality, 83. 
10 Ibid., 221. 
11 Ibid., 31. 
12 Ibid., 30-31. There is the potential for confusion in this sentence. Dumas’s structural account of promeity does 
locate Christ in the “depths of being” ontologically-speaking. His reference here is that Christ will not be located 
in the “depths of being” existentially-speaking, echoing Bonhoeffer’s prison-era critique of “psychotherapy or 
existential philosophy” which limits Christianity to private inwardness. “God,” Bonhoeffer insists, “should not 
be smuggled in somewhere, in the very last, secret place that is left” (DBWE 8, 457).  
13 Dumas, Theologian of Reality, 16. 
14 Ibid., 17. 
15 Ibid., 215. 
16 Ibid., 16. 
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down the epistemological path after Hegel.17 This, for Dumas, is the fundamental contrast 
between Bonhoeffer and Barth. Barth “started from the transcendentalism of Kant and 
Kierkegaard” while Bonhoeffer’s “ontology of the everyday world” which he “drew from 
Hegel” served “as the formal model for his Christology, ecclesiology, and ethics.”18 It is thus 
difficult to reconcile Barth and Bonhoeffer, in Dumas’ reading, because Bonhoeffer’s main 
target is precisely “the metaphysical dualism . . . the temptation to divide existence into two 
worlds” which underlies “a theology stressing act.”19 
 
Starting with the Incarnation means asserting the structural unity of Christ and reality. This 
resolves the ontological aspect of the God-world divide, in Dumas’ mind. But with regard to 
the epistemological aspect, it also immediately throws us on to Hegel’s branch of 
epistemology’s family tree. Thus, for Dumas, “the difficult task of finding ways to recognize 
God’s presence in the midst of the world” is not fully resolved, yet a strategy which follows 
after Bonhoeffer will take a Hegelian trajectory.20 Dumas reads Ethics as a cycle of various 
attempts to resolve this “difficult task,” to recognise divinity in “the doctrine of the four 
mandates, the structures of the responsible life, and the relationship between the ultimate and 
the penultimate.”21 A mandate, for example, “is a structure in the ‘middle’ of earthly reality 
that summons the human will and shows it right here and now what the creator demands of 
his creatures.”22 Christ as the structure of empirical reality gives us hope that there are places 
in which the divine is permanently accessible, “in the structure of freedom,” for instance, in 
which God “can be truly seen.”23  
 
At this degree of immanence which begins to take epistemic form in the world, Dumas seems 
ambivalent about Bonhoeffer’s legacy. As much as he praises Bonhoeffer as a fresh 
theological voice, he remains wary of “a Lutheran emphasis in Bonhoeffer (similar to that 
found in Hegel) that troubles us here, in which the incarnation is in danger of ceasing to be 
the word of revelation to reality and of being transformed into the ongoing structure of 
reality.”24 There is good reason, in Dumas’ view, to appropriate Bonhoeffer’s structural 
immanentism as a counterweight to Barth’s transcendental actualism. But even as he presses 
                                                            
17 Dumas, Theologian of Reality, 31. The depth of Bonhoeffer’s opposition to Kant—which Dumas assumes—
does not stand up well to close scrutiny, as will be evidenced by the work of Wayne Floyd. See section 3.4.5, 
below. 
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid., 112. 
20 Ibid., 156. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 149. 
23 Ibid., 148. 
24 Dumas, Theologian of Reality, 234-5. 
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Bonhoeffer into a structuralist mould, Dumas clearly recognises the inherent problem of using 
structuralist language. It can quickly lead to a death-of-God-type collapse of Christ into 
reality which Dumas wants to resist. In this sense, Dumas should be understood as advocating 
an interpretation of Bonhoeffer which he finds useful and yet with which he is not prepared to 
fully agree.  
 
Dumas’ caution gestures toward the inherent problem with the immanentist strategy. Locating 
Christ’s being as a static quiddity undergirding the existence of empirical reality is an 
appealing way to resolve the ontological aspect of the God-world dilemma. But it 
immediately becomes difficult to place limits on the implication that Christ is 
epistemologically available via the empirical world. How can we extricate the post-
metaphysical insight from the empiricist’s web?  
 
One tempting possibility is to shift the grounds of the question from epistemology to ethics. In 
ethical terms, establishing “some human path to God”25 is not immediately troubling for some 
of Bonhoeffer’s interpreters. Indeed, it may be the firstfruits of promeity. Larry Rasmussen 
serves as an example of someone who embraces this implication. “Because the coherence of 
God’s reality and the world’s reality in Christ is ontological,” he writes, “the form of Christ in 
the world, the real, is ultimately open to apprehension and acknowledgement by every 
man.”26 This givenness can ground a Bonhoefferian contextual ethic—“contextual because 
the manifestations of Christ’s form in the world are always revealed and apprehended within 
the context of the concrete, ever-changing dynamic of the historical process.”27 In this 
reading, Bonhoeffer’s contribution to the God-world debate is to make the reality of Christ 
fully haveable even if not yet fully “realized.”28 The realisation of this unity is equally as 
possible through attentiveness to empirical reality as through attentiveness to revelation, 
opening the way for the non-Christian as well as the Christian to imitate God. Each is able to 
locate divine existence through their respective methodologies because these methodologies 
are essentially “identical because of Bonhoeffer’s identification of the world-in-Christ with 
reality.”29 Thus, even the ethical tack of the immanentist strategy cannot avoid positivist 
epistemological commitments. The epistemological distance between the human subject and 
the hidden God is resolved on the side of empirical reality, not intending to be at the expense 
                                                            
25 DBWE 10, 354. 
26 Larry L. Rasmussen, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Reality and Resistance (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1976), 23. 
27 Ibid., 24. 
28 Ibid., 23. 
29 Ibid. 
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of God but precisely in faithfulness to the God whose being is fully aligned with the world’s 
being. Christ in his promeity has so fully given himself over to reality that “the ontological-
cosmological reality of the world is already endowed with a universal Christological 
character.”30  
 
3.2.3 A response to the immanentist strategy 
There is a great deal of merit to the immanentist approach, especially insofar as it insists that 
the Incarnation reveals the essential unity of the real. The union of God and world in the space 
of reality can no longer permit us to divide what is real against itself. It will not permit a 
“metaphysical dualism” which limits our understanding of Christ to a mere “grasping” which 
thereby “minimize[s] the being of presence.”31 In this respect, the immanentist strategy 
foreshadows some of the concerns which will be taken up in a fuller definition of promeity in 
Chapter 4. 
  
However, in another respect, the immanentist strategy has already run afoul of promeity as we 
have defined it thus far. The immanentist strategy agrees that the Incarnation is the starting 
point for thinking about God and world. Moreover, it reminds us that the Incarnation should 
be free to define the scope and nature of its own givenness to reality. But with respect to 
ontological promeity in Bonhoeffer’s understanding, the immanentist strategy forgets that the 
Incarnation is precisely that which contemporaneously confronts us in the ‘who’ of revelation, 
in the appearance of the counter Logos. Indeed, it is impossible to draw any conclusions about 
the Incarnation—impossible even to ask the question “Who are you?”—until after the force of 
the Incarnation’s self-disclosure has sprung upon “horrified, dethroned human reason.”32   
 
The immanentist strategy—quite unintentionally, in some cases; perhaps even attempting to 
be faithful to the ‘who’ of revelation—quickly graduates from ‘who’-ness to ‘that’-ness, from 
person to principle. By speaking about “christocratic structure”33 as the quiescent pillars 
supporting empirical reality, the immanentist strategy betrays itself. When it speaks of 
incarnation, it means a notion conceptually derived from something other than the Incarnate 
God-human. This is the sense in which Dumas’s anxiety about losing “the word of revelation 
to reality” is appropriate—not because structural language might violate some notion of 
Christian orthodoxy, but because it claims to start with revelation as transcendent act, then 
                                                            
30 Rasmussen, Reality and Resistance, 23. 
31 Dumas, Theologian of Reality, 113. 
32 DBWE 12, 302. 
33 Rasmussen, Reality and Resistance, 16. 
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immediately loses the possibility of a revealer acting unexpectedly and thus freely, 
transcendently. This is the limit of Dumas’ interpretation of Bonhoeffer: that as much as he 
sees Bonhoeffer as a critic of transcendentalism, he cannot retain the sense in which 
transcendentalism perpetually intrigues Bonhoeffer—as a barrier resistant to the assimilating 
impulses of the epistemological subject. The human subject who takes the empirical world as 
‘path from man to God’ lacks a confrontation with anything outside of her epistemological 
purview, and therefore with anything outside of herself at all.  
 
The irony of the immanentist strategy is that, precisely in trying to be faithful to the 
concretissimum of empirical reality, it loses the particular for the abstract. This is a critique 
which Bonhoeffer himself makes in his 1935 lecture, “Contemporization of the New 
Testament.”  It is not the one perpetually beginning again with Christus praesens who risks 
losing track of real life, but rather the one who begins with a particular reading of empirical 
reality. The contextualist wants to attend to the present, but actually subjects reality to a 
universalising hermeneutic, a set of “eternal standards” to which only the “interpreters 
themselves have access a priori.”34 It is the one who begins with the facticity of empirical 
reality who begins not with “history,” “the accidental,” or the “individual,” but with the 
“eternal,” the “necessary,” and “universal meaning.”35 This “eternal element” is a symptom of 
the epistemological subject run rampant.36  Instead, the interpreter truly faithful to reality 
must move “seemingly away from the present in order to move away from the false present to 
the authentic present.”37 This authentic present is found where we attend to the reality of 
presence, to “the presupposition that the present can be found only where Christ and the Holy 
Spirit speak.”38  
 
The logic of this argument is entirely applicable to the immanentist strategy. The one who—
wanting to affirm the autonomous value of empirical existence—speaks of the congruence 
between the being of Christ and the being of the world ultimately loses reality to the 
abstraction of a universal principle. The immanentist looks behind the particularity of the 
abiding Incarnation to a prior norm, and thus misses the actuality of the present.  
 
                                                            
34 DBWE 14, 420. 
35 Ibid., 419. 
36 Ibid., 420. 
37 DBWE 12, 418. 
38 DBWE 14, 419. 
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Whether this critique would truly bother those who pursue this strategy is beside the point. 
For the purposes of refining a definition of promeity as method, however, the immanentist 
strategy usefully reminds us that beginning with the Incarnation means taking seriously the 
person of revelation as fully given over to presence pro-me. At the same time, however, the 
immanentist strategy forgets that this presence pro-me remains person. Promeity as method 
means beginning over again with the revelation of God in Christ. Being confronted anew by 
the ‘who’ of the Incarnation necessarily allows for the possibility of this ‘who’ confronting us 
again and again.  
 
 
3.3 The dialectical strategy 
The second strategy gleaned from Bonhoeffer’s insights about God and world will be referred 
to as the dialectical strategy. This possibility can only be treated briefly, as it has only ever 
been hinted at, but never fully developed.  
 
Against the early appropriation of Bonhoeffer by death-of-God theologies, some of the 
theologians who knew him personally—Eberhard Bethge, Paul Lehmann, Helmut 
Gollwitzer—suggested that a dialectical approach to Bonhoeffer’s theology would bear more 
fruit. The immediate context for this claim was the concern that death-of-God theologians had 
condensed Bonhoeffer’s theological contribution to a few of the most provocative assertions 
from the prison letters. These phrases had been then “expropriate[ed] . . . for purposes alien to 
the intimate connection between Bonhoeffer’s own faith and spirit as a Christian and his 
theological concerns.”39 In this way, Bonhoeffer had been treated as “the apostle of Christian 
atheism.”40 A dialectical approach offered to reclaim not only the full breadth of his work, but 
also the more ecumenical faith with which he lived. Doing so exposed Bonhoeffer’s work to 
the possibility of self-contradiction, but also more accurately rendered the character of the 
man as these theologians knew him. Bethge, for instance, cautioned against reading the 
phases of Bonhoeffer’s development such that “a later one neatly replaces an earlier one.”41 
Better to let these disparate thoughts remain suspended in tension than to force an artificial 
synthesis upon them. “To accept the witness of one period and to stay with it,” Bethge writes, 
“might become the means to escape from the challenge and make the living Christ a mere 
object of our religious desires.”42 
                                                            
39 Lehmann, “Faith and Worldliness,” 32. 
40 Ibid., 33. 
41 Bethge, “The Challenge of Bonhoeffer,” 24. 
42 Ibid. 
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The language of dialectic at first suggested a hermeneutic for interpreting Bonhoeffer’s work 
as a whole. Over time, however, it was applied not only to the form but also to the content of 
his theology. Dialectic could be used to describe “the relation between faith and worldliness 
in Bonhoeffer’s thought” as well as “the relation between God and the world come of age, 
between Christology and religionless Christianity, between church and humanity, theology 
and ethics, forgiveness and love, hiddenness and openness in the life of discipleship.”43 
Bonhoeffer’s Christology could itself be understood dialectically, moving between a 
traditional notion of transcendence and Christ’s “being and revelatory presence to the 
world.”44 This is true, in the words of James Woelfel, not only as a final summation of 
Bonhoeffer’s theology, but at all points, such that “both poles in Bonhoeffer’s christological 
dialectic remain in fruitful relationship and tension throughout all his writings.”45  
 
While acknowledging that there might be merit to reading the whole movement of 
Bonhoeffer’s work dialectically, the more relevant question for the moment is how this might 
be understood as a strategy for addressing the problem of God and world. What might it mean 
to think of God’s revelation in act in dialectical tension with God’s revelation in being? What 
might it mean for reality itself to result from the dialectical movement of God to world and 
back? 
  
Two possibilities emerge. The first essentially returns Bonhoeffer’s thought captive to the 
Hegelian stable. This is the possibility hinted at, for instance, by Hanfried Müller while 
interpreting Bonhoeffer’s understanding of reality’s indebtedness to the “visibility and 
tangibility” of the transcendent God’s “historical power.”46  Müller believes that, in 
Bonhoeffer’s work, this definition of reality’s dependence on the free actualism of Christ “is 
very carefully broken through dialectically and is finally dissolved by reality itself, with its 
demand for realism and relevance.”47  This first possibility, then, is really just a Hegelian kind 
of immanentism, with the movement between God a se and the world inexorably resolving 
itself in history, inescapably conditioned by the priority of reason, however much this 
synthesis might represent “a higher level of subjective fulfillment.”48 
                                                            
43 Lehmann, “Faith and Worldliness,” 36. 
44 Woelfel, Classical and Revolutionary, 281. 
45 Ibid., 282. 
46 Hanfried Müller, “The Problem of the Reception and Interpretation of Dietrich Bonhoeffer,” in World Come of 
Age, 192. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Floyd, “Encounter with an Other,” 99. 
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The second possibility is to leave God and world as two realities held together in a permanent 
suspension without resolution. This possibility instinctively gestures at the desire to preserve 
the sociality of God and world in their true otherness to one another. In this kind of reading,  
 
Bonhoeffer’s wrestling with Kant’s Ding an sich, and the constant threat of 
the Hegelian dialectic to close off all interplay between self and anything 
genuinely ‘other,’ needs to be heard as a sort of proto-postmodern plea for a 
philosophy and theology of radical hospitality.49 
 
This notion, derived from a human-to-human ethic, can be applied even to the God-world 
dilemma to the extent that Bonhoeffer is understood as intending to preserve the autonomous 
integrity of Creator and created. Reality in this case would emerge as the very dialogical 
“betweenness”50 resulting from the interplay of divinity and the empirical world. Interpreted 
in this way, Bonhoeffer’s understanding of this taut interstice would call to mind Rowan 
Williams’ formulation: “the exchanges of conversation and negotiation are the essence of 
what is going on.”51 Perhaps Bonhoeffer joins Theodor Adorno and Franz Rosenzweig as 
early adopters of “metaphors of multi-voiced, contrapuntal strands being woven together into 
harmonic diversity in order to try to subvert the pretensions of the system.”52 The dialectical 
strategy suggests that it would be a mistake to seek anything more precise in Bonhoeffer’s 
legacy. Rather, we should permit him to serve as an early dialogical contextualist, not seeking 
to resolve the location of Christus praesens, but happy that it should serve as a kind of 
endless, indefinable goad, the nearly invisible needle pricking our comfortable sense of 
certitude and closed-ness. 
 
In the end, this may be correct. Perhaps this is the best we can ever say of Bonhoeffer’s 
theological contribution. It is difficult, however, to argue that this was Bonhoeffer’s intention. 
Merely as a matter of temperament, the dialectical suspension of otherness does not seem to 
suit Bonhoeffer’s longing for concretion. That aspect of Bonhoeffer’s thought which allowed 
him to famously declare, “Whoever knowingly separates himself from the Confessing Church 
                                                            
49 Floyd, “Encounter with an Other,” 116-7. 
50 This formulation arises in the context of Wayne Floyd’s work, although his discussion of ‘betweenness’ is 
distinct from the way it is being used here in the context of the dialectical strategy. See Wayne W. Floyd, 
Theology and the Dialectics of Otherness: On Reading Bonhoeffer and Adorno (Lanham, MD: University Press 
of America, 1988), 134. 
51 Rowan D. Williams, “Interiority and Epiphany: A Reading in New Testament Ethics,” Modern Theology 13.1 
(1997), 30, emphasis in original. 
52 Floyd, “Encounter with an Other,” 114. 
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in Germany separates himself from salvation,”53 does not —either ethically or ontologically—
sit comfortably with an interpretation of his thought as an unresolved dialogical dance. 
However much it may benefit our hermeneutic to read the corpus of Bonhoeffer’s theology 
dialectically, it is hard to argue that the final content of his theology would have looked 
dialogically postmodern had he survived the war.  
 
Fidelity to Bonhoeffer is one issue. The more important problem with respect to promeity, 
however, is pointed out by Hans Schmidt. The dialectical strategy places us close to a quasi-
Kierkegaardian “absolute paradox” which requires us to deny what is most significantly given 
in the notion of promeity, namely, that “the reality of God in Jesus Christ actually entered into 
the reality of this world.”54 The result, for our discussion of promeity, is that the dialectical 
strategy does not permit the hypostatic union of the Incarnation to be true union, to be a single 
‘who’ preceding the question. 
 
The dialectical strategy is loosely sketched here in part because it is never more than loosely 
sketched among any of Bonhoeffer’s interpreters. For the purposes of refining a definition of 
promeity as method, however, the dialectical strategy is useful as contrast. Neither dialectical 
possibility can fit within promeity as method, each for the same reason: promeity begins with 
the essential unity of God and world in the Incarnation as a prerequisite to further reflection. 
To speak in terms of dialectic, then—no matter how assured the final unity—is actually to 
speak of the unfolding dynamic of two realities when the unity of one is already given. This 
unity of God and world in the Incarnation is not the foretaste of a movement to be 
accomplished in the eschaton, but foregrounds the very possibility of interrogating the God-
world problem. It is the ‘who’ of revelation confronting us, and this encounter cannot be 
acknowledged without simultaneously acknowledging it as pro me.  
 
Therefore, to summarise thus far: promeity as the description of a method requires beginning 
again with Christ, not as idea but in the particular once-ness of the Incarnate Christus 
praesens. Beginning with this ‘who’ of revelation means acknowledging a priori the essential 
unity of the act of personhood and the being of presence. Whatever further implications which 
might be explored for the question of God and world, the Incarnate God-human must be both 
prior to and fully self-descriptive of God’s immanence in history, without substituting a 
principle of immanence for the concrete particularity of this revelation. 
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Both the immanentist and dialectical strategies take Bonhoeffer’s concerns seriously, and 
attempt to draw from them an approach to speaking of Christus praesens more precisely, 
befitting their origin in the mind of a man “stubbornly opposed to mere abstraction.”55 As we 
shall see, however, they both remain trapped within the typology of transcendence and 
idealism which Bonhoeffer sketched in Act and Being. Neither fundamentally offers a way of 
thinking about God and world which Bonhoeffer had not already anticipated and rejected. 
What is required then, is a third strategy which returns to Bonhoeffer’s early dissertations, 
engaging his claim to have found there a way of unifying theologies of act with theologies of 
being. It is to this third strategy we will turn next.  
 
 
3.4 The social-anthropological strategy 
3.4.1 Introduction 
The immanentist strategy tended to locate the force of Bonhoeffer’s theological potential in 
his 1940’s-era writings. The dialectical strategy advocated for a fuller reading of Bonhoeffer’s 
work, satisfied that the internal tensions need not be resolved. A third strategy, to be 
developed at length in this section, places the weight on his earlier theology, confident that 
the themes developed there can capture the essential logic of his later ideas. From the 
perspective of the debate concerning continuity, the advantage of this third strategy is that it 
most clearly makes sense of Bonhoeffer’s theology as a unified whole, neither broken nor in 
tension with itself, rejecting the suggestion that the prison letters constitute a sudden and 
radical departure.  
 
This third strategy starts with Bonhoeffer’s dissertation, published as Sanctorum Communio, 
and his habilitation thesis, published as Act and Being, as revealing the very formative 
concerns and ideas which shape the rest of his theological development. The early theses 
concern themselves with ecclesiology and its relation to sociology (in the case of Sanctorum 
Communio) and epistemology (in the case of Act and Being). The phrase ‘Christ existing as 
church-community’ originates in these works as a description of the church in its relation to 
revelation. For the advocates of the third strategy, this phrase becomes decisive. The church is 
the form of Christus praesens. In this view, if Bonhoeffer’s later theology discards anything, 
it is not God’s transcendence, nor God’s presence in the church, but rather a strong notion of 
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the church’s exclusivity vis-à-vis the world. Articulating this more precisely means 
articulating how Bonhoeffer’s early theses understand the church as apotheosis of community 
generally, and the implications of this for human existence as social relatedness. Hence, we 
will refer to this third strategy as the social-anthropological strategy. 
 
The social-anthropological strategy for making sense of Bonhoeffer’s contribution to the 
question of God and world emphasises Bonhoeffer’s basic proximity to a Barthian 
understanding of revelation. In this understanding, a kind of Barthian actualism still 
undergirds Bonhoeffer’s understanding of revelation. The givenness of promeity is thus a 
description of where in this empirical world Christ has chosen to freely abide, to eternally 
elect to give himself over to reality time and again. Contrary to the immanentist strategy, then, 
the question is not how the reality of empirical existence finds its necessary relation to God. 
Instead, the starting point remains God’s free aseity, and so the issue is how best to 
understand—to borrow a phrase from David Law—“the relation between the punctiliar and 
the linear, the vertical and the horizontal.”56 While acknowledging the centrality of Christus 
praesens in Bonhoeffer’s thought, the social-anthropological strategy tries to understand this 
presence as abiding while still leaving it grounded in the free, irruptive Word of revelation. 
How and where can we speak of Christ choosing to make himself available with a consistency 
and concreteness than could be called ‘presence?’ 
 
The work of Clifford Green, Wayne Floyd, and Charles Marsh informs the shape of the 
social-anthropological strategy. None of the three are primarily interested in the God-world 
problem, although the implications of their work trace the outline of a Bonhoefferian solution. 
While the work of each should be understood apart from the rest, their differences in 
emphasis merely serve to refine the nature of their similarities. All three understand the young 
Bonhoeffer’s indebtedness to Barth, and so understand that ecclesiology and epistemology are 
“no substitute for the truth of revelation.”57 They likewise understand the concretion of 
revelation in the Incarnation of Christ. What the truth of revelation has provided, for all three, 
is an intrinsically social self-disclosure, “not an idea, a past historical happening, a doctrine, 
or an entity” but rather “a person, and since person and community are inseparable, the 
revelation of Christ is present in a personal-communal form.”58 Properly understanding this 
                                                            
56 David R Law, “Redeeming the Penultimate: Discipleship and Church in the Thought of Søren Kierkegaard 
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connection between revelation and sociality first requires a brief overview of Bonhoeffer’s 
first publication, Sanctorum Communio. 
 
3.4.2 The barrier of otherness in Sanctorum Communio 
Over five chapters, Sanctorum Communio undertakes an analysis of social philosophy to be 
“carried out on the foundation of Christian theology.”59 The first chapter serves as a 
prolegomenon to the study, defining ‘sociology’ and ‘social philosophy’ as distinct modes of 
analysis in the German academic landscape. Bonhoeffer, writing in 1927, lives in the overlap 
of two eras—towards the end of the 19th century post-Hegelian fascination with social entities 
as metaphysical constructs giving rise to “a full-blown social mythology,”60 and at the 
beginning of the empiricist era that characterises modern sociology as a scientific discipline. 
A fully modern definition of sociology remains just out of Bonhoeffer’s reach at this stage—
even empirical sociology attempts, in his understanding, “to trace the many complex 
interactions back to certain constitutive acts of spirit,” a phrasing which places Bonhoeffer 
closer to early-20th century structuralism than late-20th century social science.61 In this sense, 
sociology of religion’s aim is “to research phenomenologically the structural distinctiveness 
of religious communities.”62 This places it apart from social philosophy, which “is the study 
of the primordial mode-of-being of sociality” as a theoretical discipline prior to empirical 
investigation.63 Bonhoeffer’s interest in Sanctorum Communio is to take up a theological 
exercise which uses “insights that derive purely from social philosophy and sociology”64 as a 
means for refining a theological understanding of “the structure of the given reality of the 
church of Christ.”65 
 
The interaction of these modes of thought—the sociological and the theological—becomes 
more evident in the second chapter, as Bonhoeffer sets a Christian concept of person at odds 
with prevailing philosophical definitions of personhood. This contrast occurs within the 
context of a major concern of Bonhoeffer’s early theology—articulating a personalist 
philosophical theology that can stand against 19th-century German Idealism. Idealism at this 
stage in Bonhoeffer’s thought primarily encapsulates Hegel and Fichte, to whom he attributes 
an epistemology which places the human subject at the centre of the universe, such that all 
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reality not only refers back to but is in some sense dependent upon the perceiving I.66 In 
Bonhoeffer’s understanding, idealism is simply incompatible with the Christian doctrine of 
revelation, and has quite a number of deleterious effects in theology and philosophy. One of 
the most pernicious consequences is that idealism excludes the possibility of real sociality, 
permitting the subject’s intellect to be “dominant, exclusively claiming universal validity,” 
such that all the distinguishing characteristics which make the You uniquely other are 
“conceived as immanent to my intellect.”67 The consequence, for the idealist subject, is to 
find oneself not really “in the social sphere” at all, interacting not with others as they are, but 
with others as one projects them to be in one’s own consciousness.68 What is needed is “some 
fundamental barrier” which can truly draw the subject out of the fortress of its own knowing 
and into a true acknowledgement of the other, thereby permitting real sociality.69 
 
For Bonhoeffer, at this early stage, the philosophical tools needed to construct such a barrier 
are found in a hesitant return to Kant. Without fully endorsing Kantian thought, Bonhoeffer 
does wish to appropriate Kant’s emphasis on the “absoluteness of the ethical demand” which 
places the person into “a state of responsibility.”70 This is precisely the point of starkest 
contrast with idealism. Idealism fails at the point of its encounter with “the concept of reality” 
which it “did not think through thoroughly, and therefore did not think through at all.”71 As 
mentioned earlier, Bonhoeffer at this stage somewhat naïvely equates Idealism with Hegel, 
and his critique of Hegelianism is thus a kind of quasi-Kierkegaardian concern, that Hegel has 
subordinated actual existence to the plodding pull of spirit and history, with human reason 
firmly holding the reins. “Hegel,” Bonhoeffer will later argue in Act and Being, “wrote a 
philosophy of angels, but not of human beings as Dasein.”72  In contrast then, Bonhoeffer 
wants to reassert the priority of Dasein, of the being of humans as they already find 
themselves existing in actuality. The human subject who takes reality seriously therefore 
takes seriously the existence of someone outside oneself, someone to whom ethical 
responsibility is owed. It is by virtue of this ethical demand that the other transcends the 
subject, placing a “real barrier” before “the movement of the dialectic of mind,” a barrier 
which forces us to acknowledge the concrete rather than losing ourselves in the “abstract and 
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metaphysical.”73 The Kantian barrier which we run against is the ethical decision presented to 
us by the undeniable existence of the other. 
 
This barrier begins as a response to the ethical question posed by the encounter with 
otherness, but its value is not only relevant to ethics. The demand imposed from without 
serves a philosophical function. It is instrumental—if not fully determinative—of 
Bonhoeffer’s theological understanding of personhood. In virtue of what, exactly, is the You 
able to place the I into ethical responsibility? The answer, from the perspective of Christian 
theology, must be the You’s intrinsic relatedness to God. It is God, after all—the ultimate, 
“impenetrable You”—who places an ethical demand upon humans, an ethical demand that 
truly comes from without.74 Consequently, for a Christian understanding of the person, it is 
the You-ness of God, imparted to the “concrete You” which truly makes the “the other 
become a You to me.”75 The otherness of the stranger who places the human subject into 
responsibility can only be the radical otherness of God made manifest, the one to whom 
humanity’s final obligations are due. This obligation carries real epistemological and 
ontological weight, creating an obstacle to the universalising tendency of human reason, the 
temptation to sublate all otherness to the self. As a result, You-ness not only corrals the 
individual, it can thus be said to create the individual. “The I comes into being only in relation 
to the You” as the You delimits and structures the I.76 The You stands as the hard shore 
absorbing the waves’ crash, turning the borderless abyss of the idealist mind into a defined 
entity, a self.  
 
The third chapter of Sanctorum Communio turns from personhood toward the question of 
community, asked from the perspective of revelation. Here, Bonhoeffer inquires about the 
nature of human community “within an intrinsically broken history,” after the Fall of Adam.77 
Theologically, then, any sociological description of the church must simultaneously take into 
account its fallen being-in-Adam. This fallenness immediately implies a supralapsarian 
“community with God.”78 Furthermore, the very possibility of corporate responsibility—that 
“in Adam, all die” (1 Cor. 15:22)79—suggests “that human beings, as spirit, are necessarily 
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created in a community.”80 Bonhoeffer recognises—and spends the rest of the third chapter 
delineating—the fact that the intrinsic inter-relatedness of humans appears to contradict the 
necessity of an insurmountable You to stand against the subject’s I.  In the end, Bonhoeffer 
argues that the true unity of a community “must exist absolutely in the willing of the 
community.”81 This unity of wills is different from any “mystical fusion” of persons, such that 
community not only permits but requires “the inner separateness of I and You” so as to create 
persons capable of uniting their individual wills into a community.82 For Bonhoeffer’s 
purposes in Sanctorum Communio, this definition is sufficient.  
 
The fourth chapter of Sanctorum Communio briefly turns to the issue of humanity’s collective 
guilt in Adam. Permitting revelation the right of definition means not only accepting 
humanity’s collective guilt, but actually taking culpability as prior to the empirical human, 
thus creating “a Christian-ethical concept of the species.”83 Sociologically, this is only 
resolved in the “ethical personality of collective persons;”84 theologically, in “the structure of 
humanity-in-Adam . . . both composed of many isolated individuals and yet . . . humanity that 
has sinned as a whole.”85 In this sense, the fourth chapter reiterates the relation of community 
and individual—humanity as “a collective person, yet infinitely fragmented”86—and 
establishes the condition which the new humanity of Christ will reverse. 
 
The fifth and final chapter of Sanctorum Communio is its true centre both figuratively and 
literally—the chapter takes up more than half of the book. The fifth chapter does not negate 
any of the previous insights, but neither does it take them to be foundational. Rather, it seeks 
to redefine the earlier insights—however much they may relate to categories of sociological 
debate—as properly arising from the church, the sanctorum communion, established by God’s 
revelation in Christ. “Only from this vantage point,” Bonhoeffer writes, “are we justified to 
integrate philosophical considerations into the theological framework.”87 What unites the 
disparate concerns addressed in the fifth chapter is Bonhoeffer’s desire to articulate a 
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definition of the church-community in the reality of Christ which can take on board the 
insights of sociology.88  
 
In fact, the fifth chapter reads as a kind of beginning-again in its own right. Each of the issues 
addressed in the first four chapters—ethical responsibility, community, collective 
personhood—is readdressed from the perspective of revelation, for “only the concept of 
revelation can lead to the Christian concept of the church.”89 God’s revelation in Christ yields 
the truth that the church has been simultaneously founded and “already completed” in 
Christ.90 The wills of the church’s individual members find themselves gathered and 
maintained in unity by the Holy Spirit.91 The revelation in Christ of “God’s own heart” 
creates both the possibility of human community founded in love and the possibility that this 
community can be united with God’s will.92 In the kerygmatic advance of the Word of God in 
the world, “the actualized church-community is also present,” demonstrating the intrinsic 
connection between church and Word.93 The love of God which enters a person allows them 
not only to receive the ethical demand of the other, but to actually respond selflessly: “Thus 
the You is to the I no longer law but gospel, and hence an object of love.”94 The Other is the 
occasion for a decision to be made—will I receive the stranger with hospitality or 
indifference, with respectful restraint or over-bearing compulsion? Under the logic of 
revelation, Christ creates and enters into the midst of this “moment of being addressed.”95 He 
creates this moment by turning the Other’s existence from morally neutral fact into ethical 
demand. Then, by first being-free-for the Christian, Christ enters into the midst of decision by 
transforming the Christian’s existence into a true being-free-for the Other, an approach in love 
which governs both the hospitality and the restraint with which the stranger is accommodated. 
This love, manifest in the social existence of the church, could be characterised as Christ’s 
very presence on earth. 
 
3.4.3 Green and sociality as ontological category 
Clifford Green initiated the engagement with this aspect of Bonhoeffer’s theology in his 1972 
work The Sociality of Christ and Humanity, later revised, expanded, and published in 1999 
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under the title Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality. Green’s interest in this work is to re-
evaluate the assumption which would understand the early works merely “under the rubric of 
ecclesiology.”96 Despite Sanctorum Communio’s obvious interest in the church, Green wants 
to focus attention on something even more foundational, namely, Bonhoeffer’s interest in a 
theological anthropology of sociality which provides a context for the church’s existence. In 
this sense, Green also wants to begin with the priority of revelation, “The freedom of God in 
revelation is a sine qua non. However, this freedom must not be understood formally and 
abstractly.”97 The immanent concretion which God has freely revealed to us in promeity is the 
“Personstruktur of the present Christ in the Gestalt of Word, sacrament, and Gemeinde.”98 It 
is Green’s understanding of this Personstruktur which is relevant to the social-
anthropological method. In Green’s reading, the pro-me of Christ implies relatedness between 
Christ and human, and hence,  
 
Revelation is a social reality. God cannot be understood in isolation from 
humanity, and human beings cannot be understood individualistically. . . In 
reality, human beings, precisely as individual persons, are always in human 
communities. Revelation, likewise, is and occurs communally, that is, in the 
church.99  
 
But Green’s reading of the early dissertations makes it clear that the social form of revelation 
is inter-personal even before it is ecclesial. In this respect, he draws heavily on Sanctorum 
Communio’s insight that “The socio-ethical relation to the human ‘other’ is precisely the form 
in which people encounter the divine ‘Other.’”100 Green understands revelation as prior to and 
providing a grounds for the very inter-connectedness of free individuals. “Human sociality,” 
he writes, “is grounded in the social being and activity of God as seen in the revelation in 
Christ.”101  
 
With respect to the present question of God and world, Green’s work sketches the outline of 
the social-anthropological method for interpreting Bonhoeffer. Humanity in its social 
dimension is not the recipient of God’s free revelation, but is itself created in the act of God’s 
revealing. While retaining God’s aseity, here is a point where we can speak about the 
                                                            
96 Green, Theology of Sociality, 19. 
97 Ibid., 85. 
98 Ibid., 237. 
99 Ibid., 84. 
100 Ibid., 35. 
101 Ibid., 63. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 51 
 
verticality of the transcendent God freely abiding with the horizontal plane of humanity. The 
consequences of his reading, Green writes, “means the form of transcendence is defined by 
Bonhoeffer’s socio-ethical understanding of person.”102 Christ’s givenness to reality is a real 
givenness in the possibility of community among otherwise isolated strangers. 
“Transcendence,” Green writes, “is not God’s otherness beyond humanity and above the 
world; the holy, creating, sustaining, and reconciling love of God which is revealed in Christ 
is God’s lordship in the world among human beings.”103 The revelation of God in Christ 
freely binds him to the embracing love of communality. Where one finds sociality, one 
already finds a condition established by Christ. Where one sees individuals united in 
collective personhood, one glimpses the Personstruktur of Christ. Where one sees 
communities sharing in genuine agape, one can be assured of Christus praesens. Green is 
careful to distinguish this from any immanentist reduction. “To be sure,” he writes, 
“Bonhoeffer is never in danger of identifying God and humanity, any more than of confusing 
Christ and the church. But that relational duality which characterizes the life of human 
persons is a reflection of God’s relatedness to humanity.”104 Here Green’s work contains 
implications for a broader engagement with the God-world dilemma, even while his focus 
remains on human sociality. The first movement of the social-anthropological strategy is to 
see interpersonal relatedness as that feature of reality able to receive the immanence of 
Christ’s promeity. 
 
Although Green’s analysis covers all of Bonhoeffer’s major works, his interpretation of 
Bonhoeffer’s total legacy relies heavily on the personalist vocabulary of Sanctorum 
Communio. “Bonhoeffer’s early theology must be understood as a ‘theology of sociality,’”105 
he writes, but even Bonhoeffer’s later theology “gains indispensable illumination when seen 
in the light of his theology of sociality.”106 Even as Bonhoeffer moves away from strictly 
ecclesial language and begins to speak more about the transcendent God’s immanence in 
reality, the same underlying logic of sociality applies. The later language of secularity is—just 
as much the language about the church-community—best understood when related to Christ 
manifest positively in the care and unity implicit in human sociality. For Green, this is the 
fruit of Bonhoeffer’s analogia relationis, briefly mentioned in Creation and Fall. Green 
argues that “since God’s freedom is relational, in being free for humanity, so human beings 
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are the image and likeness of God in being in relations of freedom.”107 This is not to merely 
sanctify the mode of human existence, but to suggest that:  
 
It is a particular relationship which constitutes imago: just as the true 
Lordship of the Creator is God’s being free for the creation, so the true 
humanity of God’s creatures is co-humanity in being free for others on the 
basis of their freedom for God through Christ.108  
 
Here is a refinement of the social-anthropological strategy which locates Christus praesens in 
Christ’s free decision, but permits this presence to be located even in secularity. Anyone who 
is truly free-for-others finds themselves, whether they know it or not, participating in the 
imago Dei by acknowledging the ethical demand of the Other and responding in the 
unconscious imitation of Christ’s own freedom to be for the Other. This, then, appears as the 
promising first step of the social-anthropological method—acknowledging the person of 
presence while locating the person as truly present. 
 
Shortly after writing Sanctorum Communio, however, Bonhoeffer begins to doubt that a 
conception of otherness manifest in the ethical demand is really strong enough to provide a 
proper barrier to the self. As Wayne Floyd and Charles Marsh have both pointed out, this 
doubt is written across Bonhoeffer’s habilitation thesis, Act and Being, in which he drops 
much of Sanctorum Communio’s I-You language in favour of a deeper engagement with the 
epistemology of subjecthood.109  
 
3.4.4 Act, being, and the epistemological ego 
Act and Being represents Bonhoeffer’s most explicitly theoretical engagement with precisely 
the questions of God and world which this present essay aims to examine. It is best read, 
however, neither as a resolution to the question, nor even as an argument for why Christ-
existing-as-community is the best locus for a resolution. Instead, it should be read as a kind of 
respectful exchange between philosophy and a theology of revelation. The problem of act and 
being poses questions to both philosophy and theology. For philosophy, it is a question of 
how to relate human reason to ultimate reality—the Kantian Ding-an-sich, the thing in itself. 
Does ultimate reality lie on the other side of an epistemic wall, obscured from direct view, 
able to be glimpsed indirectly in transcendental apperception’s acts of “pure intentionality, 
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alien to being”?110 Or is ultimate reality fully available to human reason or even, potentially, a 
product of human reason? Is the being of ultimate reality exposed to us, available in 
“continuity” for our examination and perusal?111 And how does the being of ultimate reality 
relate to Dasein, our own being as humans finding ourselves already thrown into a lived 
situation? The first part of Act and Being engages philosophy precisely because “Kant and 
idealism” have taken up these questions in a way that ought to alert theology to the questions’ 
significance.112  
 
The first half of this respectful exchange is that philosophy’s attempts to answer these 
questions “are said to make a contribution to the understanding of the problem of act and 
being within the concept of revelation.”113 As we will see in a moment, philosophy provides a 
set of parameters, a kind of checklist which theology can use to consider whether its own 
conception of revelation has tacitly slipped into problematic modes of idealist thought. 
Theology may use this checklist a posteriori as a means for self-evaluation, but it cannot start 
by attempting to fulfil philosophy’s requirements. Theology must begin with revelation, and 
so the second half of the mutual exchange is for a theology of revelation to disclose to 
philosophy that only in Christ can the problem of act and being be resolved. It is “only from 
within revelation,” Bonhoeffer writes, that “the untruth of human self-understanding is made 
clear.”114 In this way, it is philosophy which finds itself interrogated, its unresolved aporias 
surpassed in revelation. Act and Being is thus an exploration down the path of revelation’s 
logic, never doubting that revelation supplies both theology’s origin and destination, yet 
nonetheless allowing philosophy to post warning signs for unexpected cliffs along the way. 
As a whole, then, Act and Being serves less to fully answer the question of God and world 
than to map out the terrain which an answer will have to cover. 
 
Idealism remains Bonhoeffer’s primary antagonist as he engages with philosophy in Act and 
Being. What has changed since Sanctorum Communio is Bonhoeffer’s awareness of the subtle 
ways in which “idealism’s affirmative ontology inevitably creeps back into the method of 
theology as well as philosophy.”115 Sanctorum Communio’s ethical demand, found in the 
concreteness of the You, had been Bonhoeffer’s first attempt to erect a barrier against 
idealism. The problem, however, is that if the barrier of otherness is merely ethical demand, it 
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does not truly constrain the human subject’s desire to correlate all otherness to its own 
experience. There is no way of navigating the Ich-Du relationship that does not inevitably 
condition the existence of the You for the I’s self-understanding, thereby assimilating even 
the You into the I’s epistemological project. However much the You might place an ethical 
demand upon the I, it does not fundamentally change the fact that the I understands the You’s 
existence as significant only insofar as it effects a change to the I, insofar as it creates the 
occasion for an ethical choice. Fundamentally, this gives the I perpetual epistemic priority, 
subordinating even the difference of the Other to the subjective I’s acknowledgement of that 
difference. Idealism seeps into the dialogical language of Ich und Du until the You—even the 
divine You—becomes “a function of the I’s own consciousness.”116 What was intended to be 
a relation between two equals has instead become a relation between myself and a mere 
extension of my own cognition. Act and Being, therefore, implicitly acknowledges the 
difficulty of drawing I-You language away from the pull of idealism’s maelstrom.117 What is 
needed is more than the barrier of an ethical demand, but a truly epistemic barrier, an 
encounter which not only provides the occasion to love, but the occasion to respectfully halt. 
Without losing “Christ existing as church-community,”118 what is gained in Act and Being is a 
greater appreciation for the fact that Christus praesens must function as a true barrier, as the 
radical alterity of otherness which can save the subject “from the delusion of being at its own 
disposal.”119 
 
In the first half of Act and Being’s respectful exchange, Bonhoeffer remains alert to the 
lessons philosophy has learned in its search for “pure limiting concepts.”120 
Transcendentalism offers useful boundaries for the thinking subject. Thought—properly-
defined—always finds itself happening in relation to something beyond itself, either 
“retrospectively or prospectively.”121 Retrospectively, thinking finds itself looking backward, 
already beholden to a symbolic community it did not create. Prospectively, thinking finds 
itself looking forward into the future, considering objects of which it has no experience.  
Transcendentalism establishes limits such that, “in knowing, human Dasein knows itself to be 
suspended between two poles that transcend it.”122 But to say this is to resolve philosophy’s 
questions in favour of “the pure act,” such that true thinking occurs in the moments when the 
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subject finds itself confronted by transcendence.123 The subject’s own being collapses into 
these fragmentary moments, insofar as these acts provide the only basis by which the I may 
“understand itself.”124  
 
This epistemology of act, however, inevitably finds its own inadequacies exposed by the mere 
existence of Dasein. “The I is being-already-there”—the thought can only occur to a 
thinker—and so the being of the human must precede even the act of thinking.125 This creates 
a dilemma, as the human subject finds itself always already being, yet needing to suspend its 
own thinking between transcendence in order to understand itself properly. It may well refuse 
to accept this suspension and so give in to idealism, “the great temptation for all genuine 
philosophy.”126  In doing so, thought “raise[s] itself to the position of lord over what is non-
objective by taking the process of attainment, the I, into itself in the act of thinking.”127 
Alternatively, thinking may agree to abide by the limits of transcendence. But, precisely in 
giving itself power to set its own limitations, it has revealed itself as idealism in disguise. 
Thinking has not submitted at all, but merely condescended to show token respect to 
transcendence, thereby taking for granted its own seat on the throne “as that which makes the 
separation possible at all.”128 Whatever transcends the human subject must be more than static 
concept; it must possess some personal capacity to enforce the barriers demanded by its own 
otherness. Here there is room, even in philosophy, for God “in existence as condition, 
possibility, always in process and never completed.”129 God, in this conception, would 
function as transcendence with agency, a transcendence which does not ask the human subject 
to acknowledge its limitations, but imposes them. Even this conception, however, while 
appealing, cannot easily evade idealist pretensions. For what does it even mean to speak of 
this God-as-term in the equation of transcendentalism? Either we are able to conceive of this 
transcendent God, in which case thought has already surmounted the very barriers God was 
needed to reinforce, or else we are unable to conceive of God, in which case there is no point 
of contact between God and our existence at all. “God is no longer accessible even to the 
reflection of consciousness on itself” and so vanishes away into virtual non-existence.130  
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What transcendentalism can offer as a guidepost to theology is a reminder that thought must 
always occur “‘in reference to’ transcendence.”131 This notion of human existence as being 
defined by its reference to transcendence will be of great significance later, in Chapter 5. But, 
for now, what is worth noting is why transcendentalism nonetheless fails, in Bonhoeffer’s 
mind. It fails, firstly, because it easily falls captive to idealism, as we have just noted. But 
even to the extent that it resists this collapse and remains pure actualism, transcendentalism 
struggles, secondly, to account for Dasein, for the priority of the being-already-there of the 
human. It struggles in two ways: first, to acknowledge the real being of humans prior to 
thought; second, to account for the continuity of self-identity in between individual acts of 
transcendental apperception.132 
 
Bonhoeffer contrasts transcendentalism—as a philosophy of act—with various philosophies 
of being in order to further flesh out philosophy’s total contribution to a theology of 
revelation. These various ontologies are not concerned with an account of true thought, but 
with an account of true being. The phenomenological method—as an attempt to “demonstrate 
the primacy of being over against consciousness”133—deeply informs Bonhoeffer’s 
appropriation of ontology. Thinking, from this perspective, is a mere tool “to uncover or 
‘clear the way’ to this being.”134 Bonhoeffer examines a number of options in brief. Among 
these options, his greatest affinity is for the work of Martin Heidegger, who “has succeeded in 
forcing together act and being in the concept of Dasein.”135 It is worth considering for a 
moment what appeals to Bonhoeffer about Heidegger’s philosophy. 
 
Heidegger, in Bonhoeffer’s reading, prioritises being without subordinating it to “timeless 
essences and values.”136 Rather, Heidegger takes the priority of Dasein seriously. Thought is 
immediately subordinated, unable to “produce its world for itself. Rather, it finds itself, as 
Dasein, in the world; in every instance, it is already in a world just as, in every instance, it is 
already itself.”137 The reality and continuity of personhood are established a priori, not 
haphazardly assembled from a jumble of transcendental acts. Yet, Sein resists objectification. 
It is not the case that Heidegger merely “opens being itself up to viewing.”138 Sein is both 
constitutive of Dasein, and yet not fully constitutive, as Dasein retains a self-determining 
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capacity by its free decision in a moment. Being likewise “cannot be statically comprehended 
as something that exists” and so resists the pretensions of the subject.139 Yet, at the same time, 
Being must be “interpreted in reference to the understanding of being, and thereby drawn into 
the movement of decision-making existence.”140  
 
In a very brief interaction, Bonhoeffer sees in Heidegger a number of concerns which parallel 
his own: (a) an understanding of reality which resists idealist thought, (b) an understanding of 
Dasein which places it in necessary relation to ultimate reality, yet, (c) without collapsing 
ultimate reality into human existence, which both (d) permits Dasein’s self-understanding and 
continuity through time while also (e) requiring it to be defined in reference to something 
beyond itself. The only reason why Bonhoeffer cannot recommend theology’s wholesale 
adoption of Heidegger is because, in subjecting even time to Dasein, Heidegger comprehends 
temporality as “primordially finite.”141 Thus all of history, even God’s history, finds itself 
enclosed by finitude. To begin with Heidegger, therefore, is impossible, as “no room has been 
left for the concept of revelation.”142 Yet it becomes clear that what Bonhoeffer hopes for is to 
start with revelation and nonetheless explore its possibilities along the trail marked by exactly 
the priorities which Heidegger has articulated. Act, being, and Dasein serve as the three legs 
to the stool Bonhoeffer is building. Revelation must preserve its transcendence in act, yet 
abide in the continuity of being, and in both regards must address itself to the real existence of 
Dasein, such that humans can understand their actual, continuous being as truly acted upon. 
 
Philosophy’s engagement with the problem of act and being thus leaves theology with two 
broad markers to keep it from falling into idealism: “that not only are human beings pure act 
‘in reference to’ but also that thought is ontologically ‘suspended’ in being.”143 In other 
words, human existence must always find itself defined from without, by the act of a 
transcendent Other, and yet this very act which makes self-understanding possible cannot be 
fully constitutive of the self, as it is always preceded by the fact of an already-existing human 
being. The challenge is to see the very fact of temporal human existence as constituting and 
being constituted by a perpetual relatedness to a truly other, truly free transcendence. 
 
                                                            
139 DBWE 2, 71. 
140 Ibid., 71-2. 
141 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1962), 379. 
142 DBWE 2, 73. 
143 Ibid., 79. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 58 
 
In the spirit of beginning again with revelation, Part B of Act and Being turns to theology, 
explicating an understanding of God and human existence based on revelation that can also 
avoid the pitfalls of idealism marked by philosophy. Where philosophy plays a particularly 
useful critical function, for Bonhoeffer, is in helping to identify where the theology of his 
distant mentor, Barth, has gone astray. In attempting to preserve God’s freedom in aseity, 
Barth conceives of revelation as moving from eternity into history, but never belonging to 
history, “with the result that the act cannot be grasped in conceptual form or become part of 
systematic thought.”144 This neo-Kantian sensibility erects a barrier that human reason cannot 
surmount, and therefore prevents the ravenous subject from merely using human vocabulary 
to consume God’s reality. But it also leaves open the question of where revelation actually 
encounters human existence, as Barth takes it as given that “God’s freedom and the act of 
faith are essentially supratemporal.”145 Indeed, any further attempt by Barth to conceive of 
revelation perduring between revelatory acts “is bound to fail” as long as Barth holds that “no 
historical moment is capax infiniti.”146 Bonhoeffer takes this to be the moment when Barth 
has inadvertently fallen into the worst habits of transcendental idealism, preserving actualism 
in such a way that “God recedes into the non-objective, into what is beyond our 
disposition.”147 Bonhoeffer also wants to preserve the priority and freedom of revelation, but 
intends to do so while also permitting it a being that perdures in relation to human existence, 
not as mere object for human examination, but as transcendent presence. 
 
To get nearer this notion, Bonhoeffer attempts to reframe the issue such that “in revelation it 
is not so much a question of the freedom of God . . . as it is of God’s coming out of God’s 
own self.”148 Here we find the logic of promeity, long before the Christology lectures. 
Thinking about God’s coming from God’s own self towards humanity nonetheless respects 
God’s freedom, Bonhoeffer argues, precisely because it allows that “God freely chose to be 
bound to historical human beings and to be placed at the disposal of human beings. God is 
free not from human beings but for them.”149 What is the nature and location of this binding? 
That is exactly where further reflection on promeity leads. For now, Bonhoeffer hazards a 
tentative answer: “God is present . . . to put it quite provisionally for now—‘haveable’, 
graspable in the Word within the church.”150  
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Theologies with a stronger notion of God’s abiding self-disclosure are equally prone to falling 
over the idealist cliffs which philosophy has indicated. Bonhoeffer identifies three 
possibilities: “Revelation can be understood (1) as doctrine, (2) as a psychic experience, and 
(3) as an institution.”151 All three, however, quickly run aground in ways parallel to 
philosophical ontologies. Revelation conceived of as doctrine is little different from 
transcendental actualism, as it “makes for no encounter with the existence of human 
beings.”152 Revelation existing in religious experience turns God’s free speech into mere 
object.153 Revelation as structurally attached to the institutional church cannot accommodate 
Dasein, placing the human being “entirely in the transsubjective,” able to account for humans 
insofar as they exist in holy communion as sanctified Christians, but “not capable of 
encountering the existence of human beings qua sinful experience.”154 All three methods treat 
revelation as merely something that exists, and “something that exists, is not able to encounter 
the existence of human beings,” in other words, is not able to effect a real change to the 
human subject, because it will always find itself captive to the subject’s thinking, encircled by 
the cor curvum in se.155 The outline of Bonhoeffer’s basic concerns emerge here as clearly as 
in the previous section. What form of God’s presence can be real presence without giving 
itself so far over to human reason that it can no longer stand as barrier to the subjective ego? 
 
Bonhoeffer’s answer comes around to the church-community, but via a far more indirect route 
than one might expect, lest we in any way confuse Christ-existing-as-church-community with 
a notion of revelation as ecclesial structure. He is in search of a “genuine ontology” which 
will both place knowledge in service to and have an actual effect on Dasein, “the existence of 
human beings.”156 Simultaneously, this genuine being must not merely be another part of the 
world, another facet of experience for idealism to subsume. Rather, authentic being “in a 
genuine sense ‘stands over against’ the I, in such a way that it challenges and limits its 
manner of existence.”157 If this ontology intends to engage with Dasein, it must do so in two 
ways: “(1) The existence of human beings must be affected; and (2) it must be possible to 
think of being in continuity.”158 A theology of revelation provides us with just such an 
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ontology as “an act of God that draws human beings into the occurrence of revelation,” 
transforming the existence of the subject from being-in-Adam to being-in-Christ.159  
 
Despite the radical disjuncture in the life of someone encountered by revelation, the 
continuity of the person is maintained insofar as their true personhood has always been 
borne—even unwittingly—by its external relatedness. Every human being is “always part of a 
community” whether they find themselves amidst the body of those “in ‘Adam’ or in 
‘Christ’.”160 To the extent that even humans in Adam find themselves in community, they 
exist “in social context.”161 To exist in the sociality of Dasein is to find oneself, by definition, 
already encountered by something outside of oneself. This true outside can only be 
transcendent otherness, and thus can only be God, such that, “Encountered existence is 
existence in social context, existence in reference to Christ.”162 Even the human in Adam who 
knows nothing of Christ nonetheless finds her existence defined in reference to Christ, 
“rejected and accepted in its historical totality. Existence, therefore, ‘is’ only as sinful and as 
pardoned.”163 The “historically whole human being”164 is already “the synthesis of act and 
being”165 insofar as she is both an individual determined by transcendental apperception in 
her historical existence and as she is always a part of the human community, borne along in a 
being established by revelation which she did not choose. Here is the closest Bonhoeffer 
comes in Act and Being to re-appropriating the insights of Sanctorum Communio. There is no 
escaping the Kolletivpersonen of community—to belong to Adam is to find that “I myself am 
Adam . . . In me humanity falls. As I am Adam, so is every individual.”166 
 
The transition to being in Christ, then, does nothing to change the definition of existence as 
being-in-reference-to-Christ. And in this respect, the identity of the individual is preserved. 
What does change for the Christian is that one comes “to know myself borne. I am borne, 
therefore I am, therefore I believe.”167 To know oneself as borne—i.e. to know one’s being in 
reference to transcendence—is to know oneself as being in Christ. And being in Christ is 
synonymous with being in the church.168 It is worth noting that this is a claim which 
Bonhoeffer feels no need to defend. It is simply a fact which has been given in revelation. To 
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find oneself included in Christ is to find oneself included in the church as Christ’s body. 
“Thus in faith is disclosed a new sphere of knowledge and objects, that of existence in social 
reference,” Bonhoeffer writes.169 In Christ, the new human sees herself now existing in 
relation to the church-community and acknowledges, for the first time, her previous existence 
in the community of sinful humanity. 
 
A theology of revelation thus starts with Christ as the one who encounters me, placing me 
into community and defining my existence. In the words of Michael DeJonge, “The freedom 
and transcendence of a personal God depend not on supra-temporality, but on the structure of 
personhood. A person, unlike an object, enters history while retaining its freedom.”170 While 
this means that “the being-of-revelation is ‘person’, hovering in the tension between the 
objective and non-objective,” it does not precisely give further clarity about the being of this 
person.171 This leaves Bonhoeffer attempting to say two things about revelation 
simultaneously, that it is “the revealed person of God and the personal community that is 
founded on God’s person.”172 In the first approach, these two things should be understood 
distinctly. Christ is free in self-disclosure logically prior to the community. It is “only where 
the living Christ approaches us” that “self-understanding is possible.”173 To understand 
ourselves moving from sinful in Adam to pardoned in Christ cannot be comprehended “unless 
Christ himself in person speaks to us his new word, the word that creates our Dasein again 
and again.”174 Yet quickly following after this first approach, a second look reveals that this 
self-disclosure of Christ is also the affront of the Other, thereby immediately placing us into 
community. And so the formation of a community of those who live in relation to Christ—
and therefore live in relation to Christ in one another—follows closely on the heels of 
revelation. Indeed, it becomes the locus for the being of revelation.175 The person of Christ is 
both prior to community and yet intrinsically bound to the disclosure of life together. The 
second half of the exchange between philosophy and theology is thus complete, for theology 
has returned to philosophy a caution that “the existence of human beings can be encountered 
only through the community of faith. It is from the person of Christ that every other person 
first acquires for other human beings the character of personhood.”176 
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3.4.5 Floyd and the resistance of true alterity 
Just as a reading of Sanctorum Communio must be supplemented with a reading of Act and 
Being, so we should supplement Clifford Green’s approach to sociality with the critical 
reserve of Wayne Floyd. Green understands how much human community requires the 
distinctiveness of the individual; there is no suggestion in Green that community demands 
homogeneity. Nonetheless, the logic of sociality too easily surmounts the real resistance of 
personhood in order to embrace the possibilities of love and unity in human togetherness. 
Wayne Floyd’s work draws us back to the first step, to not assume that individuals can easily 
be united in community without erasing some of their differences, and to reflect again on the 
markers pointed out to us by the philosophy of transcendence, to the “function of the 
‘resistance to subjectivity par excellence’—Kant’s infamous thing-in-itself.”177 In this respect, 
Floyd urges us to be wary of a smiling totalitarianism, cheerfully and obliviously smothering 
dissent in the name of community. We are too often caught unaware by the fact that our 
unified togetherness has actually dismissed, excluded, or subsumed the otherness of the 
marginal in favour of the homogeneity of the majority. It is in this sense that Bonhoeffer’s use 
of transcendentalism plays an ethical function, in questioning “the manner of our ethical 
valuation of and response to that ‘object’” of otherness.178 As much as Bonhoeffer is 
interested in community, it must be a community of true persons, their identities permitted to 
stand in dignified autonomy, unimpeded by the encroaching presumptions of another.  
 
Floyd interprets Bonhoeffer’s epistemology through this ethical lens, arguing that Bonhoeffer 
“was searching for an enriched conception of human rationality, taking significant clues from 
epistemology, which would be adequate to the social and ethical theological vision which 
inspired him.”179 This epistemology thus amounts to “a form of thinking that takes seriously 
philosophy’s own attempt to surmount its intrinsic tendencies towards system, towards 
totality.”180 Floyd understands this demand, articulated by philosophy, as pressing upon 
theology the need to  “demonstrate its ability to articulate meaningfully its own claims for 
heterogeneity and otherness, all the while resisting falling back into the very dualistic 
metaphysics against which idealism and liberal theology had so courageously fought.”181 In 
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this respect, Floyd understands Bonhoeffer’s appropriation of personalist language as “both 
more and less radical than many other exponents of personalism might suppose.”182  
 
It is more radical in the sense that otherness cannot simply be an occasion for an ethical 
decision, but must originate from a true other, not someone who is merely received 
empathetically on the basis of a perceived congruency between Ich und Du. “In the moment 
of the encounter,” Floyd explains, “‘I and Thou are not just interchangeable concepts,’ and 
thus the relationship between them is not that of ‘like’ to ‘like.’ For the address of the Thou 
and its being-suffered by the I ‘is’ an unlikeness.”183 Personalist language does not go far 
enough to preserve genuine alterity. Within the personalist framework, true alterity is only 
possible at such a remove from the I that it might as well not exist. As Floyd highlights, 
Bonhoeffer is sensitive to the fact that “every attempt to portray a more ‘concrete’ other, a 
more determinate limit, had to defend itself against the idealist/systematic-ontological 
presumption that any ‘other’ which is heterogeneous to the subject, and vice versa, is so 
marginal that finally it ‘is’ not at all.”184  
 
At the same time, however, Floyd understands Bonhoeffer as reaching for something he can 
never quite grasp, which is an ethical-epistemological account of otherness which can truly be 
free of idealism. It is in this respect that Bonhoeffer is “less radical” than personalism. There 
are two insurmountable problems which Bonhoeffer cannot get around. In Floyd’s words, 
“The first is not being able to conceptualize ‘other persons’ in a manner which 
‘epistemologically’ can allow the other to ‘be’ at all. The second is not being able to let the 
other be encountered receptively as ‘ontologically’ that-which-I-am-not-and-cannot-be.”185 It 
is in this respect that Floyd sees a growing affinity between Bonhoeffer and Hegel over time. 
Faced with the same problem, Hegel chooses not to relentlessly preserve transcendental 
otherness, but sublates it in a way that does not require a totalising unity.186 There is a 
resemblance here with Bonhoeffer’s movement yet, we should add, in the way a palindrome 
resembles itself. There is something deeply Hegelian about Bonhoeffer’s thought, were it to 
be understood, however, as applied in reverse, so to speak. Promeity, as we shall see in the 
next chapter, does not reconcile God and world so much as it ultimately moves behind the 
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problem itself to a unity preserving otherness which precedes any reflection on spirit and 
world. 
 
For the purposes of articulating a social-anthropological strategy for extending Bonhoeffer, 
Floyd’s work serves as a useful caution against an overly simplistic equation of Christus 
praesens with sociality, lest we inadvertently call Christ to hand as a restrictive and totalising 
homogeneity. To do so would be both unfaithful to Christ and neglectful of Bonhoeffer’s 
concerns in Act and Being. Floyd’s only weakness, if anything, is that he overemphasises the 
extent to which Bonhoeffer is concerned with the protection of otherness. Floyd, for example, 
interprets Bonhoeffer as insisting that “a genuinely dialectical form of thinking is possible 
only to the extent that it sustains the reality of authentic Otherness.”187 In such formulations, 
Floyd gives otherness a basic priority in Bonhoeffer’s thought which it does not entirely 
deserve. The purpose of Bonhoeffer’s notion of an epistemic barrier is not principally to 
safeguard otherness, although that is an immediate benefit. Instead, the primary purpose of a 
real barrier is first to confront the individual subject, to draw the self out of the cor curvum in 
se. Bonhoeffer’s base concern is not with the loss of otherness, per se, but with the unlimited 
appetite of the human subject. What is required is an epistemology which adequately limits 
the human Logos. Otherness arises as one expression of that limit. “Whether the limits are 
rational or ethical in kind,” they must not permit humans to “understand themselves, in the 
last resort, not from the transcendent but from themselves, from reason.”188 Ethical limits set 
by the Other are one version of an epistemic barrier, but not the only possibility. What 
motivates Bonhoeffer’s concern with sociality is not the status of the You, but the status of 
the I in sin, the Adamic self standing outside of the garden, bereft, faced with the horror of 
total self-dependence. As he says in Creation and Fall, describing the effects of sin:  
 
Now humankind stands in the middle, with no limit. Standing in the middle 
means living from its own resources and no longer from the center. Having 
no limit means being alone. To be in the center and to be alone means to be 
sicut deus.189  
 
To locate otherness as the fountainhead of Bonhoeffer’s concern is to slightly miss his deeper 
attack on idealism for the sake of the self. An ethical concern for otherness is not the 
necessary condition for a Bonhoefferian epistemology, but one implication of it. In this 
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regard, Bonhoeffer affirms Barth’s “energetic attack against Idealism. Here the ego is found 
as not only the interpreting but even a creative ego; it creates its world itself.”190 Bonhoeffer’s 
concern would be less accurately characterised as proto-postmodern than as neo-Lutheran. It 
is the human ego which must be rescued for the debilitating effects of sin, not the You which 
must be rescued from the I. Thus, Bonhoeffer again affirms Barth’s attack on idealism in the 
context of Reformation theology: 
 
Barth sees in the essential boundlessness of thinking, in its claim a closed 
system, in its egocentricity a philosophical affirmation of the theological 
insight of the Reformers, which they expressed in terms of cor curvum in se, 
corruptio mentis. Man in statu corruptionis is indeed alone, he is his own 
creator and Lord, he is indeed the center of his world of sin.191 
 
At this stage, the potential application of the social-anthropological strategy to the problem of 
God and word has reached a crossroads. Green’s work on sociality correctly draws our 
attention to Bonhoeffer’s interest in the communality of the church. Applied to the God-world 
dilemma, it suggests the possibility that the agapeic expanse of love which enfolds 
community is the proper location of Christ’s immanence in reality. Floyd, however, serves as 
a reminder that the embrace of communality can—even unintentionally—impose a 
suffocating, un-Christian uniformity. Applied to the God-world dilemma, this presents an 
alternative: perhaps Christus praesens should properly be understood as disguised, obliquely 
immanent in the mystery of otherness. This caution is both useful and unsatisfying. It 
highlights Bonhoeffer’s interest in preserving alterity, but at the expense of never returning to 
the true communality which motivates his ecclesiology. Otherness has been preserved, but 
what of the sanctorum communio? Is the church a true unity, or merely an association of 
impenetrable monads—the inter-dependent limbs of an organic body, or the bolted-together 
gears of a serviceable automaton? 
 
Where, then, does one find Christus praesens in reality, properly speaking? Positively—
available in the abundant, perceivable, agapeic unity of the spiritual family? Or negatively—
hidden, veiled in the insoluble transcendence of the brother who remains a mystery? The 
social-anthropological strategy advances by not permitting this dichotomy to stand 
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unchallenged. What is required is a conception of true communality truly dependent on the 
preservation of otherness. 
 
3.4.6 Marsh and agapeic togetherness 
The way forward is provided by Charles Marsh, who stands with Bonhoeffer’s early theses in 
asserting that the act of revelation is God’s self-giving to be present in and with the church. 
Marsh unites the claims of community and alterity by calling upon the philosopher Michael 
Theunissen’s understanding of “the dialogical self-becoming of the individual I.”192 This 
understanding promises to maintain both otherness and community by understanding self-
identity in terms of “the I’s movement to the other.”193 Rather than enclosing the Other within 
the I, the I is pulled “out of itself into social relation.”194 Translated into the theology of 
revelation, this allows Marsh to propose that Bonhoeffer could be interpreted as advocating a 
social-ontology that understands the human self as truly becoming itself in its relation to 
Christ-existing-as-church-community. The true identity of the I is not found in its self-
enclosedness, but in its becoming more than an I, “remain[ing], as an extended self, always 
with the other.”195 In this way it is actually becoming more like itself: “Through the 
grounding of the self upon Christ existing as community, the person discovers that Christ is 
the basis of the capacity for self-being and being with others.”196 This movement is not only 
true for the human I as subject, but for the divine subject as well, such that God is also 
becoming more like God’s self in the movement of agape towards the beloved other of 
humanity.197 It is not only humanity, but the whole of creation which is the recipient of this 
self-giving love which re-centres both God and world.  “As community,” Marsh writes, 
“Christ precedes both I and other as their source and mediation, engendering a new ontology 
of relation based on the coming of God into worldly experience.”198  
 
This movement finds its origin in the Incarnation and thus in the prior activity of God’s 
revelation in Christ. Marsh argues that:  
 
The surpassing of otherness and totality in Christ is possible only if 
revelation is the event for which God is active subject; only if God is subject 
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of the knowing of revelation and is thereby understood as the divine I who 
at once stands against and embraces the human subject in the provenience of 
his knowing.199  
 
Rather than continuing to stand at a distance, proclaiming, God’s self-givenness to 
community not only abides in presence, but leaves a lasting and real change on the being of 
the human subject. Revelation “actively refigures the self in faith such that openness to and 
life for the other become the new ontological description of being-in Christ.”200 It is this 
refigured self— transformed into its true identity only in contact with true otherness—which 
is properly in Christ and hence capable of joining in true unity with the body of Christ. 
 
Marsh is therefore a useful corrective to Floyd’s tendency to overemphasise otherness. Marsh 
captures Bonhoeffer’s desire to return to a proper definition of community, in the sense that 
the ultimate aim of Bonhoeffer’s ecclesiology is to achieve a true unity with an adequate 
respect for otherness. In this respect, Marsh understands that identity is not inviolable, but that 
breaking through the wall of self can be a means to becoming more like ourselves, more fully 
human: 
 
Therefore, according to Bonhoeffer, the claim of the other that fractures the 
infrastructural totality of the system and intrudes into the presumed 
continuities of self-identity qua self-mediation does not incite the 
disappearance of the self . . . Life together establishes and restores our 
genuine humanity as individual persons, even as our individuality attains 
authenticity only in life with others. In losing ourselves we find ourselves; 
and in finding ourselves we lose ourselves.201  
 
What Bonhoeffer leaves us with is a notion of community that is not built on individuality, 
but which is building true individuality:  
 
The promise of Bonhoeffer’s christological explication of the self for others 
is precisely its capacity to illustrate in an exquisitely nuanced way a 
conception of life together that originates in the identity of the subject and 
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yet requires the movement of and to the outside to achieve its completed 
end.202  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the social-anthropological strategy should be understood as the 
application of this “promise” to the problem of God and world. It is an extension of 
Bonhoeffer’s social insights into ontology rather than an extension of Bonhoeffer’s own 
ontological insights. With respect to the latter, Marsh, like Floyd, recognises that 
christological promeity places Bonhoeffer on a Hegelian trajectory. This trajectory is 
nonetheless distinct from Hegel’s own philosophy, insofar as the social-anthropological 
strategy understands Bonhoeffer as principally indebted to Barth. Christ as the ‘who’ giving 
rise to promeity is the anchor preventing the social-anthropological strategy from slipping into 
mere immanentism. Marsh writes: 
 
What distinguishes Bonhoeffer’s description from Hegel’s is not so much 
the emphasis on divine embodiment but his sweeping, uncompromising 
christocentrism. God as the ‘ultimate reality’ is no other than the one who 
‘shows forth, manifests, and reveals Himself, that is to say, God in Jesus 
Christ.’ In Jesus Christ the reality of God entered the reality of the world, as 
a result of which the reality of God and the reality of the world are 
explicated by the name Jesus Christ.203 
 
Thus, the social-anthropological strategy implicitly fixes Bonhoeffer’s theology to a Barthian 
notion of revelation, with the transcendent God given to reality at the point of sociality. With 
respect to Bonhoeffer’s own christological ontology, however, Marsh acknowledges 
Bonhoeffer’s ever-increasing use of the language of immanence. Marsh’s limited critique of 
Bonhoeffer is located precisely here, where “Bonhoeffer seems to push too far his emphasis 
on Christ as the center of the real.”204 This is not to admit that Bonhoeffer gives way to a 
death-of-God shift in thinking, but to admit that Bonhoeffer’s eager insistence on immanence 
does not sit easily alongside even the later Barth’s theology of Word. Marsh restrains 
Bonhoeffer from the total collapse of an “extreme kenotic position” by pointing out the places 
where the later Bonhoeffer retains a Barthian sensibility, for instance in Ethics when 
Bonhoeffer “argu[es] that the togetherness of Christ with the world always preserves the 
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provenience of God’s grace and thus the difference of God and the world.”205 What remains 
outside the frame of the social-anthropological strategy’s consideration, however, is the 
possibility that Bonhoeffer did not begin with precisely the same understanding of revelation 
as Barth, despite their shared christocentrism. This possibility will be revisited in the next 
section and again in Chapter 5 as a way of proposing a truly Bonhoefferian notion of divine 
immanence which is neither immanentist nor exclusively Barthian.  
 
For now, however, let us sum up the fruit of the social-anthropological strategy with respect 
to the problem of God and world. In this argument, God emerges out of transcendence in the 
Incarnation, and establishes his presence in Christ-existing-as-church-community. This 
movement towards the world opens God up to becoming, to being even more like himself in 
loving the other. Simultaneously, however, Christ “activates the living consciousness of the 
other as neighbour.”206 This draws humanity into the church-community, which equally draws 
humanity out of ourselves and into relationship with others. Properly understood in light of 
revelation, this entry into relationship can actually be seen as an entry into relationship with 
Christ. The human self is reconfigured as a compassionate, “overabundant I”, becoming more 
like a true individual as she shares in the love of the community.207 Thus, Christus praesens is 
epistemologically available in the togetherness of Christian community without being 
exhaustively disclosed in it. This epistemological aspect of God’s immanence in reality 
quickly embraces ethical implications, as agapeic togetherness reshapes the relation of the 
community to all otherness exterior to it. Marsh depicts this movement beautifully, as “the 
love of Christ overflow[ing] the new being of the self” such that “love is that event in which 
an I no longer exists for itself but exists in connection to an other person on the way toward 
becoming a we, and in this sense the I becomes truly an I.”208 
 
 
3.5 A response to the social-anthropological strategy 
3.5.1 Bonhoeffer’s language of presence 
Neither Green, nor Floyd, nor Marsh understands himself to be offering a comprehensive 
guide to Bonhoeffer’s thoughts on the God-world problem. Insofar as their work extends our 
understanding of Bonhoeffer’s interest in sociality, ecclesiology, and theological 
anthropology, it should be entirely commended. Such is the merit of their work, however, that 
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it carries further implications for a very promising interpretative resolution to the nature and 
form of Christus praesens in the world. As mentioned, the social-anthropological strategy 
sketches a fundamental ontology that is not extracted, per se, from Bonhoeffer’s own limited 
engagement with ontology. Instead, it is projected outward from Bonhoeffer’s engagement 
with ecclesiology, lightly engaging Bonhoeffer’s own writings on Christ’s being. The social-
anthropological strategy is entirely within its rights to diverge from Bonhoeffer himself in this 
regard, although it would be worth considering for a moment in what way Bonhoeffer’s 
christological promeity leads to the very language of immanence which the social-
anthropological strategy is most likely to dismiss. In this way, the hope is to clarify how 
promeity as a method stands in distinction to the social-anthropological strategy. This is not to 
suggest that the social-anthropological strategy is inherently flawed, but that there are 
worthwhile considerations which it does not fully address. The argument of this section is that 
promeity as method forms an even more foundational layer to Bonhoeffer’s thought than his 
interest in sociality. In this way, it incorporates and therefore permits all of Green, Floyd, and 
Marsh’s insights on community to stand while still accommodating a Bonhoefferian language 
of Christ’s immanence in reality. In other words, agapeic togetherness is properly understood 
as one manifestation of Christus praesens, but it is not the sum of Christus praesens, and 
therefore we are directed to search for a deeper logic. 
 
First, we begin with a rather simple point: over the course of his lifetime, Bonhoeffer refers to 
Christus praesens in connection with many facets of Christian life and reality. At various 
moments, he explicitly connects the reality of divine presence to: 
a) The Word, generally—“God is only there where he speaks his Word, not where I look 
for him.”209 
b) The Bible—“In the word Christ is present;”210 “Wherever God is present in the divine 
word, there one has the present;”211 “What we want is to encounter Christ in his own 
word;”212 “He is present today, in bodily form and with his word.”213 
c) Kerygma—“The word of the sermon is in fact this Christ who bears human nature;”214 
“In the proclaimed word, Christ steps into the congregation;”215 In the context of a 
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sermon: “we ourselves do not want to believe that God is really here among us;”216 
“How does this body become visible? First, in the preaching of the word.”217 
d) The sacraments—“There are sacraments because Christ is present in his body.”218 
e) Prayer—“the Psalter is capable of being simultaneously prayer to God and yet God’s 
own Word, precisely because the praying Christ encounters us here . . . they pray only 
insofar as Christ prays within them.”219 
f) The Holy Spirit— “Always have . . . Christ’s proximity in the Holy Spirit.”220 
g) The ‘call to discipleship’—“The call to discipleship here has no other content than 
Jesus Christ himself;”221 “Christ’s call, Christ himself, is required for that better 
righteousness.”222  
h) The commandments—“We are encountered by a You, not an It, an idea, in the 
commandments.”223 
i) The otherness of the neighbour—“Jesus Christ also encounters us in every step we 
take, in every person we meet;”224 “Christ walks the earth as long as there are people, 
as your neighbour.”225 
j) Suffering—“The form of Christ on earth is the form of the death of the crucified 
one;”226 “It is by Christians’ being publicly disgraced, having to suffer and being put 
to death for the sake of Christ, that Christ himself attains visible form within his 
community.”227 
k) The church-community, generally— “The church is the present Christ himself;”228 
“The risen and exalted Christ has closed in on the world . . . in the form of the church-
community;”229 “Church is the presence of God in the world.”230 
l) The ‘space’ or ‘place’ of the church—“What is the proper place of the church?  . . . [It 
is the] place of the present Christ in the world;”231 “It is Christ, the Crucified and 
Resurrected, who determines the living space of the church-community.”232 
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m) The institutional structure of the church— “This whole, structured, visible body is the 
present Christ. Wherever one differentiates between this structuring and the body 
itself, one surrenders faith in Christ.”233 
n) The ‘law’ of the church-community—“The law of the church-community is not a 
collection of legal regulations but rather Christ himself.”234 
o) The church’s request—“The community of Jesus believes that its Lord desires to be 
present wherever it asks him to be present.”235 
This list is a mere sample of Bonhoeffer’s explicit usage, and does not include the many 
moments when the logic of presence is implied but not mentioned. The simplest and most 
appropriate deduction to make from this wide variety of expression is that—in keeping with 
the method of ontological promeity—the reality of Christus praesens asserts itself prior to 
any attempt to systematise it under an existing theological rubric. Bonhoeffer’s conviction—
antecedent to other commitments—is that Christ is present. Whenever Bonhoeffer wants to 
highlight the real influence revelation applies to lived existence, he appeals to the language of 
presence. In Bonhoeffer’s mind, it is imperative that theology account for Christus praesens, 
even if he himself struggles to systematise the logic and meaning of this fact. 
 
3.5.2 The sociality of revelation in the social-anthropological strategy 
Attempts to extend Bonhoeffer’s logic by applying a systematic framework to the language of 
presence can take one of two paths. The first is the alluring but elusive hope that these 
different ways of speaking can be separated and classified as belonging to different eras of his 
life, with each phase undergirded by its own distinct set of interests, rationales, and 
applications. The extensive and varied references to Christus praesens across his work resist 
such a classification, however. Bonhoeffer’s interest in presence is one of a few themes in his 
corpus that cannot be attached to a particular, limited circumstance. 
 
Rather than classifying these various usages chronologically, the alternative is to group them 
under the logic of the most central themes. Broadly, the social-anthropological strategy offers 
the best attempt to do precisely this. More specifically, it attempts to assimilate these various 
strands of thought into the mutual relationship of two fundamental categories: Word and 
church-community. Word captures the proclamation of the gospel in its various forms: 
kerygma, Bible, Eucharist, baptism, etc. Bonhoeffer read Barth’s early work as giving Word 
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priority over church, with church merely designating that community of people gathered 
around the proclaimed Word, whatever relationship that community might have to the visible 
structures of the church. Bonhoeffer was certainly struck by this vision and incorporated it 
into his own work at times. One hears strong echoes of Barth when Bonhoeffer writes, for 
instance, that “where the word breaks in, there is the church . . . there the church as a whole is 
Christianity, insofar as it hears God’s word over all reality.”236 Yet as much as Bonhoeffer 
was sympathetic to this understanding, his instinctive reaction when reading Christian 
Dogmatics in Outline, as mentioned in Chapter 1, was to attempt to reclaim some measure of 
priority for the actual existence of the empirical church.  
 
The social-anthropological strategy offers a way to navigate between these dual convictions 
by insisting on the inherent sociality of revelation. Revelation in its kerygmatic dimension 
always falls on a people rather than an individual or, more accurately, creates a people where 
once there were only mere individuals. It does not make sense, then, to ask whether Word 
takes priority over church. The Word is always received by a church-community precisely 
because it simultaneously creates receptivity even as it gives the Word. As Bonhoeffer was 
noted as saying in a lecture: “[The] church is constituted through [the] word of God in 
Christ’s redemptive act. The word, and nothing else, is constitutive! [The] church is always 
already there. . . The church is always already included when we talk about the word.”237 
Therefore, it is plausible that even the wide variety of Bonhoeffer’s language regarding 
Christus praesens could fit under the twofold typology of Word and church-community 
united in the social dimension of revelation. 
 
At first glance, the intrinsic sociality of revelation also fits neatly with Bonhoeffer’s larger 
point, that what is required for revelation to impact our lived existence is an encounter with 
the Other, an encounter which imposes and therefore reveals our limits. Word creates church-
community insofar as Word is spoken to us and thus implies an encounter with another 
person. This encounter in Word is the encounter with the divine Other which happens along 
with and for the encounter with many others in the Gemeinde. In this respect, the social-
anthropological strategy appears perfectly faithful to Bonhoeffer’s conviction in Act and 
Being that:  
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Only through the person of Christ can the existence of human beings be 
encountered, placed into truth, and transposed into a new manner of 
existence. But as the person of Christ has been revealed in the community of 
faith, the existence of human beings can be encountered only through the 
community of faith.238  
 
In the spirit of greater concretion, however, a question must be put to the social-
anthropological method. Is it—to be more precise—the encounter with Christ which liberates 
the isolated self? Or is it the encounter with the other human, which God has bound God’s 
self to in such a way that to name the other is also to speak of the true Other? Is agapeic 
togetherness initiated by an encounter with Christ himself, or by an encounter with the other 
in whom Christ has elected to make divine alterity manifest? Marsh seems inclined towards 
the latter view, and in this respect he defaults to a Barthian protection of God’s aseity. It is not 
divine being we encounter, per se, but the being of community which the transcendent God 
has made to act as the being of Christ for us. Marsh’s own language is ambiguous. He writes, 
for instance, rather unhelpfully, that “Christ exists as the luminescence of agapeic 
togetherness.”239 Pressing into that metaphor, it appears to be community which generates the 
light—the otherness of fellow humans which is substantively encountered—while Christ’s 
own being is present as the quality of that light at its most brilliant. The metaphor may not be 
able to bear such close attention, but that interpretation generally coincides with Marsh’s 
language about Christ’s own being. “For Bonhoeffer,” he writes, “it is the presence of Christ 
as community that enacts the metanoia of the new being.”240 This does not necessarily clarify 
the question, either, except to note that Christ’s presence is immediately qualified as a 
predicate of community. Marsh uses this same kind of construction later: “Jesus Christ as life 
together activates the living consciousness of the other as neighbour.”241 Here the relation 
seems clearer. The Word of Christ calls to the I in the transcendent act, initiating a proper 
awareness of another being. This other being is not Christ himself, but the neighbour whose 
otherness Christ has made to serve as a lifeline emerging from eternity to pull the ego from 
the whirlpool of self. It is in this relatively limited sense—in its ultimately socialising effect—
that the encounter with otherness should be understood as an encounter with Christ, and thus 
as the immanence of God in Christ-existing-as-church-community.. 
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3.5.3 Revelation as the self-Christ encounter 
At this point, in a very subtle way, the social-anthropological strategy begins to diverge from 
promeity as method. The logic of promeity begins with an encounter which forces the 
acknowledgement that this ‘who’ is present, and thus pro me. It is, by definition—prior to 
reflection—the person who is properly present, not the person who has appended the effects 
of his presence to the presence of a human other. This distinction is very slight, but 
nonetheless significant. As an example of this divergence, Marsh tends to be rather dismissive 
of the role that ‘encounter’ between God and human plays in Bonhoeffer’s theology. Marsh 
notes one early example of this language, from a 1928 lecture Bonhoeffer gave to his 
congregation in Barcelona: “Only through God’s call do I become this ‘self,’ isolated from all 
other people, called to account by God, confronted, alone, by eternity.”242 Marsh brushes 
aside this kind of rhetoric as a feature of Bonhoeffer’s early thought which he quickly moved 
past. “Theologically,” Marsh writes, “he grew to distrust his Kierkegaardian and existentialist 
description of the self-God encounter.”243  
 
Insofar as this quotation from Bonhoeffer’s early days emphasises the encounter with God as 
one which creates isolation instead of community, then Marsh is correct that Bonhoeffer 
discards that element of the claim. But the language of the individual self encountering Christ 
in revelation is one of a few themes that can truly be identified across Bonhoeffer’s entire 
body of work. Finkenwalde’s meditative discipline, for instance, was entirely grounded on the 
hope that attentiveness to scripture could lead one to encounter Christ afresh. “What we 
want,” Bonhoeffer writes in the guide to meditation given to his students, “is to encounter 
Christ in his own word . . . Each day see to it that you meet Christ before you meet other 
people.”244 The immediacy of this encounter is what shapes scripture into command, and 
command into a call to discipleship. Bonhoeffer writes in Cost of Discipleship of “The Christ 
who is present with us is . . . the incarnate, crucified, risen, and glorified Christ . . . he 
encounters us in his word.”245 In the Ethics manuscript it becomes slightly clearer that 
Bonhoeffer has left behind the notion of revelation inducing absolute solitude, but nonetheless 
still describes it as the encounter between person and Christ: “In encounter with Jesus Christ, 
a person experiences God’s call, and in it the calling to a life in community with Jesus 
Christ.”246 Note the construction, which seems to invert the logic of the social-anthropological 
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argument. It is the encounter with Christ which leads to community, not the encounter with 
otherness which the transcendent God has made into a vehicle for encountering the agape 
love of Christ. Even from the later prison papers, one finds in fragmentary notes Bonhoeffer 
returning to this theme as an essential ingredient of real faith: “Christianity arises out of the 
encounter with a concrete human being: Jesus.”247 Below this line, Bonhoeffer likely carries 
on with a related thought, writing “Experience of transcendence,” the implication being that 
encounter with Christ is what constitutes the true experience of transcendence.248 Rather than 
speaking of entry into the communality of the church as the true encounter, Bonhoeffer 
embraces the Apostle Paul’s Damascus Road experience as the ne plus ultra of encounter 
with presence, not in terms of its ecstatic character, but in terms of its capacity to effect a real 
change on the lived existence of a human being. He writes to Bethge in 1944:  
 
When Jesus made sinners whole, they were real sinners, but Jesus didn’t 
begin by making every person into a sinner. He called people from their sin, 
not into it. Certainly the encounter with Jesus turned all human values 
upside down. This is what happened at Paul’s conversion, but his encounter 
with Jesus preceded the recognition of his sins.249 
 
Note the immediate significance of the encounter with Christ as a justifying event, a theme 
which we will return to in Chapter 5. For now, the point is that the language of encounter 
between individual self and God pervades Bonhoeffer’s writing, and this encounter is 
properly with the pro-me Christ, not with mere sociality. Despite its best intentions to the 
contrary, there is a perpetual risk that the social-anthropological strategy falls into the trap 
Bonhoeffer associates with Friedrich Gogarten, absolutising community “in such a way that 
in place of the encounter of human beings with the absolute, with God, stands the encounter 
with the You of the neighbour.”250  
 
This is not to dismiss the significance of sociality or ecclesiology, even as a location of 
Christus praesens. Instead, the real problem with the social-anthropological strategy is not 
that it limits God’s self-disclosure to sociality, but that it actually does not have anything to 
say about God’s ontology at all. It has plenty to say about the being of Dasein, but it leaves 
Christ’s ontology hidden behind a neo-Kantian wall. Simply saying that otherness is the form 
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in which Christ exists is actually to say nothing of significance about Christ’s ontological 
givenness to reality. The being of the God-human remains shrouded in the immanent Trinity. 
The nature of this being is revealed only in its qualified resemblance to the agape of 
fellowship.  
 
In this respect, the social-anthropological strategy’s problem is a mirror image of the 
immanentist strategy’s problem. The immanentist strategy eagerly explicated the ontological 
aspect of the God-world problem, but then struggled to articulate the epistemological aspect 
without collapsing God into empirical reality. The social-anthropological strategy reverses 
this problem. Epistemologically, we are given a strong sense of how we can know where 
Christ is present—any place where we see self-giving, sacrificial love that respects 
individuality while gathering the lonely and rejected into embracing community. This may be 
entirely accurate, and yet the social-anthropological strategy remains relatively silent on the 
implications of this epistemology for the God-human’s ontology, precisely because it uses a 
Barthian definition of revelation in order to preserve the Kierkegaardian ‘infinite qualitative 
difference’ necessary, in its understanding, to initiate agapeic togetherness. 
 
In its dependence on a definition of revelation wholly owned by Barth, the social-
anthropological strategy can never fully accommodate Bonhoeffer’s concerns expressed in 
Act and Being. The difference between Barth and Bonhoeffer was alluded to in section 3.4 
and will be explored at greater length in section 5.2, but suffice to say that the kerygmatic 
paradigm of Barth’s theology of Word perpetually leaves revelation to be resolved in the 
intellect. Certainly, the human intellect itself is not affirmed by the revelatory Word, but the 
fallen intellect’s abolition and restoration does nothing to change the fact that the Word is 
revelation in virtue of its content. It is a linguistic, sermonic metaphor for Christ, resolved in 
the eventual acceptance of its propositional truth. This resolution occurs in understanding, 
even as much as this redeemed intellect may require the illumination of new being.  
 
But more than the content of revelation, it is exactly this new human being which is 
Bonhoeffer’s greater concern—Dasein “transposed” by the “encounter” with Christ which 
only then creates the condition for the comprehension of Word, self, and other.251 Bonhoeffer 
is dissatisfied with the presumption that this new existence can be created by revelation, 
insofar as revelation is predominately understood through the paradigm of kerygmatic Word. 
As proclamation, as truth, the Word must be heard and understood. This understanding must 
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be achieved in consciousness, and thus, in principle, there is nothing to prevent its casual 
absorption by the unruffled idealist self. What is required to liberate the cor curvum in se is 
not mere revelatory act captured by intellect, but the emergence of revelation’s being over and 
against the being of self. What is required is a real act in being, a real sense of the Incarnate 
Christ as present in the world, rather than emerging from aseity to latch on to a particular 
facet of reality—a connection which can be merely comprehended rather than encountered. It 
is on precisely this point that Bonhoeffer is most critical of the neo-Kantian vestiges in 
Barth’s theology. Bonhoeffer writes in Act and Being of Barth’s actualism: 
 
It must seem strange at first that the relation between God and human beings 
should dissolve into pure acts precisely where, at the outset, the 
transcendence of consciousness on the part of revelation is unequivocally 
asserted. The consequent assumption is confirmed, namely that 
transcendentalism is lurking here.252 
 
Marsh recognises the significance of the event transposing Dasein in Bonhoeffer’s theology, 
but places it firmly back under the rubric of a classical Lutheran notion of kerygma. In 
Marsh’s interpretation of Bonhoeffer, it is “in the hearing of the Word” that “the inner person 
is called out of itself in kerygmatic proclamation.”253 This call is what disrupts the interiorised 
self, opening it up to the outside world, it is “the reconstitution of the interior I as turned 
outward.”254 Insofar as the Word is understood as mere ‘call’, however, it does not 
sufficiently address Bonhoeffer’s concerns. No matter the power contained within this call to 
initiate, distinguish, unite, or transform, it remains, by its very nature, an act resolved in 
consciousness and thus exposed to precisely the transcendentalist paradoxes which Act and 
Being names and rejects. In this respect, the social-anthropological understanding of Christ’s 
givenness reduces promeity to what Bonhoeffer critiques in the Christology lectures as mere 
“ideational power” emanating at a great distance from Christ’s heavenly throne.255 Even as 
much as the social-anthropological strategy intends to speak about Christus praesens, it needs 
to be reminded of the other side to Bonhoeffer’s Lutheran inheritance—as he quotes directly 
from Luther, “It is one thing if God is present, and another if he is present in you.”256   
 
                                                            
252 DBWE 2, 83. 
253 Marsh, Reclaiming Bonhoeffer, 152. 
254 Ibid., 153. 
255 DBWE 12, 311. 
256 Ibid., 314. 
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None of this is intended to diminish Bonhoeffer’s interest in Christ-existing-as-church-
community, but to point out that even this assertion cannot, by itself, easily resolve the 
problem of God and world even within Bonhoeffer’s own thought. Instead, it presses us to 
consider a deeper logic which can incorporate a truly transcendent and yet truly ontological 
Christology which undergirds not only sociality, but ecclesiology, ethics, and more. The route 
towards this deeper logic is the method of promeity. Christological promeity presses us to 
take with utter seriousness the priority of the ‘who’ of revelation, and further presses us to re-
orient our understanding of the God-world problem in the face of this personal presence. As 
such, promeity reminds the dialectical strategy that the hypostatic union of God and human is 
not eschatologically achievable but already accomplished. Promeity reminds the immanentist 
strategy that this presence remains free person. And, finally, we can add that promeity 
reminds the social-anthropological strategy that this person is true presence. When we assert 
that Christ is for us, we are not merely describing the transcendent Christ’s intention, nor even 
describing an epistemic vantage from which we glimpse something of Christ’s being. Instead, 
we are allowing that Christ has graciously revealed his own self as pro me before all else, in 
no other way and to no other end. In this sense, we must speak about Christ’s real being in its 
necessary relationship to reality, even while we are perpetually reminded that this being is 
Jesus of Nazareth and none other. 
 
3.5.4 Conclusion 
There is something ingeniously untidy about Bonhoeffer’s early dissertations, like the 
cluttered workshop of an eccentric inventor. A superfluity of ideas is left in piles on the floor, 
resisting an easy reconstruction of Bonhoeffer’s thoughts, however neatly catalogued they 
might have been in the author’s mind. Every retelling of Bonhoeffer’s early theology is a 
stylised narrative. With that in mind, any number of loose leaves have been set aside for the 
purposes of highlighting a few significant traits which emerge in Bonhoeffer’s thought. These 
concerns, expressed philosophically in the early theses, nonetheless appear over and over 
again in very practical ways across his work. Any theology which follows in the footsteps of 
Bonhoeffer must consider these concerns, not out of mere fidelity to Bonhoeffer, but because 
they indicate progress over the difficult terrain of questions already considered.  
 
First, as has been repeatedly noted, theology’s chief antagonist is idealism in the broadest 
sense, as the Adamic temptation to claim utter self-sufficiency, to reflect all reality back 
through one’s self, and thus to usurp the place of God. Second, existence can only understand 
itself in reference to that which transcends it, always finding its own being in relatedness to 
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another. Third, that which is transcendent cannot be mere act, but must be real being, able to 
retain its alterity while exerting a compassionate limitation on the epistemological ego. 
Fourth, this being must encounter Dasein; it must exert its influence exactly in the encounter 
with already existing humans in their empirical reality. Fifth, this encounter with Dasein must 
form the condition for the human subject to be transformed—socially, ethically, 
epistemologically, existentially, soteriologically, and, ultimately, at the very ground of the 
self’s being.  
 
These five features should not be understood as philosophical boundaries around theology, 
but actually as philosophical manifestations of revelation’s demand. They are not additions or 
limitations to promeity; they are rather the implications of a commitment to christological 
promeity for notions of act, being, and Dasein. This may not be immediately self-evident. 
Chapter 5 will indirectly return to these five features in light of a fuller portrait of promeity. 
There, the attempt will be to extend promeity’s implications more concretely with respect to 
ontology, epistemology, and ethics. Before that, however, Chapter 4 will begin again with the 
revelation of God in Christ, returning to promeity’s source to consider the sharp grace of its 
radical demands and thus elaborate on its method in light of the loose threads still dangling 
from the various strategies mentioned in this chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
Extending Bonhoeffer’s Christology: 
Promeity as Method 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Promeity, as we have seen, is the ontological grounding of Christus praesens. We find 
ourselves encountered by the contemporary presence of the personal ‘who’ of revelation. This 
revelation both permits and provokes a further articulation of God’s relationship to the world. 
This is the sense in which Bonhoeffer uses promeity—as a statement, as a christological 
axiom on which we can build. Yet, it is the claim of this thesis that promeity describes not 
only an axiom, but a method. Understanding promeity as a method requires us to see the way 
in which the axiom of promeity actually entails a logical movement of its own. Chapter 2 
began to sketch the contours of this movement in three steps, suggesting that promeity 
requires first returning again to the Incarnation, not as idea, but as the person of Christ. 
Second, promeity guarantees the freedom of the Incarnation to stand as the grounds for all 
further reflection. The person of revelation is free as person and cannot be objectified and 
therefore placed onto a list of universals constructed by the totalising subject. Third, however, 
promeity requires acknowledging the person of revelation as presence. Permitting Christ to 
define his own self-disclosure means accepting that his being pro me is no contingent fact of 
the moment, but is his own ontological self-constitution. Chapter 2 ended by acknowledging 
the difficulty, even for Bonhoeffer, of concretely articulating these three commitments 
simultaneously.  
 
Bonhoeffer’s ambiguity in this regard creates an opening for his readers to construct their own 
way of extending his thought to more clearly define the relationship between God and world. 
Chapter 3 examined three interpretive strategies for making of sense of Bonhoeffer’s 
commitments. The argument of Chapter 3, however, was that each strategy, in its own way, 
ran afoul of precisely those commitments sketched in Chapter 2 which ought to ground a 
reading of Bonhoeffer’s Christology. The dialectical strategy could not understand with 
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sufficient seriousness that beginning with the Incarnation means taking the union of divine 
and human as already defined and established. The immanentist strategy took seriously the 
extent to which divine presence has been established as necessary and abiding, but could not 
retain the other half of promeity’s commitment, that this presence remains free person. The 
social-anthropological strategy took seriously the free aseity of Christ’s personhood, and 
made a robust attempt to also define Christ’s presence in the relatedness of Christ to sociality 
and the construction of human personhood. Yet, the social-anthropological method could not 
go far enough in understanding presence as a self-description of Christ’s real being. Even to 
the extent that the social-anthropological method took Christ’s presence seriously, it 
nonetheless could not fully take seriously that the pro-me Christ has revealed presence as 
constitutive of his very being. Being present, for the social-anthropological strategy, is 
something the person of Christ does, not a description of what Christ’s personhood actually is. 
In this respect, even the social-anthropological strategy diverges from the path of promeity. 
 
All three interpretive strategies are faithful to Bonhoeffer insofar as they try to imitate his 
own desire to speak with greater precision about the nature and location of Christus praesens. 
All three strategies, however, are built on the premise that locating Christus praesens in 
reality is just another way of describing the attempt to locate the transcendent God in the 
created world. In Bonhoeffer’s mind, however, these are two very different tasks, and taking 
the first task seriously in fact dissolves the second task entirely, as we shall see. In this 
respect, then, all three strategies do not sufficiently understand the radical intensity of 
Bonhoeffer’s commitment.  
 
It is the purpose of Chapter 4 to articulate this degree of intensity by returning to a closer 
reading of Bonhoeffer’s christological language. The result will be to add a fourth step to the 
three steps of promeity mentioned above: that beginning again with the revelation of 
Incarnation means not only allowing Christ to define his own being, but to define all of our 
theological language and, ultimately, our entire description of reality. This is the point at 
which promeity truly becomes a method. The recurring pattern of promeity’s movement is the 
pilgrimage to place perceived aporia before the Incarnation, only to discover that some of the 
ideas we hold in tension are equally grounded and already united in Christ. Our attempts to 
hold one idea over another—or even to resolve them in a dialectical movement—actually 
deny their pre-existing unity in revelation which ought to precede not only our reflection, but 
our very definitions. We do not need to relate reality to God, but to redefine our own 
conception of reality to fit its a priori relatedness to God. This means, in the same breath, that 
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we must redefine our language of divinity to fit God’s a priori relatedness to the world. 
Refining this thought requires appropriating promeity as a cognitive and rhetorical pattern 
which we can extend beyond the scope of dogmatic christological questions in order to apply 
it to contemporary issues, including the questions of a fundamental ontology. But before we 
can be prepared for that final leap, it is important to engage in a closer reading of 
Bonhoeffer’s christological commitments. 
 
 
4.2 The doctrinal pillars provided by promeity 
“Death and Christmas have moved very close to each other,” Bonhoeffer wrote to the alumni 
of Finkenwalde during Advent, 1939, after reporting the accidental death of a brother during 
military service.1 Earlier in the year, Bonhoeffer had fled military conscription by travelling 
to America. Agonised by the distance from friends and family at this most dire hour, however, 
Bonhoeffer hastily returned as Germany moved towards war, which broke out in September. 
By December, at least sixteen of Bonhoeffer’s former Finkenwalde students had already been 
drafted into the army, and one former Confessing Church pastor from Pomerania had already 
been killed in action.2 For anyone unfamiliar with Bonhoeffer’s ethos, it would seem a strange 
time for an extended meditation on doctrine. Yet, amidst the pastoral letters or care and 
concern sent to his former students and their families, Bonhoeffer continued to circulate 
theological briefs to the pastors of the Confessing Church in Pomerania. Rather than distract 
him, the bleak shadow of war only seemed to intensify Bonhoeffer’s resolve to interrogate life 
theologically, to bring the full force of revelation to bear on existence amidst horror, courage, 
and sacrifice. In faithfulness to the Real One, this theological interrogation of life could not be 
separated from a lived interrogation of theology, a determined examination of the possibilities 
inherent in ancient dogmatic debates. 
 
Consequently, shortly after writing the aforementioned letter, Bonhoeffer wrote his first 
formal engagement with Christology in its doctrinal aspects since the 1933 lectures. 
Circulated among the Pomeranian pastors during December, 1939 as a meditation on 
Christmas, Bonhoeffer considered anew the implications of God born in a manger. In terms of 
content, there is little fresh ground broken or new insights which were not already included in 
the 1933 lectures. Little about Bonhoeffer’s Christology appears to have changed in the 
intervening six years. Nonetheless, this brief reflection is worth attending to because it gives 
                                                            
1 DBWE 15, 288. 
2 Ibid., 273. 
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us an insight into the particular aspects of Christology Bonhoeffer considered worth 
highlighting in a condensed format. As we shall see, the claims he mentions in 1939 are also 
the very doctrinal pillars which arise out of promeity. 
 
There are three points which Bonhoeffer chooses to highlight in 1939. First, in becoming 
human, God took on human “nature, being, flesh of all human beings” and in taking on 
human nature took on “the epitome of all human possibilities altogether.”3 As much as this is 
a statement about the comprehensive effect of the Incarnation, it is equally a statement about 
the priority of Christ to define the human. The confession that “God become human by taking 
on human nature,” stands in contrast to the alternative, that God took “on a single human 
being.”4 God did not select a human existence from among many, but took on humanity as a 
whole to transform and redefine it. This provides hope not only of our acceptance, but also the 
proximity and priority of Christus praesens: “where Jesus Christ is, we are, whether we know 
it or not.”5 
 
Secondly, in 1939, Bonhoeffer reiterates a major motif from the 1933 lectures which we will 
discuss in greater detail below. This is the assertion that the hypostatic union precedes 
reflection on the Incarnation, excludes the extra Calvinisticum, and so “the divine nature is 
hidden in the manger” but “is nonetheless present; it is hidden for our sake, it is present for 
our sake.”6 When one is encountered by the person of Christ, one finds oneself addressed not 
by the human form or aspect of divinity, but by the already united “human and divine nature 
joined in the person of the Son of God.”7 The implications of this claim will run very deep, as 
we shall see. 
 
Thirdly, in 1939, Bonhoeffer highlights something which is easily overlooked as a mere 
technical point of Lutheran dogmatic minutiae. This is the doctrine of the genus majestaticum, 
“that is, the impartation during the incarnation of the attributes of the divine nature to the 
human nature.”8 This is a provocative point with immense implications which Bonhoeffer 
does not revisit as thoroughly as he did in 1933. Suffice to say that, in the 1939 reflection, the 
genus majestaticum serves as a reminder of “the deepest and ultimate union of God with the 
                                                            
3 DBWE 15, 530. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., 531. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., 532. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 85 
 
human being.”9 This, Bonhoeffer reminds us, provides the basis for a sacramental theology. 
To take the genus majestaticum seriously is to take Christ’s hoc est corpus meum seriously, 
and vice versa. 
 
The doctrinal questions of Christology are still very much alive for Bonhoeffer in 1939, even 
in a world craving violence, careless of the answers. As we revisit the core ideas of the 1933 
lectures, it is worth bearing in mind the 1939 meditation. The three ideas mentioned above 
will not only shape our appropriation of the 1933 lectures, but will also prove, in the end, to 
be the theological bridge linking traditional doctrine with Bonhoeffer’s christological 
innovations of the 1940’s, manifest particularly in his Ethics manuscript. Whatever seems 
dichotomous between Bonhoeffer’s middle and late theology—transcendence versus 
immanence, church versus world, faith versus autonomy, religion versus secularity—finds a 
shared conceptual starting point in the Christology of 1939. It is therefore worth considering 
the origin of these ideas in the 1933 lectures, before considering the destination of these ideas 
in Ethics. 
 
 
4.3 Promeity in a dogmatic frame 
As a hermeneutical problem, attention has been and should be given to the issue of what it 
means to extract Bonhoeffer’s theological claims from his lectures, insofar as they are also 
attempts to instruct his students on the breadth of doctrine.10 The 1933 Christology lectures 
range over a wide of variety of topics. Though there is a legitimate argument to be made that 
the whole series represents Bonhoeffer’s own convictions, the highlights arising from the 
1939 meditation will not only serve to focus our attention, but to limit our inquiry to those 
claims which are most explicitly Bonhoeffer’s own.  
 
As noted in chapter 2, the Christology lectures begin with the ‘who’ of revelation serving as 
barrier to the egocentric pretensions of idealist philosophy. This ‘who’ is available, it 
confronts us, and precisely in confronting us reveals itself to be the pro-me person of Christ. 
To acknowledge Christ as pro me is simultaneously to acknowledge him as person and as 
presence. In this respect promeity is an ontological statement; it describes Christ’s own way 
of being. As person, Christ retains the power to act. As presence, Christ has made himself 
present to us, and done so in a way that abides. In abiding, he discloses being, Christus 
                                                            
9 DBWE 15, 533. 
10 See Larry L. Rasmussen, “Editor’s Introduction to the English Edition,” in DBWE 12, 37ff., as well as p. 299 
for a discussion of issues surrounding the reconstruction and translation of the Christology lectures.   
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praesens. Promeity as method means not only starting with the fact of Christ’s revelation, but 
then recognising that the incarnate Christ discloses himself as act and being, as a unity which 
resists division into contrasting aspects. 
 
To begin with the pro-me ‘who’ is to acknowledge that the one revealed to us is already “the 
human-God Jesus.”11 This is simultaneously to take seriously Dasein, to begin our reflection 
from our own historical situatedness with respect to the issue. As mere humans, our access to 
the divine is entirely given to us in revelation, and if this revelation is Christ, then our 
thinking is very much circumscribed by the definitions and possibilities inherent to the 
Incarnation. What we are left with, in Bonhoeffer’s words, is the fact that “I cannot know who 
the human Christ is if I do not simultaneously think of the God-Christ and vice versa.”12 This 
description of the ‘who’ precedes our reflection just as surely as the ‘who’ itself precedes our 
reflection.  
 
This raises three questions which need to be addressed. First, and most importantly, what are 
the implications for theological thought of asserting that it is the God-human who confronts 
us, and therefore that divinity and humanity belong together despite our many attempts to 
think of them separately? Second, then, what are the implications for our understanding of 
divinity if we locate its definition in the revelation of the incarnate God-human? What, for 
instance, does it say about God to assert that it is not only Christ’s physical humanity but his 
divinity which has taken form in time and space? Third, there is the converse question, i.e. 
what are the implications for our understanding of humanity if we locate its definition in the 
revelation of the incarnate God-human? What, for instance, are the implications of asserting 
that it is Christ the historical human who is still temporally present despite his physical body 
having been put to death some two thousand year ago? The three christological doctrines 
manifest in the 1939 reflection are the pillars erected by promeity precisely because, as we 
shall see, they correspond to the answer to these three questions. 
 
Let us begin with the first question: what are the theological implications of being 
encountered by the God-human of the Incarnation? The implications, for Bonhoeffer, are both 
simple and far-reaching. It immediately shifts the grounds of all christological debate. It is 
this point which Bonhoeffer hints at in his second statement from the 1939 reflection. If the 
driving force behind classical dogmatic debates has been the attempt to articulate the relation 
                                                            
11 DBWE 12, 313. 
12 Ibid. 
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of human and divine in the person of Christ, then that entire debate has been set aside. 
Bonhoeffer’s insight is that there is no way of even engaging that debate without taking a 
definition of human or divine as prior to the reality of the Incarnation, and therefore 
subsuming the Incarnation under the pre-existing definitions of our language.  
 
Instead of the Incarnation representing a mere datum which can be analysed through the 
categories of divinity and humanity, Bonhoeffer understands that what has been given in 
revelation is already the hypostatic union of both, together. The Incarnation is the definition 
of human and divine independently, while also defining the two as hypostatically one in the 
person of Christ. The Chalcedonian formula, in Bonhoeffer’s mind, is less actus reflectus than 
actus directus. It is not a solution to a problem puzzled out by the early church; it is rather a 
response to the bare facticity of the Incarnation. The Chalcedonian formula serves a negative 
function, it is the sentinel guarding the mystery of the actus purus, reminding us “that all 
options for thinking of all this [the relation of the two natures] together and in juxtaposition 
are represented as impossible and forbidden options.13 Beyond acknowledging the union of 
human and divine as the content of revelation, there can be no further elaboration on the 
underlying mechanics. Nor can there be a kind of reflection that focuses on one without the 
other, as if one can, in Bonhoeffer’s language, “get behind Christ’s claim” to an 
understanding of either facet without the other.14  
 
With one blow, Bonhoeffer cuts through the Gordian knot of much traditional christological 
debate. There is no need for further inquiry into the relation of the two natures. What is 
required, however, is further reflection on a very different dichotomy—the relation between 
the incarnate God-human and his veiled appearance to us in the homoioma sarkos, the 
likeness of flesh.15 Again, the homoioma sarkos should not be understood as the human form 
of Christ’s divinity, but as the shroud in which “the whole God-human is hidden.”16 The 
“stumbling block” of the homoioma sarkos tempts us to separate pneuma from sarx, to 
separate exalted, impassable divinity from humiliated, crucified flesh. But the homoioma 
sarkos should be understood, in a sense, as external to the mystery of the Incarnation rather 
than internal. It does nothing to modify the nature of the underlying union which Chalcedon 
confesses. Whatever subsequent reflection we make concerning the Incarnation, we always 
                                                            
13 DBWE 12, 342. 
14 Ibid., 304. 
15 Ibid., 313. 
16 Ibid. 
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find ourselves making reference to “Jesus Christ as the already existing God-human.”17 
Therefore, it is the total God-human who is present and available; it is the total God-human 
who is veiled in eternal mystery.  
 
What makes the homoioma sarkos a stumbling block is that the empirical Christ who walked 
in our midst has been crucified. In both life and death, he appears to us in humiliation 
precisely when we anticipate that the true God-human would be revealed in exaltation. This 
again refines the christological concern. It is not the fact that God would appear as a human 
which should give us pause. To the extent that it does give us pause, it only demonstrates how 
beholden we are to pre-existing expectations of divine and human. Instead, what should give 
us pause is that the God-human would appear as this human, as the wandering, rejected, and 
executed Lamb of God. It is for this reason that, in Bonhoeffer’s Christology, “the doctrine of 
God who became human and the humiliation of Christ must be kept radically separate.”18 To 
speak of Christ’s becoming flesh as divine condescension is once again to attempt to ‘get 
behind’ the Incarnation to a pure divinity which precedes the hypostatic union.  
 
One implication of this argument is manifest in Bonhoeffer’s hard opposition to the extra 
Calvinisticum, the Reformed notion that there is a second person of the Trinity a se— some 
surplus of Logos which exists prior to or beyond Jesus of Nazareth.19 To speak of God’s 
condescension, therefore, is not to speak of God’s free decision to become human, but to 
speak of the God-human’s free decision to be clothed in humiliation, to reveal God’s self in a 
manger, on a cross, with “nowhere to lay his head” (Matt. 8:20). The juxtaposition of the 
essential glory of the God-human with his empirical appearance as the crucified God-human 
is what “blind[s] the mind of unbelievers” (2 Cor. 4:4). It is easier to reconcile Christ’s glory 
with his appearance after the resurrection, but the prior unity of the God-human must remind 
us that the ‘who’ of revelation will always be “the presence of the God-human as the 
Resurrected One, that is, the Exalted One” and “at the same time the presence of the 
humiliated Christ.”20 Therefore, “to speak of Jesus’s being humiliated is not to put any limit 
on his divinity.”21 The humiliated God-human is not the final or summary form of the divine, 
but it is inextricably united with the exaltation of the God-human. 
 
                                                            
17 DBWE 12, 313. 
18 Ibid., 356. 
19 Ibid., 346. 
20 Ibid., 314. 
21 Ibid., 355. 
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It is only as Bonhoeffer begins to discuss the three-fold Gestalt of Christ in word, sacrament, 
and church-community that promeity begins to emerge as a pattern. As word, Christ is neither 
a word spoken by the Father, nor the speaker of many commands, but Christ “is the Word in 
the form of the living Word to humankind.”22 As such, Christ is the union of speaker and 
spoken, linguistic person and presence in one. As person, the Word transcends mere idea 
which “the [human] person needs only take possession of.”23 As presence, the Word is always 
“a word spoken to us”24 and thus we can say that “Christ is by nature, as God’s Word spoken 
to me, pro-me.”25 The challenge is not to locate God’s words with respect to human words. 
Both find their origin in the pro-me Christ, the Word of God. The challenge is ensuring that 
we find the actual words we speak caught up in this union of divine and human Word. For 
Bonhoeffer, true kerygma is the place where our commonplace word finds itself united with 
the Word.26 Importantly, however, this is to say that in the true sermon—when the words we 
speak find themselves caught up in the Word—we find our words not only emerging as divine 
words, but as more human words. Hence, the Word “does not mean Christ as timeless truth, 
but rather as truth breaking into a concrete moment.”27   
 
This is Bonhoeffer’s formulation in the 1933 lectures, but it echoes a very persistent theme in 
his understanding of kerygma which had emerged most clearly as he began to wrestle with the 
possibility of the church giving an explicit command of God’s will, such as “fight this war, or 
do not fight this war.”28 As true kerygma:  
 
the commandment needs concretion in content through the one who 
proclaims it; the commandment: ‘Love thy neighbor’ is as such so general 
that it requires the strongest concretion if I am to hear what it means for me 
here and today. And only as such a concrete word to is it God’s word. He 
who proclaims the word must therefore be aware that he must include the 
respective situation within the form of the commandment, so that the 
commandment is relevant to the real situation.29  
 
                                                            
22 DBWE 12, 316. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 317. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 DBWE 11, 360. 
29 Ibid. 
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Notice the distinction here: not all kerygma is Word, but that which is Word will find itself at 
the nexus of God’s will and the particular circumstances of the moment. It is only in this 
respect that it can manifest the pre-existing unity of divine and human, of eternity and history, 
at the kairos when the Word of God speaks. 
 
As sacrament, the same underlying logic announces Christus praesens in the bread and wine. 
In light of the history of Protestant debate on the nature of Christ’s presence in the sacrament, 
Bonhoeffer follows the Lutheran argument on this point—that Christ’s words of institution, 
“this is my body,” are the first and last statement on the matter.30 Bonhoeffer, while agreeing 
with Luther in this respect, does not use this foundation as a reason to re-engage in a 16th-
century polemic. Instead, the logic of promeity once again cuts through the debate. Even 
Luther’s arguments about the relation of Christ to the substance of the elements are, for 
Bonhoeffer, “impossible metaphysical hypostatizations. In each of them, one element of the 
reality has been isolated and made into a system.”31 What is given in Christ’s hoc est corpus 
meum is that “the God-human is present now in the sacrament.”32 With this established, there 
is no need for further reflection on the metaphysics of substance and accidents, indeed, such 
reflection is made impossible. We cannot speak of the meeting of God and reality in the 
Eucharist, because to do so would be to act as if we can speak of either in isolation. We can 
only speak of the God-reality, the God-human.  
 
The sacrament is Bonhoeffer’s new christological challenge made manifest. Rather than 
debating the relation of Christ to reality, we require further reflection on the relation of the 
exalted Christ-reality to its appearance for us as a bit of crumbly bread and a sip of wine. The 
latter is Christ’s form in “his being humiliated in the present.”33 It is this confession that the 
God-human’s glory can be reconciled with the lowly appearance of a simple meal which is 
“the stumbling block” manifest in the sacrament.34 
 
Finally, in the church-community, the same pattern of thought applies. The Incarnation 
reveals to us Christ “as the new humanity,” and therefore as the true humanity in its 
relatedness to the divine.35 In this way, revelation “creates the form of the church-
                                                            
30 DBWE 12, 320. 
31 Ibid., 321. 
32 Ibid., 319. 
33 Ibid., 322. 
34 Ibid., 320. 
35 Ibid., 323. 
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community” and so “the church-community is the body of Christ.”36 As before, this fact exists 
prior to reflection, in the givenness of the pro-me Christ’s presence. The real problem for 
ecclesiology is understanding how the reality of Christ-existing-as-Gemeinde can be 
reconciled with the church as “it still lives in the aeon of sin.”37 By the light of revelation’s 
reality, “Insofar as the church-community is the church-community, it no longer sins.”38 
Clearly, however, the church-community does sin, and by implication distinguishes itself 
from its true nature as the church-community. This, then, is “the stumbling block” as it relates 
to the church-community.39 The challenge is to understand even the sinful church as Christus 
praesens, but in his humiliated form, standing at some perceptual distance from the God-
human in his exalted form, and thus at some distance from the true body of the church-
community.  
 
Let this serve as a concluding word, then, with respect to the social-anthropological strategy 
for interpreting Bonhoeffer described in Chapter 3. For all of its promise, it was ultimately an 
attempt to understand the social possibilities of the church as a place where the transcendent 
Christ has chosen to disclose his presence. We are in agreement that Christ-existing-as-
church-community is not only a formula for understanding ecclesiology, but a location for 
understanding sociology and even anthropology. We are in agreement, furthermore, that it is 
enormously significant to Bonhoeffer’s project. The disagreement is that, in the attempt to 
articulate the transcendent Christ’s presence in the social existence of the new humanity, the 
social-anthropological strategy implicitly understands the first in isolation from the second. 
The critique of the social-anthropological method here very much parallels Bonhoeffer’s 
critique of Luther’s sacramentology. The attempt to refine the ‘how’ of God’s relation to 
sociality is actually subjecting the Incarnation to prior definitions of both God and sociality. 
What the Incarnation presents to us is the prior union of human sociology and the divine in 
the social existence of Christ. The real question is not how to articulate Christ’s relationship 
to a social-anthropology, but how to understand the exalted social life of the new humanity in 
relation to the humiliated form of our broken, isolating, possessive, disconnected relating to 
one another. In this respect, there is much to commend the work of scholars like Green, 
Floyd, and Marsh as an attempt to refine and resolve the second question. But the second 
question reveals the mistaken presumptions inherent in the first question, and therefore the 
work of the social-anthropological strategy—for all of its potential application to social 
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existence—cannot serve as an adequate resolution for the interest which occupies this essay, 
i.e. implementing promeity as a method for addressing the problem of God and world.  
 
In Bonhoeffer’s application of the Incarnation to word, sacrament, and church, we begin to 
truly see promeity emerging as a pattern of a thought. Beginning again with the Incarnation 
drives us back to consider the pro-me Christ who has encountered us. Acknowledging his 
priority means permitting him the freedom of self-definition. Acknowledging his radical 
otherness as person means admitting that definitions derived from any experience outside of 
Christ cannot be applied to Christ. The Incarnation supplies its own definitions. This means 
acknowledging that the person, in his being presently manifest, defines his own being for us 
in terms of presence. Moreover, however, promeity as a method means returning all of our 
definitions to the Incarnation as the true source of knowledge, as the Logos which confronts 
and limits the human logos. 
 
The first words which will have to be redefined upon encounter with the incarnate Christ are 
the very words we take to be constitutive of Christology: ‘divine’ and ‘human.’ A new 
definition of each arises from Bonhoeffer’s Christology precisely from the points raised in his 
1939 Christmas reflection. What are the implications for ‘divinity’ of acknowledging the 
already-there God-human? What are the implications for ‘humanity’? The first and third 
Lutheran points of emphasis which were highlighted in the 1939 reflection are clearly present 
in the 1933 lectures as answers to these questions. 
 
First, “God . . . became human as we became human. He is completely human. Nothing 
human is foreign to him.”40 This is not to subject God to a prior definition of humanity, such 
“that we already knew beforehand who God is,” but to locate ‘divinity’ in its proper definition 
in Christ.41 Moreover, God has taken on not only the form of a man, but “the whole nature of 
humankind.”42 At its limit, this leads Bonhoeffer to critique the doctrine of enhypostasia—an 
argument for holding together the hypostatic union and Christ’s full humanity without also 
attributing to him sinfulness. Even the formulation of the human hypostasis “existing 
enhypostatically in the divine hypostasis,”—carefully calibrated to preserve the fundamental 
unity of Christ—contains within it a pre-conceived notion of distinct divine-ness and human-
ness.43 Consequently, it is “an ultimately concealed form of docetism.”44 It betrays our 
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willingness to continually pit Christ’s glory against the degraded fallenness of humanity. But, 
for Bonhoeffer, “God glorifies himself in the human” and therefore, “God’s self-glorification 
in the human is thus the glorification of the human.”45 We must rid ourselves “conclusively 
with the attempt to unite two isolated existing realities. We believe that Jesus the human being 
is God, and that he is so as the human being, not in spite of his humanity or beyond his 
humanity.”46  
 
Christ is sinless—a dogmatic assertion which Bonhoeffer affirms. This assertion is not 
affirmed, however, as a judgment of Christ’s actions. It “is not a judgment within a moral 
system but rather a recognition, through the eyes of faith, of the One who does these 
things.”47 In this respect, Bonhoeffer is not concerned with justifying the goodness of Christ’s 
actions, understanding that it is exactly Christ’s entry into the humiliated form of the 
homoioma sarkos which veils all human action in “the ambiguity of good and evil.”48 Christ’s 
holiness is not an assessment after the fact, but a presupposition revealed by the present 
‘who’. His glory, therefore, is not the spotlessness of his holiness, but precisely the fact that 
this Holy One would be humiliated in the likeness of flesh. Bonhoeffer, while affirming 
Christ’s perfection, seems perpetually more opposed to erecting an insurmountable wall 
between Christ and humanity’s sinfulness than fearful that Christ’s perfection might become 
tainted by sin.  
 
A definition of divinity which begins with the pro-me Christ therefore finds its glory not in 
isolated purity, but in the love required to enter the state of humiliation. In terms of the way 
Bonhoeffer’s Christology informs his broader theological project, it is worth noting the 
implications here for his critique of docetism. The early church reacted against docetism out 
of soteriological concerns—human flesh could only be redeemed to the extent that Christ had 
assumed it and therefore atoned for it. Bonhoeffer agrees with this critique, but as a secondary 
matter. More fundamental is the problem that docetism is motivated by “an abstract idea of 
God, a doctrine of God that prefers to leave the human element to one side.”49 This is less a 
soteriological concern than an ontological concern—docetism does not properly begin with 
Christ pro nobis. Its origin “lies in the antithesis between idea and appearance” which 
Bonhoeffer attributes to “Greek” and “pagan” thought rather than the “Jewish thinking” of 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
44 DBWE 12, 335. 
45 Ibid., 355. 
46 Ibid., 354, emphasis in original. 
47 Ibid., 357. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., 333. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 94 
 
scripture.50 Bonhoeffer’s presumption is that a more biblically-faithful understanding would 
presume the unity of idea and appearance. This is clearly not the same as saying that the idea 
is merely extrapolated from appearances, but that the idea is made manifest precisely in its 
appearance. Any apparent contradiction between the two is not a reason to adjust the idea, nor 
to dismiss the appearance, but to call the capacities of human observation into question. 
Applied to Christology, the apparent paradox between our notion of God a se and God 
appearing in the manger lies in our own limitations rather than in any inherent contradiction 
between the two.  
 
It is Bonhoeffer’s boldness to assert the presence of divinity in union with its broken 
appearance—at the moment when we are most tempted to perceive a divide—that holds 
together the radicalism of promeity’s method. Ethically and politically, it informs his later 
work, even down to the very practical decision to participate in the conspiracy to overthrow 
Hitler, thereby imitating Christ by “acting in vicarious representative responsibility and 
entering out of love for the real human being into the guilt of the world.”51 In one sense, it can 
be understood in the context of a Lutheran theologia crucis, the logical consequence of truly 
“unit[ing] both justification and Christology into an inextricable whole, so that it is not 
possible to think of God without the world, or of forgiveness of sins without Christ.”52 
Admittedly, however—in the context of historical theology and ecumenical conversation— 
Bonhoeffer’s Christology occupies a fairly radical position on this point. Pressed to its limits, 
it can make Bonhoeffer appear even more Lutheran than Luther. It is for this reason that the 
Lutheran Jaroslav Pelikan, in an early reading of Bonhoeffer, found himself worrying over 
whether Bonhoeffer “barely extricates himself from the Ebionite heresy.”53  
 
A re-definition of humanity in response to the Incarnation takes seriously the last point 
highlighted in the 1939 Christmas reflection—Bonhoeffer’s expansive appropriation of the 
communicatio idiomatum. The dogmatic doctrine of the interaction between the divine and 
human natures in the one person of Christ receives a distinctively Bonhoefferian spin. For 
Bonhoeffer, the interaction of the two cannot be limited to Christ’s person; it must describe 
not only their relatedness in the Incarnation, but the origin of their intrinsic relatedness 
through Christ. The communicatio idiomatum includes the genus majestaticum, which 
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“asserts that the attributes of the divine nature can and must be expressed by the human 
nature.”54 The pro-me structure of Christ leads immediately to this doctrine. As the encounter 
of presence, we understand that, “The body of Christ is not bound by its bodily nature but is 
present everywhere simultaneously as the genus majestaticum.”55 Because “Jesus is ever-
present” and always the God-human, one cannot look to God without seeing the human.56 In 
Christ is a glimpse not only of redeemed humanity, but of humanity in its truest sense, a 
humanity abandoned by homo sapiens in the Fall. 
 
It is important to clarify that the re-definition of language in the Incarnation, for Bonhoeffer, 
does not permit us to treat the person of Christ as mere idea. We are not supplied with a new 
vocabulary—a meaning for terms that can be extricated from their origin in Christ and then 
broadly applied in other contexts to other debates. Even in their other uses and applications, 
these terms must retain their Christ-relatedness—it is the first clause of their definition. It is 
along these lines on which Bonhoeffer accuses Hegel of docetism.57 Hegel, in Bonhoeffer’s 
eyes, turned the Incarnation from an act of decision into an act of necessity—“the taking 
shape of the idea” of the God-human.58 This docetic turn is not redeemed simply by locating 
its origin in God’s free decision. Whether the principle of incarnation precedes or follows 
after Christ’s Incarnation, it is nonetheless an idea which fails to attend to the real and 
immediate appearance of Christus praesens. In a similar vein, the Incarnation’s renewed 
definition of humanity does not give us a set of markers for living as new humans in 
compassion and self-sacrifice. For Bonhoeffer, the Incarnation gives us Christ. ‘Humanity’ 
and ‘divinity’ must be understood as related to Christ even before they are understood as 
related to one another.  
 
In this spirit, Bonhoeffer reflects in the 1933 lectures on Christ “as the center of human 
existence, of history, and of nature.”59 In short sketches, Bonhoeffer hints at the logic of 
promeity applied to these three phenomena of reality. Bonhoeffer’s preference is to speak 
about the way Christ defines “the boundary and the centre” of all three.60 This terminology is 
likely more confusing than helpful, however. It gives the appearance that Bonhoeffer is 
describing Christ’s relationship to each phenomenon in two ways, when it would be more 
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accurate to say that Bonhoeffer is describing each phenomenon as possessing two distinctive 
natures, with Christ related differently to each nature.  
 
With respect to human existence, for instance, Christ is not the centre of our present 
existence, but the centre of our true existence “before God.”61 In this respect, “Christ is not 
the center that we can see here but rather the centre according to our faith.”62 Christ is thus the 
centre of the new humanity—of humanity as it ought to be in its restored relationship to 
God—but also the limit of the old humanity—the boundary against which our fallen logos 
crashes.63 In this respect, Christ is the centre of true humanity—the new humanity—without 
losing his relatedness to the false, inauthentic humanity of the empirical human condition. 
 
With respect to history, Christ is the centre as “the meaning of history,” and the “promise” 
toward which “history lives.”64 In this respect, Christ is the centre of true history, the narrative 
of God’s redeeming work in the world. And yet, Christ is also the limit of “every other claim 
that history might make.”65 Any other false narrative of historical movement which does not 
account for Christ finds itself “swallowed up in an event that takes place in the deepest 
desolation of human life, on the cross.”66 Here, one can reach back to Bonhoeffer’s definition 
from Sanctorum Communio, that “history in the proper sense only begins with sin, since we 
intrinsically associate the fact of mortality, which makes ‘history’ possible for us in the first 
place, with sin.”67 The inauthentic empirical history which we annotate and interrogate finds 
its origin in the Fall, as the moment when the social life of humanity becomes a proper 
movement, first away from God, then into itself in the cycles of death and destruction, then at 
odds with itself as the perpetually restless and ultimately ill-fated attempts at self-generated 
reconciliation. Christ’s appearance—when “God’s word became history”68—announces the 
limit of this shadow history in the simultaneous proclamation of a “messianic history”69 
which is the true story of the world. 
 
This same troubled search of existence for its true self is manifest in nature, for “what are 
natural catastrophes if not nature’s dim desire to free itself, to make itself into a new 
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creation?”70 Christ as “the firstborn of all creation” (Col. 1:15) consequently “makes all other 
creatures into the old creation.”71 Christ is centre in his relatedness to creation as it is 
redeemed before God, and therefore the centre of creation, properly speaking. This is not the 
same as the fallen creation of our present experience, yet Christ abides in relationship to this 
fallen creation as well, as the boundary which announces its limit. In his relatedness to human 
existence, history, and creation, Christ “is the judgment and the justification.”72 He appears as 
the limiting judgment against fallen reality by simultaneously appearing as the centre of 
justified reality. 
 
As we have seen, the 1933 lectures alone provide a pattern of redefinition that establishes 
promeity as a method. God, humanity, Word, church, Eucharist, existence, history, and nature 
are subjected to the same basic methodology. Promeity demands their redefinition in the 
Incarnation, in the person who is presence. Locating these concepts in the Incarnation means 
taking Christ’s revealed reality as prior to our reflection, and shifts into view a new object for 
our consideration: the relation of these phenomena in their empirical existence to their true 
existence in Christ, or, put another way, the relation of the Real One’s presence veiled in 
humiliation to the same presence revealed in exaltation. The true ontological centre of each 
facet of reality is hypostatically united with Christ. That which is empirically available to us, 
however, is no less defined by its relation to Christ. The difference is one of humiliation to 
exaltation, of judgment to justification, of stumbling block to revealed glory. Spelling this out 
more concretely will be the concern of Chapter 5. 
 
For now, the central conceit of this thesis is that promeity as method is Bonhoeffer’s chief 
contribution to the problem of God and world. Promeity must be applied with utter 
seriousness not only to ecclesiology and anthropology, but to a fundamental ontology. 
Transcendence and immanence are yet further vocabulary which must submit to the logic of 
promeity. Thus, Bonhoeffer’s contribution to the problem of God and world is not to answer 
the question, but to abolish it entirely. Any attempt to reconcile God to world is bound to fail 
precisely because it implicitly treats the two in isolation, and thereby finds itself speaking 
from some other ground than the given unity of the Incarnation. What should trouble us is not 
God’s relationship to reality, but the Christ-Reality’s relation to our empirical existence. 
Being itself is not related to Christ, being is Christ insofar as we acknowledge the prior unity 
of the universal and the Dasein in Christ. A Bonhoefferian fundamental ontology refuses to 
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acknowledge prior definitions of either God or reality, and thus refuses to acknowledge the 
basic dichotomy which makes the God-world problem so troubling. 
 
Refining this insight requires first grappling with Bonhoeffer’s own fragmentary attempts to 
explicate it fully in his later work. As much as it can be a challenge to read Bonhoeffer’s later 
theology in continuity with his earlier, it can be a challenge even to read Ethics in continuity 
with itself. Written in short bursts at intervals between 1940 and 1943, Ethics, as its title 
suggests, is principally concerned with the problem of God and world in its ethical aspect, i.e. 
how do we act in accord with God’s self-revelation?73 Given the overlap with Bonhoeffer’s 
decision to join the anti-Hitler conspiracy, Ethics is obviously no mere academic exercise. 
The desire to not only understand a Christian ethic but motivate the church to act in accord 
with God’s work lends Ethics its intensely focused and forceful urgency. As such, 
Bonhoeffer’s own understanding of ontology is available only by inference, working 
backwards from his express interest in a Christian ethic that can meet the demands of the 
moment.  
 
 
4.4 Promeity, Christ-Reality, and Ethics 
The earliest portion of Ethics, a section entitled “Christ, Reality, and the Good,” is the place 
where the ontological issues rise closest to the surface. While Christology is not addressed in 
Ethics in relation to any dogmatic categories, nonetheless it quickly becomes apparent that 
Christology is central to Bonhoeffer’s attempt to create a properly Christian definition of the 
good. Bonhoeffer clearly retains the basic sensibility of promeity—that God must be allowed 
to define God’s self—and so God must be allowed to speak first about what is good or, more 
precisely, to reveal God’s self as goodness. This is an affirmation of God as Creator and 
consequently as grounds for the world properly understood. “Where God is known by faith to 
be the ultimate reality,” Bonhoeffer writes, “the source of my ethical concern will be that God 
be known as the good.”74 In further keeping with the method of promeity, to speak of God is 
first to speak of Christ, “as ultimate reality is no other than the self-announcing, self-
witnessing, self-revealing God in Jesus Christ.”75 Furthermore, however, in fidelity to his 
earlier Christological insights, to speak of Christ is to acknowledge the God-human, the two 
natures in one person prior to any reflection. And so to speak of God’s ultimate reality is to 
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acknowledge that, “There are not two realities, but only one reality, and that is God’s reality 
revealed in Christ in the reality of the world.”76  
 
Precisely in this formulation, however, the subtle ambiguity of Ethics is present. A great deal 
hinges on how exactly we read what Bonhoeffer means by “the reality of the world” in which 
“God’s reality” is revealed. If God’s reality is in some way generally available in the 
empirical reality of the world, then perhaps Bonhoeffer’s later theology is best characterised 
by an immanentist type move towards the collapse of divinity into the empirical world. This, 
then, would be the final result of “the christocratic character of reality,” in Larry Rasmussen’s 
words.77   Indeed, this is how Rasmussen reads Ethics, as the place “where Bonhoeffer states 
vividly that Christ’s taking up the world into himself in the Incarnation established an 
‘ontological coherence’ of God’s reality with the reality of the world.”78 
 
Bonhoeffer fails in Ethics to articulate the relation between Christ-Reality and reality as 
clearly as he establishes the relation between Christ as the centre of the new and the limit of 
the old in the 1933 lectures. There is no further discussion of the homoioma sarkos, of 
Christ’s presence behind the veil of humiliation. Bonhoeffer’s usage of the world ‘reality’ 
refers at times to empirical existence and at times to the Christ-Reality, without sufficient 
distinction. Precisely this ambiguity permits the interpretation that there is no difference 
here—that empirical reality has become the sum and extent of the Christ-Reality. Yet there 
are also moments of forceful clarity in Ethics in which the distinction is maintained. This 
permits an equally plausible interpretation, that Bonhoeffer’s later fundamental ontology 
remains congruent with his earlier Christology, and the ambiguity in his usage owes less to an 
immanentist shift in his thought than it does to the unguarded urgency of his writing, 
unmodulated by any final attempt to gather Ethics into a systematic and publishable whole.  
 
This latter interpretation of Ethics—that Bonhoeffer maintains a distinction between Christ-
Reality and empirical reality—emerges at intervals over the course of the manuscript. For 
example, Bonhoeffer writes in the section “Christ, Reality, and the Good”: 
 
The unity of the reality of God and the reality of the world established in 
Christ (repeats itself, or, more exactly) realizes itself again and again in 
human beings, Still, that which is Christian is not identical with the worldly 
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. . . Rather, the unity that exists between them is given only in the Christ-
reality, and that means only as accepted by faith in this ultimate reality.79 
 
The language in the distinction between the “the reality of God” and “the reality of the world” 
very much parallels the insights of the 1933 lectures. The two are united, but only insofar as 
the Christ-Reality establishes a new centre for both or, more properly, reveals itself as the 
place where both are rightly understood as one. This unity “realizes itself again and again in 
human beings,” suggesting that the Christ-Reality advances on humanity in its real existence, 
but nonetheless stands over Dasein as the true essence which existence is unable to realize in 
itself. 
 
Tracing back over the outline of this same logic, Bonhoeffer writes that “the place that in all 
other ethics is marked by the antithesis between ought and is, idea and realization, motive and 
work, is occupied in Christian ethics by the relation between reality and becoming real.”80 In 
this parallel construction, “reality” falls on the side of “ought,” and “becoming real” on the 
side of what “is.” In this way, Bonhoeffer attributes true real-ness to the ought, to that which 
is not empirically immediate, but which is nonetheless even more real in virtue of its 
revealing a world reconciled to God. Meanwhile, that which is—the empirical and historical 
facts of the matter in the present—are tasked with “becoming real” and therefore are not only 
distinct from but implicitly less real than reality itself. This “becoming real”—or, to use the 
earlier construction, this God-world unity “realizing itself”—is the movement of the ought-to-
be into the is, the agential encroachment of the Christ-Reality on the dominion of factual 
existence. 
 
Echoing the 1933 distinction between idea and appearance, Bonhoeffer writes that, “Neither 
the idea of a pure Christianity as such nor the idea of the human being as such is serious, but 
only God’s reality and human reality as they have become one in Jesus Christ.”81 Any 
understanding of humanity or divinity in isolation is a subjection of the Incarnation to pagan 
ideation; an ethical understanding which attends to the Christ-Reality pressing upon us is both 
more faithful to Christ and more faithful to the concretion of the moment.  
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Counter-intuitively, at first glance, this places empirical, observable reality on the side of an 
abstract idea rather than concrete appearance. However, in the context of Bonhoeffer’s 
concern from his earliest days about the boundless egoism of the idealist subject, this claim 
crystallises. An understanding of reality which places the perceiving I at the centre—as 
empirical observation necessarily must—is ultimately groundless and ephemeral. What is 
required in order to root any understanding—including an ethical understanding—in the 
concretissimum of the moment is an encounter with a truly insurmountable Other, an act 
which our being finds itself defined in reference to. In this respect, it is the Christ-Reality 
which is more real, and therefore less subject to idealism, than the world as it appears to the 
human subject. Bonhoeffer picks up on precisely this point later in Ethics, in a section entitled 
“History and Good,” when he critiques the attempt to turn the biblical Christ’s activity into 
mere principle: 
 
Such an ‘ethic of Jesus’ does not lead to concrete historical responsibility. . . 
What dominates this perspective is the notion of a self-sufficient, 
‘autonomous’ historical reality, upon which a Christian ethic, which in its 
origin and nature is foreign to reality, is then to be forcefully imposed. 
However, what is overlooked here is the decisive fact from which alone the 
structure of what is real can be understood, namely, God’s becoming 
human, God’s entering history, taking on historical reality in the reality of 
Jesus Christ.82 
 
Here again we see the double feature of Bonhoeffer’s understanding. At one and the same 
time a Christian ethic should be neither understood as distinct from reality—and therefore as 
something which must be “forcefully imposed” upon reality—nor as wholly defined by 
empirical reality. According to the method of promeity, it is the Incarnation which serves as 
grounds for a Christian ethic, not as principle but as Christ-Reality. A truly Christian ethical 
existence is related not to life as circumscribed in our own definitions, but to life as it is in 
Christ, and therefore to existence in the truest sense. Echoing the logic regarding the ‘who’ of 
revelation from the 1933 lectures, Bonhoeffer writes:  
 
Ever since Jesus Christ said of himself, ‘I am the life,’ (John 14:6; 11:27), 
no Christian thinking or indeed philosophical reflection can any longer 
ignore this claim and the reality it contains . . . No question about life can 
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reach behind this ‘I am.’ The question of what life is changes here into the 
answer of who life is. Life is not a thing, an essence, or a concept, but a 
person—more specifically, a particular and unique person. This particular 
and unique person is life, not in possessing life among other attributes, but 
as an I, the I of Jesus . . . By proclaiming this fact, Jesus says that he not 
only is the life, in the sense of some sort of metaphysical entity that might 
perhaps affect me, but that he is precisely my life, our life.83 
 
Permitting the ‘who’ of revelation the freedom of definition means discovering that Christ has 
not stopped after defining his own being, but has comprehensively defined what can truly be 
described as life. Picking up on the language of the earliest theses, Bonhoeffer insists that:  
 
The statement that our life is outside ourselves and in Jesus Christ is in no 
way the result of our own self-understanding. Instead, it is a claim that 
encounters us from outside, which we either believe or contradict. When we 
are struck by the word—which is the purpose for which it is spoken—we 
recognize that we have fallen from life, from our life.84  
 
Humanity’s fallenness places us at a remove from life, even while we are alive. The same 
basic construction of Christ as the centre of the Real and the limit of our self-enclosed, 
illusory experience informs Bonhoeffer’s ethical theory just as it informs his understanding of 
church and nature, sacrament and history. 
 
The question of ethics is really about “how the reality in Christ—which has long embraced us 
and our world within itself—works here and now or, in other words, how life is to be lived in 
it.”85 This formulation both fits our description according to the method of promeity, and yet 
retains the ambiguity which makes Ethics an unsettled, unfinished effort. Clearly 
distinguished here is “the reality in Christ” and “our world,” yet the former somehow 
embraces the latter within itself. The argument here is that this relation is best understood in 
parallel to the shifted christological concerns of 1933. The Incarnation has dissolved the 
question of what Christian life has to do with the world. The ‘who’ of revelation will not 
permit Christian discipleship to be thought of apart from an ethical life in and for the world. It 
is in this respect that the problem has shifted. No longer is the problem determining whether 
                                                            
83 DBWE 6, 249-50. 
84 Ibid., 250. 
85 Ibid., 55. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 103 
 
God would have the Christian act, but instead locating the true action of Reality in relation to 
our fearful and tentative gestures of pious goodwill.  When Bonhoeffer writes—
provocatively, albeit rather unhelpfully—that “only in Christ is the world what it is,” this is 
best read as an affirmation of the true reality of the world in its ought-ness, hidden in God’s 
reality, present yet veiled in the homoioma sarkos.86 Bonhoeffer’s affirmation that “God and 
world are enclosed” in the name of Jesus does not indicate a simplistic equivalency which 
collapses God into the empirical world for the sake of Christ, though it could indeed be read 
that way.87  Instead, it ought to be read alongside Bonhoeffer’s admission, following shortly 
thereafter, that “Jesus Christ cannot be identified either with an ideal, a norm, or with what 
exists.”88 Hence, “to speak of the world without speaking of Christ is pure abstraction.”89 
 
As a preliminary suggestion, Reality, for Bonhoeffer, appears as a kind of tertium quid, a 
layer between God and the world in which both find themselves united. This third layer can 
simultaneously be conceived of as mediating between God and humanity, as revealing the 
true essence of both God and humanity, and as providing a transcendent boundary beyond 
which the empirical experience of humanity cannot pass of its own accord. Bonhoeffer unites 
these descriptions when he writes, “The figure of the reconciler, of the God-man Jesus Christ, 
steps into the middle between God and the world, into the center of all that happens. In this 
figure is disclosed the mystery of the world, just as the mystery of God is revealed in it.”90 It 
is not difficult to trace the continuity of this language with Bonhoeffer’s earlier theology. It is 
prefigured, for instance, in Bonhoeffer’s description in Cost of Discipleship of “something 
which comes between persons called by Christ and the given circumstances of their natural 
lives.”91 As presence, this something is a real description of new existence in Christ. As 
person, this something: 
 
 is Christ himself. In becoming human, he put himself between me and the 
given circumstances of the world. I cannot go back. He is in the middle. He 
has deprived those whom he has called of every immediate connection to 
those given realities. He wants to be the medium; everything should happen 
only through him. He stands not only between me and God, be also stands 
between me and the world, between me and other people and things. He is 
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the mediator, not only between God and human persons, but also between 
person and person, and between person and reality. . . Since Christ there has 
been no more unmediated relationship for the human person, neither to God 
nor to the world.92 
 
Read superficially, this passage represents Bonhoeffer at his most otherworldly, speaking 
negatively about reality as something from which “Christ has untied the person’s immediate 
connections” and extricated the believing Christian.93 Outside of the broader movement of 
promeity, this passage seems to suggest not only distance between the Christian and reality, 
but a distinctly lesser significance given to reality in the Christian’s concern. Understood in 
this way, Cost of Discipleship stands in stark contrast with what seems like a more positive 
statement in Ethics: “There are not two realms, but only the one realm of the Christ-reality.”94  
 
The argument of this thesis, however, is that the method of promeity equally encompasses 
both movements in Bonhoeffer’s work. The reality of Ethics is the Christ-Reality to which 
empirical reality bears a necessary but not identical relation. Reality, as Christ-Reality, is in 
this sense even more real than our factual existence; it is the truest essence of our factual 
existence. To Bonhoeffer’s testimony—“only in Christ is the world what it is”—we can add 
an earlier affirmation—“only before God does the human being become what he is.”95 The 
Christian therefore cannot ignore Reality any more than she can ignore Christ.  
 
In the same way, Cost of Discipleship should be understood as suggesting precisely this 
disjuncture between the Christian and empirical reality, not in favour of quietist 
disengagement, but in favour of a real participation in the Christ-Reality, and therefore an 
even greater participation in reality than was ever possible before. Empirical existence fools 
us; its “illusion is immediacy.”96 Christ sanctifies the real, not as it appears to us in its 
immediacy, but as it ought to be. Thereby, Christ simultaneously divorces the Christian from 
an interpretation of reality which is mere abstract, self-centred idealism and forces her into a 
concrete engagement with the Christ-Reality, a participation in the agapeic restoration of 
reality to its own true identity. It is in this sense that promeity begins again with the person of 
Christ, but then must immediately and simultaneously attend to Reality, as the abiding 
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transcendent presence of Christ. “In Jesus Christ, the Real One,” Bonhoeffer writes, “all 
reality is taken on and summed up; Christ is its origin, essence, and goal.”97 
 
One would be forgiven for seeing in Ethics’ various claims something immensely provocative 
and yet unfinished, the ragged edges overlapping in unsystematic and occasionally 
uncomfortable ways. In the eagerness of his vision and the ferocity of his polemic, 
Bonhoeffer was prone to stretching each argument to its breaking point. Consequently, there 
are moments in Cost of Discipleship where it does seem as if Bonhoeffer is advocating the 
Christian’s disengagement from the world. There are moments in his later theology where it 
does seem as if Christ has fully immersed his identity not merely in the tertium quid of the 
Christ-Reality, but in empirical reality as we have it at hand. Rather than taking these 
extremes as indicative of fundamental shifts in Bonhoeffer’s theology, this essay argues that 
such extremes are a by-product of the superabundance of his thought, of his tendency to 
provoke and only later (if at all) to reconcile or ameliorate these provocations. 
 
The interpretive claim here is not that promeity is manifestly central to Bonhoeffer’s later 
theology, but that understanding the movement of promeity as a method yields a fruitful 
reading of Bonhoeffer’s work at all stages. Promeity as an ontological claim, as a claim which 
has already rejected the very grounds on which the God-world question is asked, is a 
persistent impulse in Bonhoeffer’s theology and the simplest way of drawing together 
seemingly contradictory statements. It finds its origin in his Christology, and remains present 
in all his work as a kind of syllogistic instinct, but is never developed as fully or coherently as 
it could have been. 
 
As a contribution to the question of God and world, however, the hermeneutical argument 
about interpreting Bonhoeffer is actually a secondary matter. Unfilled gaps or overlapping 
excess around the perimeter of Bonhoeffer’s thought should not distract us from its overall 
shape—that taking promeity seriously means taking the God-world problem not as resolved, 
but as impossible to even ask in the first place. Promeity as a pattern of thought takes on a life 
of its own as a method which can be applied to a variety of theological problems, but which 
also needs to be sharpened with respect to the question of transcendence and immanence.  
 
A few interpreters—Ernst Feil, Heinrich Ott, and Christiane Tietz—have already noticed this 
feature of Bonhoeffer’s fundamental ontology, although none have seemed to know quite 
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what it means or where it leads. It is useful, however, to consider the paths their thinking has 
taken in order to explore promeity’s potential and dangers with respect to a articulating a 
Bonhoefferian fundamental ontology. 
 
 
4.5 Feil and the principle of concretion 
Ernst Feil’s work acknowledges that Bonhoeffer’s theology find its centre in his Christology 
and his Christology finds its centre in the a priori ‘who’ of revelation. Referring to the 1933 
lectures, Feil writes that “it was evident that he set out from the reality of Christ present 
now.”98 In this respect, “Bonhoeffer sought God as the concretissimum; to him God was both 
concrete reality and the mystery that is close to us.”99 This concrete reality is not to be 
confused with “a positivistic-empirical concept of reality that comprehends no mystery.”100 
Therefore, we find the same Cost of Discipleship-era wedge driven between reality as it is 
constructed by the idealist empirical ego and Reality as it is hypostatically united with Christ. 
“The understanding of reality that we alone regard as valid in our unmysterious lives,” Feil 
admonishes, “is an illusion and, therefore, represents the loss of actual reality. Our illusionary 
reality cannot be corrected by actual reality.”101 The transcendent God is not otherworldly, but 
“is true reality” yet remains transcendent in virtue of “transcend[ing] what is alleged to be 
reality understood positivistically.”102 Feil adds a sweeping conclusion: “All reality which 
deserves to be called concrete, and therefore genuine, reality depends on this concrete reality 
of God.”103  
 
Thus far, Feil’s analysis captures exactly what is essential about the movement of promeity 
back to the pre-existing union of God and reality in the Incarnation, re-orienting our reflection 
towards an understanding of the relation of this exalted God-Reality to the humiliated God-
Reality of our experience.  Where Feil’s interpretation runs into trouble, however, is in the 
way he begins to extract from this movement a generalised notion of concretion. He writes: 
 
The concept ‘concrete’ may serve, therefore, as a guide through 
Bonhoeffer’s theology. Concrete reality, as represented by the concrete real 
God, the concrete historical incarnation of God’s word in Jesus Christ, the 
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concrete empirical church, and the concrete reality of the world made real in 
and for Christ, is in every instance the basis on which theology makes its 
deliberation.104 
 
As Feil’s analysis progresses, it is this attentiveness to “the concept ‘concrete’” which informs 
his study more than an analysis of the concretissimum—the Christ-Reality. The earlier 
insights about the nature of true reality drop away, replaced by the extrapolation of concretion 
as a principle for the trajectory of Bonhoeffer’s thought. Perhaps the best that can be said is 
that Feil assumes this hermeneutic to be faithful to what he believes are Bonhoeffer’s 
underlying impulses. The broad assumption about Bonhoeffer as a man interested in speaking 
to the concretion of the moment is an entirely plausible reading of Bonhoeffer’s personal 
makeup, but can mistakenly motivate an interpretation of his theology which makes empirical 
reality the non-negotiable feature in his thought. Thus, Feil begins his study with the comment 
that Bonhoeffer “wanted to concede the status of given reality and to regard it seriously.”105 
This sentence conflates two separate ideas. Certainly, Bonhoeffer wanted to take empirical 
reality with utter seriousness. But a serious approach to any concept—most especially 
‘reality’ or the ‘concrete’—must permit the Incarnation the freedom of definition, and 
therefore must contest the status of given reality rather than concede it. With this 
presupposition in mind, however, the only result of Feil’s otherwise admirable reading of 
Bonhoeffer’s Christology is to motivate a theological justification for this attention to the 
principle of concretion.  
 
The best response to Feil’s interpretation comes from Bonhoeffer himself. In a 1932 review of 
Karl Heim’s Glaube und Denken, Bonhoeffer takes up Heim’s critique of Karl Barth. 
According to Heim, “it is Barth’s ultimate, perhaps not conscious, intention to speak of God 
in the sphere of abstraction to protect himself from God in concreto.”106 Heim’s evidence for 
this claim is Barth’s seeming indifference to ethics—Barth’s failure to “provide a specific 
answer to the question of what I should do.”107 Heim’s accusation contains a degree of 
common sense—surely the theology which yields a specific resolution to a tangible problem 
is more concrete than a theology which continues to articulate first principles? Yet, for 
Bonhoeffer, this is an appeal to concretion in its most naïve sense. The desire for a quick and 
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comprehensible resolution is insufficiently wary of the self-serving whispers of the cor 
curvum in se. Bonhoeffer moves to defend Barth on this point, arguing that Barth “knows that 
the concretissimum can only be spoken by the Holy Spirit and that every concretum of human 
words remains an abstractum when the Holy Spirit has not said them.”108 As background, one 
should again infer Bonhoeffer’s persistent anxiety about idealist abstraction. The seemingly 
ethereal Word, for Bonhoeffer, turns out to be more concrete than the empirical reasoning of 
embodied humans. This is only true, however, because of its concretion in the Incarnation. 
The perpetual temptation of idealism is to turn this concretion into mere concept. As 
Bonhoeffer writes earlier, in his 1931 essay “Concerning the Christian Idea of God”: 
 
The idealistic philosophy conceives of history as of the realization of ideas, 
values, etc. History becomes ‘symbol,’ transparent to the eternal spirit. The 
essence of single historical facts is that they mean something general, but 
not that they really are something. . . The earnestness of ontological 
consideration is weakened through reinterpretation of axiological 
judgments. Jesus becomes here the symbol of God’s love, his cross means 
forgiveness, and in the very moment that we know all that means we could, 
theoretically, forget the facts forever. The fact being only the transient 
bearer of eternal values and ideas—that is to say, Jesus being only the 
transient bearer of the general new truth taught by him according to the will 
of God. In short, idealistic philosophy does not take seriously the 
ontological category in history. Which means that it does not take history 
seriously.109 
 
This passage serves as both a response to Feil and a reminder of the narrow ridge promeity as 
method will have to traverse. With respect to Feil, promeity is not justification for attributing 
to Bonhoeffer the same kind of naïve interest in concretion for which Bonhoeffer criticised 
Karl Heim. Christ is not an exemplar of concretion, Christ is the concrete itself. To borrow 
the words of Eberhard Bethge, “Concreteness is to be understood not as an addition or second 
activity but as a genuine attribute of revelation itself.”110 With respect to the broader project 
of this essay, there is a forceful reminder about the temptation to extract mere concepts from 
the personal presence of the Incarnation. All theological thought must feel threatened by 
promeity insofar as theology takes itself to be a systematic or comprehensive word. The 
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return to Christus praesens threatens the very vocabulary we take to be necessary for the 
actus reflectus.  
 
It should be noted that Bonhoeffer himself does not stand apart from this temptation to 
conceptualise. To the extent that Feil is guilty of turning the concrete into mere principle, it 
can be argued that he is only attempting to remain faithful to Bonhoeffer. Bonhoeffer’s own 
language slips, at times, into a casual totalising that makes it easy to confuse his true agenda. 
When Bonhoeffer writes in Ethics, for instance, that “In Christ we are invited to participate in 
the reality of God and the reality of the world at the same time, the one not without the other,” 
there is a sense in which Bonhoeffer is submitting to the dualistic language of idealism even 
as he tries to defend the unity of God and world.111 Such is the challenge of truly extending 
the logic of promeity. Even in arguing for the union of divinity and humanity in the God-
human, there is a perpetual reference back to autonomous definitions of “divine” and 
“human”—precisely the ideas which promeity calls into question. 
 
Feil’s appropriation of promeity provides a useful warning. It was earlier proposed that we 
might conceive of the Christ-Reality as a kind of tertium quid—a layer of reality existing 
between God and world. Rather than clarifying the issue, however, this conception only 
serves to lend the old problem of God and world a new vocabulary. As long as we begin with 
the dualistic language of transcendence and immanence, we are perpetually at risk of either 
collapsing the Christ-Reality into the static structure of empirical existence, or else holding 
the Christ-Reality at a distance, as if it constitutes some second, slightly reduced mode of 
transcendence. The challenge for promeity is to truly make the language of autonomous 
divinity and humanity impossible in light of the personal presence of the incarnate Christ. A 
new vocabulary which takes the ‘who’ of revelation seriously can neither accept the claim 
that Christ-Reality is mere givenness of God’s self over to humanity’s conceptual categories, 
nor the claim that empirical reality is merely the recipient of the Christ-Reality’s punctiliar 
actualism. The same challenges discussed in Chapter 3 emerge all over again. As person, the 
Christ-Reality cannot be conceived as mere fixed quiddity of empirical reality. As presence, 
the Christ-Reality cannot be conceived as possessing a merely contingent relationship to 
empirical reality. This is the new problem of God and world after the Bonhoefferian 
Christological shift. It is no longer the question of reality’s relationship to God, but of 
understanding the way in which our experience of reality is both obstructive illusion and 
potential intersection with respect to the active presence of the Christ-Reality.  
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4.6 Ott and Christ-Reality’s ethical demand 
Few interpreters of Bonhoeffer have better understood what is at stake in his Christology than 
Barth’s successor on the faculty at Basel, Heinrich Ott. Ott realises both the problems and the 
possibilities of a Bonhoefferian ontology which asserts that “the personal confrontation of 
God is a component which essentially determines the situation of my existence.”112 In the 
spirit of promeity, Ott analysis acknowledges that “the presence of Jesus Christ was never a 
question for Bonhoeffer; it was the beginning of his questioning.”113  
 
In his own appropriation of Bonhoeffer’s Christology, Ott understands the initial encounter 
with Christus praesens beginning in the kerygma, yet acknowledges that this encounter is 
with the real being of Christ such that “the personal nature of God belongs to the essential 
structure of the Kerygma.”114 Crucially, however, this presence remains person, such that 
“surrendering ‘theism’ or the personal nature of God means, not only renouncing a certain 
religious or metaphysical representation, but becoming blind to an active element or 
dimension of existence.”115 To the extent that Bonhoeffer’s theology represents an abolition 
of metaphysics, this turns out to mean less a materialist reduction than an accusation that 
neither materiality nor traditional theological categories give sufficient regard to Reality. Our 
empirical experience, while physical, is nonetheless the meta-level abstraction. In ontological 
promeity, as Ott understands it, “what Bonhoeffer sought was to structure the ontology of all 
that is real as Christology, or in other words, to develop Christology as the ontology of all that 
is real.”116 This places all of our definitions in the docks, and forces a return to the 
concretissimum of the Incarnation in order to understand Reality. “All concepts of reality 
which do not take account of Christ are abstraction,” Ott writes, “that does not mean simply 
that they would be false, but that they do not express the whole, final and intrinsic nature of 
reality.”117 This is manifest in Bonhoeffer’s theology as the claim that “Jesus Christ equals 
reality. But this surely implies that he is not only real, that he is not only one reality besides 
others, but that he is that reality itself, which or who is the truly real in all that is real.”118 To 
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maintain the distinction clearly, Ott adds, “the real is not simply the factual, the empirically 
verifiable; it has in addition a new dimension of depth.”119 
 
The potential for confusion, however, is already present as the in of “the truly real in all that is 
real” as well as the addition of “in addition a new dimension of depth.” What does this in and 
this addition give us in terms of a description of Christ-Reality’s relation to empirical reality? 
The first formulation suggests that empirical reality is the superabundance—the spatial 
container within which Christ is revealed. The second formulation suggests that Christ-
Reality is the superabundance—an extension of empirical reality into a transcendent beyond. 
Both formulae are potentially problematic, but Ott makes a useful effort at articulating this 
relationship more clearly.  
 
For Ott, a tentative answer begins by reference to a “theology of the Holy Spirit” which then 
gives force to Bonhoeffer’s ethical concerns.120 At minimum, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit 
has at least “showed us the ‘extra nos’ of God as at the same time the true ‘in nobis’, which 
showed that the personal and suprapersonal God is in no way some transcendent 
anthropomorphic ‘object’.”121 The traditional doctrine of the Holy Spirit, in a sense, already 
describes the work of the Christ-Reality in its personal component. Furthermore, living in 
nobis, the Holy Spirit is also presence, although a presence more descriptive of Christian 
existence than of a fundamental ontological givenness. Ott hopes to capture some sense of a 
broader givenness, however, in the ethical component of existence. “As he who is nearer to us 
than we are ourselves,” Ott writes, “he is the constitutive moment giving form to our real 
existential situation.”122 This “constitutive moment” is an allusion back to Bonhoeffer’s 
“moment of ethical decision” from Sanctorum Communio. In Ott’s reading, the proper 
location of Reality emerges from “the ethical point of attack.”123 The ethical demand of the 
moment calls us to act in accord with Reality, and thus functions as the location of Reality, 
properly understood, as “the real presence of God at any given time in the ethical 
situation.”124 This serves as a potential resolution to the question of empirical reality’s relation 
to the Christ-Reality after Bonhoeffer’s Christological shift. How is the Christ-Reality 
necessarily present to empirical reality, without being structurally beholden to it? In virtue of 
its being the persistent, transcendent ethical command to act in accord with Reality. The 
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decision whether to abide by this command is foisted upon us by our empirical situation, yet 
there is nothing about the empirical situation which will demand action, or even inform us of 
the best course of action. Ott writes: 
 
My duty as one who exists responsibly is not to ask myself how I can effect 
something in the world and on the world and on myself, but to surrender 
myself to the fact that God is already there as the unsurpassable reality, 
already present in the very things which are the subject and sphere of my 
responsible decisions and my ethical existence in a given situation, that God 
is already there in the ethical situation in which a claim is made upon my 
responsibility, and in a sense is waiting there for me.125 
 
The call of Christian discipleship is thus an attentiveness to Christ’s command in Reality’s 
demand, which can only be manifest through our empirical situation. We remain alert, 
prepared to take on our ethical responsibility, for “wherever we come up against reality, it can 
be Christ encountering us unawares.”126 This is not to re-imprison theological and ethical 
reasoning within the walls of the subjective I, but to press Reality upon Dasein as the being of 
the truly untameable Other—“To speak of Jesus Christ as the real in all reality will have 
precisely the effect of opening our eyes to the unplumbable depths in the real.”127 
 
Ott clearly understands what promeity requires and uses ethics as a promising entry into a 
further clarification of the relation between Christ-Reality and reality. Two problems present 
themselves rather quickly, however. The first is that, as someone appropriating Bonhoeffer’s 
theology, Ott feels beholden to the course and limits of Bonhoeffer’s work. In this respect, the 
unfinished Ethics does not seem to Ott to yield enough clarity to refine the point further. At 
best, Bonhoeffer was only able to give “an indication” of “the real presence of God in the 
ethical situation.128 In this way, Bonhoeffer’s work serves as “a signal, calls us to go on to 
finish the task, to a venture of seeing and hearing,” but offers nothing more.129 Thus, as Ott 
readily admits, “the manner of the real presence of Christ in all reality . . . is not yet solved. 
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Bonhoeffer himself has not answered the question.”130 Bonhoeffer’s legacy leaves us with 
only the fragments of “a few concrete indications” of the future shape of such a solution.131 
 
Ott’s own best attempt at “extending [Bonhoeffer’s] lines” is to pursue a more concrete 
definition of Christ’s presence in the ethical situation.132 Here, Ott picks up the notion of 
formation from Ethics. The moment of ethical decision is also our encounter with Christ, and 
also the moment of our Christian formation, insofar as “conformation means being drawn into 
the reality and form of Jesus Christ, who is the Incarnate, Crucified and Risen.”133 These three 
descriptors—Incarnate, Crucified, Risen—“are the three essential and constitutive 
components of the one reality of Jesus Christ.”134 Ott quotes at length from Ethics on this 
point and deems “precisely these three components as the essential ones in the encounter with 
Christ.”135 While all three are constitutive of the Christ encounter, Ott takes the Crucified 
component of the Christ-Reality to be the most promising way of finding Reality in the real. 
This more concretely locates “the Messianic suffering of Christ, the suffering of God in the 
world,” as “a deep dimension of the omnipresence of Christ, and moreover, the specific 
present-day one.”136 At this point Ott brings Bonhoeffer into conversation with Teilhard de 
Chardin as another thinker “concerned with the presence of God who is completely other in 
the reality with which we meet.”137 The two share a common interest, in Ott’s reading, though 
Teilhard’s engagement with God’s presence was expansive, occurring at the level “of the 
universe” while “for Bonhoeffer the basic experience of reality was that of humanity.”138 This 
mutual conversation leads Ott to consider Christ role as Mediator in the theology of 
Bonhoeffer. With Christ’s Crucified aspect in mind, Ott attempts to read Christ as Mediator 
into Bonhoeffer’s notion of Christ’s vicarious representation in suffering. Perhaps suffering as 
an existential category, we can surmise, is the place where Christ mediates reality for us. 
 
Unfortunately, Ott’s analysis, while provocative, is problematic precisely because the deeper 
he presses into the Teilhardian logic of mediation, the harder it is to hold this vocabulary 
together with Bonhoeffer’s commitment to ontological promeity. This is the second problem 
with Ott’s analysis: he cannot fully extricate himself from the dualistic, autonomous language 
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of God and world, and mediation only exacerbates this tendency rather than diminishing it. 
Ott himself calls into question whether “it is enough to understand the being of Jesus Christ 
the Mediator in terms of the relation between God and man, as if we knew exactly in advance 
what these two concepts mean.”139 Thus, the problem persists. How can we understand Christ 
as Mediator between God and humanity without submitting to prior definitions of divine and 
human? How can we truly allow the Incarnation to “get behind” our understanding of God 
and humanity, rather than vice versa? This is the problem which Ott is never able to 
surmount, by his own admission. The language of Christ as Mediator is potentially useful, but 
not if it necessarily suggests two autonomous realities which Christ is somehow responsible 
for negotiating. Ott is left, at the last, to shrug apologetically on his own behalf and 
Bonhoeffer’s:  
 
Certainly it appears much more difficult in comparison to work out 
concretely in our thought the definition of the Mediator as constituting a 
new and universal reality, and the reality, moreover, in which we already 
live. Bonhoeffer also, as we have seen, has not gone further on his journey 
than the first few steps.140 
 
As Ott demonstrates, our challenge in appropriating the pattern of promeity is first one of 
language. The separate language of God and world does not disclose its own origins. 
Whatever its utility, the Bonhoefferian concern is that our unspoken and unacknowledged 
assumptions, bound up in the traditional language of metaphysics, cannot be traced back to 
the Incarnation. So inadequate is our language to the task of describing the Christ-Reality that 
even out attempts to explain it in contrast to other conceptions of God and world cannot 
escape the priority of these alternate assumptions. When Ott writes, for instance, that “Jesus 
Christ is the true reality in all that is real,” we cannot help but conceptually locate even this 
dichotomy between “true reality” and “all that is real” under the old rubrics of metaphysical 
dualism.141 In this respect, promeity not only calls into question every conception of God’s 
relationship to the world, but abolishes the necessary assumptions needed to assert the 
problem in the first place. Taken seriously, promeity does not permit the question of God and 
world to even be conceived, much less asked. As such, the problem after the Bonhoefferian 
Christological shift—locating the Christ-Reality with respect to empirical reality—cannot, 
however much it wanders, return to the fleshpots of transcendence and immanence as 
                                                            
139 Ott, Reality and Faith, 392. 
140 Ibid., 393-4. 
141 Ibid., 185. 
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conceptual forms indebted to idealist abstraction. Thus, as much as Ott grasps Bonhoeffer’s 
ontological implications, even as much as he valiantly attempts to extend them, his answer 
falls back on “the immanence of God in the ethical situation” and thus Christ-Reality becomes 
mere understudy for God in the same old dramatic dialogue of metaphysical dualism.142 
 
 
4.7 The challenge of a language adequate to Christ-Reality 
Given this challenge, is there theological or philosophical language available which could 
adequately parallel promeity’s relation between Christ-Reality and empirical reality? More 
recently, Christiane Tietz has hinted at borrowing the language of Sein and Seiendes, which 
has the advantage of being language that Bonhoeffer himself borrowed from Martin 
Heidegger. Tietz has made this suggestion in the context of trying to more adequately 
conceptualise Bonhoeffer’s ecclesiology. Insofar as I have argued in Chapter 3, however, that 
Christ-existing-as-church-community should be interpreted as merely one implication of the 
broader movement of promeity, Tietz’s language may prove useful for a more fundamental 
ontology. She writes of “a third mode of being beyond Seiendes and Nichtseiendes. It is this 
third ontological mode that maintains revelation in its continuity and existentiality.”143 In this 
way, she recognizes Bonhoeffer’s broader concern as it relates to epistemology—to find a 
way of speaking of Christus praesens objectively without turning Christ into mere object. The 
“genuine objectivity” which the church possesses “differs from the ordinary objectivity and of 
course from the non-objectivity” and “pertains solely to the person of Christ.”144 This third 
thing, for Tietz, remains a vague intuition for the moment, but she is properly moving down 
the path of promeity, attempting to locate this Christ-Reality with respect to empirically 
existing beings. “Christ encounters us in Seiendem,” she writes, “but is not himself Seiendes. 
However, because he encounters us in Seiendem, he is also not Nichtseiendes. Christ is 
neither act nor being, but, rather belongs to this third ontological category.”145  
 
While Tietz does not develop “this third ontological category,” her intuition does suggest a 
philosophical language that might help us relate the Christ-Reality to the empirically real. Is 
Christ-Reality the Sein to reality’s Seiendem? The essence to reality’s existence? The 
substance to reality’s accidents? All of these formulations remain potentially useful and 
potentially problematic. The Heideggerian language misses the radical alterity of the Christ-
                                                            
142 Ott, Reality and Faith, 173. 
143 Tietz, “Ontological Structure,” 42. 
144 Ibid., 43. 
145 Ibid. 
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Reality—for Bonhoeffer, the being of Christ impinges on the finitude of Seiendem in a way 
that radically calls into question and therefore alters Dasein. The Thomistic language misses 
the free personhood of the Christ-Reality.146 To the extent that essence or substance implies a 
fixed quiddity to which reality can always refer back, they miss the implication of 
Bonhoeffer’s genus majestaticum. It is not only Christ but Christ-Reality which retains the 
freedom to define itself anew. 
 
As summary to this point, let us consider again what promeity offers. The Incarnate Christ as 
the revelation of God demands that theology attend again and again to the ‘who’ of Christus 
praesens, to the encounter that takes Christus and praesens equally seriously. As the Logos 
which threatens human logos, the Incarnation retains the priority to define knowledge. The 
dissolution of the traditional christological debates in the prior God-human establishes a 
pattern in which various aporias find their terms called into question by revelation. In 
Bonhoeffer’s appropriation of a Lutheran Christology, Christ’s taking on human nature and 
human nature sharing in divine attributes indicates that the Incarnation will not stop at self-
definition, but offers a re-definition of hypostatically united divinity and humanity. The 
Incarnation does not stop here, either, and so the whole of the human logos must seek its 
proper grounds in revelation’s disclosure. Ecclesiology, anthropology, sociality, ethics, 
hermeneutics, homiletics—all find themselves redefined as sites where the a priori God-
human may reveal himself in humiliated form. Jens Zimmerman has suggested “one dominant 
motif to describe Bonhoeffer’s Christological hermeneutics . . . the motif presencing—
presencing of the Christreality in the Christian life.”147 This motif, however, refuses to be 
restricted to biblical hermeneutics—it is the central theme which emerges across Bonhoeffer’s 
various commitments or, more accurately, it is the central theme from which Bonhoeffer’s 
theology emerges. 
                                                            
146 This is not to say that Bonhoeffer’s understanding of Christ-Reality closes him off to all possibilities 
associated with the analogia entis. Indeed, from one perspective, promeity may be the door to a fuller 
conversation between Catholic dogma and the type of quasi-Barthian position which Bonhoeffer represents. The 
perpetual challenge, however, is Bonhoeffer’s desire to attribute Reality itself to the God-human and not to any 
potential inherent in a notion of being apart from the Incarnation. Hans Urs von Balthasar agrees, for example, 
that “there was never a time when the subject was not already disclosed to the world and the world to it” (Hans 
Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Logic, Volume I: Truth of the World, trans. Adrian J. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
2000, 78). Empirical representations of the world “are nothing but surface without depth” (Ibid., 133). 
Nevertheless, “subject and object are primarily disclosed to each other . . . in the world of images” (Ibid., 132). 
Bonhoeffer’s notion of Christ-Reality seems quite amenable to the insubstantial illusoriness of representations, 
yet without suggesting any epistemologically-available mutual disclosure that is not first predicated on the 
personal freedom of Reality, rather than on some necessity. Nonetheless, there may be openings for a fruitful 
conversation here, especially as we develop a more concrete notion of an epistemology of Christ-Reality in 
section 5.3, below. 
147 Jens Zimmerman, “Finitum Capax Infiniti or The Presencing of Christ: A Response to Stephen Plant and 
Robert Steiner,” in God Speaks to Us: Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Biblical Hermeneutics, eds. Ralf K. Wüstenberg 
and Jens Zimmerman (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2013), 86. 
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The ever-present danger, however, is the idealist temptation—to abstract from the 
Incarnation’s definitions, failing to understand that the person of the ‘who’ remains integral to 
the definition. Christ cannot be turned into mere idea, even if the intention is to shape an idea 
in the image of Christ. At the same time, however, Christ cannot be understood as ‘above’ our 
world or even our thinking, as if at a distance. Instead, God is closer to reality than reality is 
to itself. In this sense, Christ has disclosed himself as ontologically given to the world, as 
Christ-Reality. As the union of act and being, Christ-Reality is the Absolute—not in final 
form, but as already given—acting in reality in such a way that his real being presses upon the 
isolated self, freeing us in the encounter with true alterity. This encounter is not otherworldly, 
not the irruption of the divine into a historical moment, but is transcendent presence, as 
Reality which reveals the shallowness of our mere experience. At all points we are seeking a 
renewed vocabulary, we are seeking words that can make proper reference to Reality, without 
subjecting it to the illusions of the human ego. Bonhoeffer’s contribution to a fundamental 
ontology, then, does not resolve the problem of immanence and transcendence so much as it 
nullifies the very question, revealing that our problem is merely a collision of false semantic 
distinctions, distinctions which only arise when we have not properly rooted our language in 
the given Reality of the Incarnation. 
 
In Chapter 1, we mentioned that the problem of God and world contained three aspects. There 
is an ontological aspect—how can we understand God’s being in relation to the being of 
existing things? There is an epistemological aspect—how can we know about the divine in the 
midst our human existence? There is an ethical aspect—how can we, as humans, act in accord 
with the intention of God? Thus far, these questions have not been answered. They have 
merely taken on a new light. There remains an ontological question—what does revelation 
give us in order to understand the ontological distinction and connection between Christ-
Reality and reality? There remains an epistemological question—how are we to know where 
the Christ-Reality is revealed in our experience, in other words, how do we distinguish 
between Christ’s presence as the Humiliated One and mere humiliation, mere suffering and 
degradation in this fallen world? Finally, there remains an ethical question—how are we to 
act in accord with the Real? 
 
Chapter 5 will suggest Bonhoefferian approaches to each of these questions. Promeity as a 
pattern of thought has led us to this point, pointing toward what is required. But further 
resources are needed to resolve these questions more concretely. As such, there are additional 
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patterns of thought in Bonhoeffer’s work beyond promeity, additional methodologies which 
might lend some guidance to our answers. Chapter 5 will briefly take up three of these further 
patterns, hoping to answer ever more concretely the question, “Who is Christ actually for us 
today?”  
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Chapter 5 
Following Promeity Towards Concretion 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Recall that our engagement with Bonhoeffer’s early dissertations left us, at the end of Chapter 
3, with a set of five features that a Bonhoefferian approach to transcendence and immanence 
would have to take into consideration. Those five features are best understood as having their 
conceptual origin in promeity. Together, they sketch the philosophical implications of the 
basic relation between revelation’s freedom in act and its presence in being, such that 
revelation forms both the necessary condition for thought and the dynamic agency able to 
exert a transformative influence on Dasein. These philosophical facets arise from 
Bonhoeffer’s commitment to the Incarnation, which—in Rainer Mayer’s words—“neither 
treats revelation wholly as an entity nor volatilizes revelation into non-entity.”1 Although 
these commitments will not be revisited explicitly, they form the necessary background for 
the discussion in Chapter 5. The aim of this chapter is to take cues from these expressions of 
promeity’s philosophical commitments to extend a Bonhoefferian understanding of Christ-
Reality forward into greater concretion. 
 
In that spirit, this chapter will revisit the three aspects of the problem of God and world 
mentioned in section 1.7: the ontological, the epistemological, and the ethical. Now, however, 
in light of promeity as developed in Chapter 4, these three aspects will have to be reframed. 
The problem is no longer the relatedness of God to world, but the problem of Christ-Reality’s 
relatedness to empirical existence. Still, however, this problem retains three aspects. 
Ontologically, how can we create an account of the free but necessary relation of Christ-
Reality’s being to the being of empirical existence? Epistemologically, how can we know 
how, where, and in what way to locate the emergence of our empirical experience onto the 
plane of Christ-Reality? Can we expect to see Christ-Reality and, if so, how will we know it 
when we do? Ethically, how then are we to know how and when to act in such a way that our 
action conforms to the free action of the present Christ-Reality? 
 
                                                            
1 Rainer Mayer, “Christology: The Genuine Form of Transcendence,” in A Bonhoeffer Legacy, 185. 
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It is beyond the scope of this thesis to fully resolve these questions, but the present chapter 
will attempt to trace the way forward which promeity suggests, drawing from further 
resources in Bonhoeffer’s theology. The three aspects of the problem will be addressed one at 
a time, and each will be addressed in concert with a further pattern of thought that emerges in 
Bonhoeffer’s work. These additional patterns are dependent on promeity as method, but not 
identical with it. They represent theological modes of problem-solving which Bonhoeffer 
returns to more than once in his work, using them to address different kinds of issues. These 
three patterns will include Bonhoeffer’s habit of using a Lutheran language of justification in 
concert with a Heideggerian language of being-in-reference-to, his habit of using temporal 
language to express revelation’s freedom as both eternal and future, and his habit of 
describing discipleship as a pre-reflective mode of imitation which grounds its own ethic and, 
ultimately, its own epistemology. 
 
 
5.2 Judgment and reconciliation—the ontological problem 
On a postcard from Bonn, dated July 10, 1931 and addressed to Paul Lehmann, Bonhoeffer 
marked the exact time of a personally momentous occasion: “this morning at 7 o’clock for the 
first time I heard K Barth.”2 What had previously been a silent, internal dialogue with Barth 
was now to become a real conversation. A few days into Barth’s lectures series at the 
university, Bonhoeffer began joining other students at evening discussions presided over by 
the Swiss theologian. In a letter to his friend, Erwin Sutz, Bonhoeffer revelled in the 
opportunity these discussions afforded him “to see how Barth still stands beyond his books.”3 
Bonhoeffer left deeply “impressed by [Barth’s] discussion even more than by his writing and 
lectures,” entranced by the intensity of a man “really fully present.”4  
 
Despite this positive impression, it did not take Bonhoeffer long to set before Barth his own 
concerns about the eminent man’s theology, especially as it regarded what Bonhoeffer 
referred to as “the ethical problem.”5 At an ecumenical conference the following year, he 
summarised this concern thusly: “Is the church able to proclaim the commandments of God 
with the same certainty with which it proclaims the gospel?”6 Barth’s theology, in 
Bonhoeffer’s reading, gave full voice to the church’s proclamation of God in Christ, but could 
                                                            
2 DBWE 11, 32. 
3 Ibid., 37. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 38. 
6 Ibid., 360. 
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it also sustain a more specific word about God’s will for the moment? Given the obvious 
economic and political turmoil engulfing Germany in 1931, Bonhoeffer’s ethical concern felt 
especially urgent. If “God’s commandment demands something absolutely particular from us 
now,” on what basis should we expect the church’s proclamation to reveal the content of this 
particular command?7 Bonhoeffer’s longing for concretion ran deep, even to the hope that the 
church might be able to say definitively, “fight this war or do not fight this war.”8 
 
In one sense, Bonhoeffer himself understood that this longing for a concrete command from 
the church—a longing which Barth initially seemed not to share—was born of their 
contrasting ecclesiologies. Interpreted in this way, his “ethical concern” was a mere extension 
of the critique Act and Being had laid against Barth’s actualism. Bonhoeffer highlights this in 
his 1932 lectures on “The Nature of the Church.” There, he characterises Barth as “seemingly 
speaki[ing] only of claims and see[ing] therein the essential nature of the church. (The church 
is an actus.)”9 In contrast, Bonhoeffer insists, “One must speak of the being and act of the 
church together . . . Locating the church as the place of God in the world!”10 For Bonhoeffer, 
God’s granting to the church the capacity to speak a command was a further function of 
promeity: “God, in one place . . .  as ‘God for us.’”11 If the pro-me Christ has ontologically 
given himself to the church, should we not expect that the church will be able to speak 
authoritatively on Christ’s behalf? Barth, perpetually uneasy about humanity’s eagerness to 
sanctify its own words, seemed reticent to rule definitively. In conversation at Bonn in 1931, 
his own commitments at this middle stage of his development only extended far enough to 
direct Bonhoeffer’s attention to “many other little lights” drawing their luminescence from 
“the one great light in the night.”12 Bonhoeffer found this unhelpfully vague, while Barth 
found the younger theologian unhelpfully demanding a certainty not provided, “making grace 
into a principle and . . . bludgeoning everyone else to death with it.”13 Read through the lens 
of ecclesiology, the difference is clear. Bonhoeffer—concerned with articulating the fullness 
of Christ’s ontological commitment to the church-community—was eager to press further into 
the free autonomy given to Christ’s body to bear and proclaim God’s commandment. Barth—
concerned with preserving the freedom and integrity of the Word from human manipulation—
                                                            
7 DBWE 11, 360. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., 274. 
10 Ibid., 274-5. 
11 Ibid., 275. 
12 Ibid., 38. 
13 Ibid. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 122 
 
urged the church to draw its ethic and thus its very identity from the recurring revelatory act 
of gospel proclamation.  
 
The argument of this section, however, begins with a slight reframing of this distinction 
between Bonhoeffer and Barth. It is not differing ecclesiologies which form the basis for their 
disagreement, but differing understandings of revelation, prior to the development of their 
respective understandings of the church. Independently, they conceive of the moment of 
God’s revelatory act in related but ultimately distinct ways. For Bonhoeffer, the dominant 
paradigm for understanding the content of the revelatory moment is a Lutheran doctrine of 
justification. For Barth, on the other hand, the dominant paradigm for that moment is a 
Reformed doctrine of kerygma. For Bonhoeffer, the encounter with Christ is first justifying—
it launches the believer into a new existence, a new mode of being, even before it imparts a 
new Word. For Barth, the encounter with Christ is a Word, a proclamation that shatters all 
prior content with its own exclamation.14 This is not to say that, for Barth, the Word does not 
justify, nor is it to say that, for Bonhoeffer, justification has nothing to do with kerygma. 
Instead, this difference is a mere matter of emphasis that, while small, widens into a broader 
implication for a fundamental ontology.  
 
Bonhoeffer’s way of articulating his own emphasis on revelation’s justifying effect is through 
the early theses’ language of being-in-Adam and being-in-Christ. More implicit than explicit 
in Sanctorum Communio, the primacy Bonhoeffer assumes for the doctrine of justification 
nevertheless shapes the very categories he uses to interrogate sociality. The “primal state” of 
Sanctorum Communio’s third chapter,15 the “world of sin” as “the world of ‘Adam’, the old 
humanity” in the fourth chapter,16 the “new life” of the sanctorum communio in the fifth 
chapter17—all draw their logic from the a priori assumption that God’s revelation is first a 
soteriological act affecting real existence. The underlying logic of Bonhoeffer’s dissertation is 
that a social anthropology can be constructed from “the ontic basic-relatedness of human 
beings to one another as persons.”18 But this claim is only made in light of what Bonhoeffer 
takes to be a given, that humans who were once properly and corporately described as “in 
                                                            
14 It is in this limited respect there is merit to John Godsey’s distinction between Barth as a Reformed advocate 
of finitum non capax infiniti versus Bonhoeffer as a Lutheran advocate of finitum capax infiniti (John Godsey, 
“Barth and Bonhoeffer: The Basic Difference,” Quarterly Review, 7.1, 1987: 9-27). Fundamentally, the 
difference is not about the ability of the human capax, but about the nature of infiniti. For Barth, aseity suggests 
the priority of alterity in virtue of ontological and epistemological distance; for Bonhoeffer it suggests the 
priority of alterity even as presence. 
15 DBWE 1, 58. 
16 Ibid., 107. 
17 Ibid., 124. 
18 Ibid. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 123 
 
Adam” can—after their encounter with revelation—be properly and corporately described as  
“in Christ.” This fact obtains despite both their individuality and their ongoing sinfulness, 
indeed, this seeming contradiction defines the challenge for Sanctorum Communio’s fifth 
chapter, to articulate the unity and reality of the sanctorum communio without either 
overriding individuality or dismissing the lingering reality of the peccatorum communio, in 
other words, to understand the sociality of “those who have been justified” as yet “hidden in 
God.”19 The various sociological and anthropological trees in Sanctorum Communio should 
not distract the reader from the soteriological shape of the forest, fenced by Bonhoeffer’s 
presumption that “the essence and structure of the new humanity ‘in Christ’ can only be 
understood in contrast to humanity ‘in Adam’.”20 This is the given of revelation and its 
primary function, that it turns the Dasein of humanity from sinful exile into an existence in 
Christ. To the extent that revelation can be understood as kerygma, its content does not 
effectuate, per se, but testifies to the good news of “the will of God to create from the old 
humanity of Adam a new humanity of Christ.”21  
 
What was largely implicit in Sanctorum Communio becomes more explicit in Act and Being 
and Bonhoeffer’s various subsequent lectures amplifying his habilitation’s argument. What is 
particularly noteworthy, for the sake of this essay’s agenda, is the way that Bonhoeffer’s 
theological language of Adam and Christ becomes integrated with a Heideggerian language of 
being-in-reference-to.  Recall Act and Being’s agenda to take from philosophy the warning 
signs along theology’s path; Bonhoeffer takes from philosophical ontologies a reminder “that 
the existence of human beings is always already a ‘being in . . . ‘”22 This is “the only correct 
aspect” of philosophical ontologies and also, theologically, “that which a genuine 
interpretation of the being of revelation also demands.”23 What theology returns as a counter-
warning over and against philosophy is an essential prerequisite, that “concepts of being, 
insofar as they are acquired from revelation, are always determined by the concepts of sin and 
grace, ‘Adam’ and Christ.”24 In combination, then, these two insights yield fundamental 
categories for human ontology. The mode of an individual human’s being is either a being-in-
Adam or a being-in-Christ; the shift from the former to the latter is the first fruit of revelation. 
The most fundamental designation that can be given to Dasein is its relatedness to Christ. 
“This is what furnishes the theological concept of existence,” Bonhoeffer writes, “existence is 
                                                            
19 DBWE 1, 124. 
20 Ibid., 22. 
21 Ibid., 62. 
22 DBWE 2, 108. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., 32. 
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envisaged in reference to revelation as an existence touched or not touched by revelation.”25 
There is no human ontology which is not first understood by way of its referral to Christ, no 
raw there-ness which does not already find itself caught up in Adam or in Christ. 
 
Touched or untouched by revelation; in Christ or in Adam—these distinctions provide the 
essential logic of Act and Being’s final, and often-neglected, Part C. Remember Bonhoeffer’s 
desire, articulated in Chapter 3 of this essay, for the being of revelation to exert a real 
influence upon human existence. Revelation as justification satisfies this requirement, insofar 
as it is “an act of God that draws human beings into the occurrence of revelation.”26 Notice 
even in this sentence the very slight distinction between the “act of God” and the “occurrence 
of revelation.” Even insofar as Bonhoeffer understands revelation as a God’s self-revealing, 
he is even more concerned with the illumination of the human consciousness required to 
receive revelation, to the existential shift necessary to receive a word from God. Both are an 
act of God, both belong to revelation. This is true for Barth, as well, but again, the difference 
is a matter of emphasis. For Bonhoeffer, the emphasis is on the way 
 
Dasein is determined by transcendence . . . it ‘is’ ‘amidst’ transcendence. 
Christ, by being the one who creates within me the act of faith by granting 
me the Holy Spirit who hears and believes within me, thereby proves to be 
also the free lord of my existence.27  
 
Bonhoeffer is entirely open to this existential shift coinciding with the proclaimed Word. 
What is essential, however, is that we understand the proclamation of this Word emerging 
from a real encounter with being, as “Christ himself in person speak[ing] to us his new word,” 
thus revealing this Word as a real, existentially pressing, transcendent ‘who’-ness “that 
creates our Dasein again and again.”28 In this way gospel word becomes Word, “the general 
assertion becomes a living occurrence.”29 Despite their extensive engagement with sociality, 
careful attention to the early theses reveals that their social-ontology of the Christian church-
community is merely one implication of revelation as justification. The transposition of the 
self from being-in-Adam to being-in-Christ precedes the turn to the neighbour. “One finds 
                                                            
25 DBWE 2, 82. 
26 Ibid., 110. 
27 Ibid., 128. 
28 Ibid., 132. 
29 Ibid. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 125 
 
oneself in Christ, because already one is in Christ, in that one seeks oneself there in Christ.”30 
Only then is the self-seeking I truly “delivered from the attempt to remain alone.”31 
 
Interestingly, Bonhoeffer’s immediate post-habilitation lectures and essays highlight precisely 
this aspect of his thought, moving slightly beyond the concerns of transcendental subjecthood 
which dominated Act and Being. A close engagement with Heidegger features prominently in 
Bonhoeffer’s inaugural lecture, delivered upon his appointment at Berlin University after 
defending Act and Being. Here, Bonhoeffer recognises that if he wants to use relatedness-to-
Christ as a defining mode of human ontology, he immediately faces a challenge. Given not 
only two possible modes of being—in Adam or in Christ—but the possibility of transitioning 
from the former to the latter, how is the continuity of Dasein to be conceived? The answer 
pushes us even further backwards, to an even more fundamental conception: being-in-
relation-to-God. Bonhoeffer insists that “the human being understands himself only by his 
act-of-relating to God, which only God can establish.”32 This being-in-Adam or being-in-
Christ is “grounded in God’s word . . . a word whose content is judgment and grace” such that 
the human’s essence “is determined by the statements ‘You are under sin,’ or ‘You are under 
grace.’”33 Both the human in Adam, as the recipient of judgment, and the human in Christ, as 
the recipient of grace, find their existence imparted in virtue of a deeper being-in-relation-to-
God. Revelation’s first function is that it “initiates” the Christian “into the death and 
resurrection of Christ” and so reveals their being as already suspended between the poles of 
transcendence, the “future, which is Christ alone” but also the past, “which is Adam and 
which must ever and again be given over to the death of Christ.”34 Revelation is thus 
justifying; it separates the new self from the old self, but cannot separate either self from its 
suspension between judgment and grace, death and life, between a once-dead-in-sin and a 
made-alive-in-Christ.  
 
Bonhoeffer returns to this idea in an essay written during his stay at Union Theological 
Seminary entitled “Concerning the Christian Idea of God.” He writes of the moment of 
justification:  
 
                                                            
30 DBWE 2, 150. 
31 Ibid. 
32 DBWE 10, 405. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 406. 
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It is just here that the personalities of God and of man come in contact with 
each other. Here God himself transcends his transcendence, giving himself 
to man as Holy Spirit. Yet, being personality, he remains in absolute 
transcendence; the immanence of God means that man hears God’s own 
word, which is spoken in absolute self-revelation, always anew.35   
 
The kerygmatic Word, unified in the moment with the act of faith—an act also given by the 
Holy Spirit—“believes that God’s word in Christ is valid for itself,” but this is simply to say 
that this moment is “in other words, the act of justification.”36 Consequently,  
 
Faith is primarily directed toward the authority of God, not to the content of 
his word . . . when we come to interpret the content of the self-revelation of 
God, we will see that this content is only the explication of the fact of the 
absolute self-revelation and authority of God.37  
 
This justifying Word is the manifestation of God’s authority insofar as it is the manifestation 
of God, where “God reveals himself through Christ to me.”38 This self-manifestation of God 
is the transcendent being which disrupts the idealist self by imposing a barrier which cannot 
be crossed. “There,” Bonhoeffer writes, “at the very limits of man, stands God, and when man 
can do nothing more, then God does all. The justification of the sinner—this is the self-proof 
of the sole authority of God.”39 This encounter establishes limits, and it is precisely limits 
which are the first act of justification, the essential unity of judgment and reconciliation, as 
Bonhoeffer explains in another essay from Union entitled “The Theology of Crisis.” There, he 
writes:  
 
This act of limiting man is God’s judgment and grace in one; for the limited 
man is the judged man and at the same time the limited man giving all 
righteousness and glory to God is so justified by God’s work and grace 
alone.40  
 
                                                            
35 DBWE 10, 459. 
36 Ibid., 460. 
37 Ibid., 459-60. 
38 Ibid., 459. 
39 Ibid., 461. 
40 Ibid., 466-7. 
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In summary, the Lutheran/Heideggerian language of being-in-relation-to-God presents us 
with a Bonhoefferian strategy for understanding the effect of revelation. Revelation can be 
understood as a transcendent Word emerging from alterity. But precisely in this way, the 
Word reveals itself not as a mere word, but as person, as the graciously intruding being of the 
present God-human, encountering the human being in the midst of life. The God-human’s 
being is a real being-in-the-world, and yet is also transcendence itself, thereby initiating an act 
whereby Dasein discovers itself to be suspended in transcendence, and therefore discovers 
itself truly for the first time. The being of revelation initiates a real transformation by 
establishing, once and for all, a true boundary around the unlimited aspirations of the human 
ego. Precisely in this limitation is true freedom—the first real otherness the cor curvum in se 
has ever encountered draws us out of ourselves. The infinite self, it turns out, was the lonely 
self. The God-human is thus revealed as the first exteriority truly capable of storming the 
fortress holding the isolated ego. This encounter transforms the human from being-in-Adam 
to being-in-Christ. This new being-in-Christ, as the transcendent appearance of futurity, is 
also the first moment when the human recognises that she has unknowingly been in Adam all 
along. Being-in-Christ is genuine participation in Christ’s being, and thus means the death of 
the old self. At the same time, it reveals an even deeper fact which has always been true and 
remains unchanged, that human existence is a being-in-relation-to-God. This being-in-
relation-to-God remains stable before and after justification; what changes in Christ is the 
soteriological implication of this fact. The being-in-relation-to-God which once meant 
judgment now means grace.    
 
Bonhoeffer’s understanding of revelation as justification places a slightly new interpretation 
on his relatively mild dispute with Barth over ethics during the 1930’s. Barth—conceiving of 
revelation kerygmatically—struggles to find the assurance needed to identify a particular 
command as Christ’s command. For him, the essential element is the content of the 
proclamation, which raises the question of how we can be certain that we have truly spoken 
Christ’s Word. Better to repeatedly proclaim the Word we already know is true and let this 
Word have its effect than deceive ourselves by eagerly trying to extrapolate from its content. 
For Bonhoeffer, however, the issue is entirely different, and is soteriological even before it is 
ecclesiological. In his case, the essential element is less the conformity of the word spoken to 
Christ’s Word than it is the conformity of the self speaking to Christ’s being. A true 
commandment from the church is not attempting to give voice to the untouchable, epiphanic 
alterity of the Word from heaven. It is trying to speak from the grounds of a justified being-in-
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relation-to-God, having found itself thrown into new existence in Christ, speaking of and in 
Reality.  
 
This distinction between revelation as Word and revelation as moment of justification further 
helps to explain the disconnect between Barth and Bonhoeffer over the meditative disciplines 
of Finkenwalde. Bonhoeffer, in a personal letter to Barth, claimed that he and his students at 
the preachers’ seminary were pursuing “a life defined by morning and evening reflection on 
the word and by fixed times of prayer” which Bonhoeffer characterised as “merely one result 
of what you yourself articulated so clearly with regard to Anselm,” referring to Barth’s book, 
Fides Quaerens Intellectum.41 Barth, however, had procured a copy of Finkenwalde’s guide 
to meditation, “read it attentively,” and replied: 
 
I cannot really say that I was pleased by what I read. I just cannot go along 
with the kind of fundamental distinction between theological work, on the 
one hand, and edifying reflection, on the other, such as emerges in this piece 
of writing and in your letter. I was also bothered in this piece by the smell—
one rather difficult to articulate—of monastic eros and pathos, for which I 
for now have neither the appropriate sensorium nor any real use.42 
 
Bonhoeffer did not seem to take this critique to heart, instead lamenting that Barth had 
misunderstood Finkenwalde as a mere attempt at pietist renewal following in “the whole line 
from Ragaz to Buchmann.”43  
 
It is worth considering, however, that this disagreement was no mere miscommunication. In 
what sense would Bonhoeffer have understood Finkenwalde as an experiment in keeping with 
the spirit of Fides Quaerens Intellectum? In it, Barth writes that understanding the Word 
“require[s] . . . a pure heart, eyes that have been opened, child-like obedience, a life in the 
Spirit, rich nourishment from the Holy Scripture.”44 This is “the effect of the Word . . . 
invariably, that both the Word and the event of hearing the Word are understood together.”45 
Bonhoeffer appears to have interpreted this as an indication that revelation initiates new 
existence, an existence precipitated by encounter, giving hope that the disciplined Christian 
                                                            
41 DBWE 14, 254. 
42 Ibid., 268. 
43 Ibid., 272. 
44 Karl Barth, Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum trans. Ian W. Robertson (Eugene: Pickwick Press, 1975), 34. 
45 Ibid. 
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might again “encounter Christ in his own word,” to use the phrasing of the guide to 
meditation.46 Barth, however, had still conceived this existential effect within a kerygmatic 
paradigm, as “Faith comes by hearing and hearing comes by preaching.”47 In this respect, 
Barth maintained that revelation would eventually be appropriated by the intellect in virtue of 
its content. Hence, there was nothing to be gained from meditatively anticipating the approach 
of Christ that could not be better gained from the careful study of the Word, approaching with 
a faithful intellect prepared to receive propositional content. For Bonhoeffer, however—even 
as much as the disciplines of Finkenwalde were scripturally focused—revelation was not a 
matter of mere semantic content, but of an encroaching being, one that had already moved 
upon the justified self and would move again.  
 
As much as Bonhoeffer falls within Barth’s theological lineage, then, what Bonhoeffer takes 
from Barth’s transcendental actualism is not the priority of revelation as defined in its 
kerygmatic capacity. What he takes away is not a statement about verticality intersecting 
horizontality. Instead, what he takes away is that existence must understand itself constantly 
in reference to transcendence, thus “know[ing] itself placed into the truth by Christ in 
judgment and grace.”48 What is transcendent is not the radical alterity of act, but the otherness 
of being which limits the human self in encounter. Even to the extent that word is a vehicle 
for revelation’s being, in Bonhoeffer’s mind, the emphasis is nonetheless on its power to alter 
Dasein, not its bare content:  
 
The word that confronts us, seizes us, takes us captive, binds us fast, does 
not come from the depth of our souls. It is the foreign, the unfamiliar, 
unexpected, forceful, overpowering word of the Lord that calls into his 
service whomsoever and whenever God chooses.49 
 
Revelation is the being of Christ-Reality confronting the human self, justifying humans in the 
transition from being-in-Adam to being-in-Christ. The best that can be said about Barth’s 
approach, for Bonhoeffer, is that it forces us to acknowledge ourselves in relation to 
exteriority, set in an existence we could not create and cannot understand without assistance 
from outside ourselves. “The original transcendental approach,” Bonhoeffer writes, “comes 
                                                            
46 DBWE 14, 932. 
47 Barth, Anselm, 22. 
48 DBWE 2, 96. 
49 DBWE 13, 350. 
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into its own in the indissoluble and exclusive reference of existence to revelation.”50 What 
transcends us in revelation is not a message received from within the mystery of the hidden 
God, but the hidden God himself approaching as personal presence.  
 
Although there may be further room to press this distinction between Bonhoeffer’s 
understanding of revelation as justification and Barth’s kerygmatic actualism, this is not the 
central point of the present thesis.51 The contrast with Barth has been raised primarily to 
highlight the depth and nature of Bonhoeffer’s interest in revelation’s ontological 
consequences vis-à-vis justification. The essential issue is not where Bonhoeffer stands with 
respect to Barth, per se—there may indeed be resources in Barth’s theology to accommodate 
and even extend Bonhoeffer’s presumptions. The essential issue, for the moment, is whether 
Bonhoeffer’s pattern of speaking about human ontology as relatedness-to-God can provide 
resources for extending a Bonhoefferian answer to the ontological aspect of the God-world 
problem, as redefined after promeity, i.e. how do we understand the ontological relation of 
empirical reality to Christ-Reality? 
 
Given the landscape of the Christ-Reality, as described in Chapter 4, two issues emerge that 
have to be kept in mind. The first is avoiding the pitfall of the social-anthropological strategy: 
a fundamental ontology must make a real statement about Christ’s ontological givenness, not 
as a transcendent actor who merely makes use of empirical existence, but as one who has 
revealed himself as structurally pro-me, truly present. The second is avoiding the pitfall of 
subsuming all empirical existence into God’s being, such that beings possess no autonomous 
existence at all.  
 
Read with these warnings in mind, the ontological implications of Bonhoeffer’s 
understanding of justification can propose a possible way forward. In Bonhoeffer’s thought, 
Dasein finds itself at the intersection of two disjunctures. First, there is the disjuncture 
between past and future, between being-in-Adam and being-in-Christ, before and after the 
irruptive break caused by the act of encounter with revelation’s being. Second, there is also 
the present disjuncture between sanctorum and peccatorum, the seeming contradiction at the 
                                                            
50 DBWE 2, 97. 
51 Briefly, however, this implies a slightly different reading of Bonhoeffer’s accusation against Barth of 
“Offenbarungspositivismus” (DBW 9, 404) than has previously been considered. Interpreted according to the 
distinction made here, Bonhoeffer’s concern is not about the way Barth or Barthians have treated the content of 
revelation, but about the simple fact that Barth has treated revelation as mere content, thus occluding the real 
force of revelation to have an unfolding personal history of its own, moving through reality to confront the self-
satisfied human ego.   
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 131 
 
centre of simul iustus et peccator, the true reality of the justified self “hidden with Christ in 
God” (Col. 3:3) versus the empirical reality of the perpetual sinner. 
 
What Bonhoeffer’s take on Lutheran theology seems to offer, however, is not only a 
resolution to these disjunctures, but a way of understanding them as essential to one another. 
Act and Being establishes that being can only understand itself in reference to something 
which transcends it, as all other grounds collapse into the sinkhole of the isolated self, 
providing no room to distinguish reality from idealist delusion. Hence, the self encountering 
Christ is, concretely, for the first time, having emerged from fantasy into reality. At the same 
time, however, thinking can only gain this understanding by simultaneously finding itself 
suspended between poles of transcendence. These poles, to use Bonhoeffer’s framework, are 
retrospective and prospective: the awareness of being-in-Adam only in the moment when that 
existence is dead and vanished; the awareness of being-in-Christ only insofar as that existence 
encounters us as true alterity. This being-in-reference-to is fundamentally continuous as a 
being-in-relation to God, yet discontinuous as a shift from being-in-sin to being-in-grace in 
virtue of now being-in-Christ. To be in Christ in one’s Real self is yet precisely to be both 
justified and sinful in one’s empirical self, insofar as neither state is comprehensively true of 
our lived experience. In this way, our present existence is properly determined by its being-in-
reference-to both; it is real Dasein only as it is suspended between poles of transcendence.  
 
Understood through this lens, Bonhoeffer suggests the potential of extending the logic of 
simul iustus et peccator not only to humans, but to all beings. The existence of empirical 
beings finds them caught in the same pair of disjunctures. Empirical reality can only be 
understood as itself after and in light of the Incarnation, as Christ-Reality. Yet, insofar as an 
understanding of its true identity is possible at all, this identity appears at once in suspension 
between its retrospective and prospective poles, grasping at a vacant notion of an autonomous 
existence apart from Christ, yet unable to subsume the Christ-Reality which transcends it. In 
this respect, empirical reality, like the empirical Dasein, perpetually retains its own 
independent being, yet always finds this being already established as a being-in-relation-to-
God. For individual beings, this being-in-relation-to-God indicates the possibility of existing 
either under sin or grace, judgment or reconciliation. As with the justified sinner, the true 
Reality of empirical beings is a hidden one. As with the justified sinner, reality finds its 
present always confronted by the Christ-Reality that is its future, and yet always defined in 
reference to the fallen being-in-Adam that is its past, and therefore always at the point of its 
dying under judgment. Yet, as with the justified sinner, the true existence of reality is not an 
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impossibly remote idea awaiting its realisation at the eschaton. Precisely as person, the Christ-
Reality is free and able to bring reality’s distant self suddenly close to hand, even if 
unaccompanied by trumpets and effulgent light.  
 
There will be Real, justified places and—perhaps more importantly—Real, justified moments. 
In these moments available to us, with or without our knowledge, reality’s existence is a 
being-in-reconciliation with God. This is to say, in the same breath, that it is also the very 
personal presence of the Christ-Reality itself. These justified moments, as moments, do not 
persist longitudinally—as if a particular place or action has been permanently transformed—
but do persist orthogonally, into eternity, as the irreversible transformation of that moment 
into its true self. As a whole, empirical reality awaits the emergence of its true self. Yet, not 
unlike the individual Christian, a real yet hidden encounter with the Incarnate Christ-Reality 
has transposed reality’s true existence into a being-in-Christ. 
 
With respect to a statement about Christ’s own ontology, Bonhoeffer’s language of 
justification extends the basic equality between the Exalted One and the Humiliated One. 
Promeity has established Christ-Reality as the a priori necessity for our further reflection. It is 
the Christ-Reality a se which is exalted, which is the glory of resurrection, the reconciliation 
between God and flesh. Yet this does not establish the Christ-Reality as a slightly lesser form 
of transcendence, hovering over the deep. Instead, it demands the Christ-Reality’s intrinsic 
relatedness to empirical reality. Empirical reality’s own being-in-relation-to God also entails a 
being-under-judgment. This judgment is the measure of the distance between the empirical 
self and the true self, between reality and Christ-Reality. This judgment, however, is also 
Christ-Reality, as the veiled form of the Humiliated One who reveals, prior to our definitions, 
the essential unity of Judge and Judged. Metaphors of nearness and farness collapse—what 
remains is that even the state of being-under-judgment belongs to the Christ-Reality, which is 
its essential givenness in humiliation to empirical reality.   
 
With respect to ontological considerations, Bonhoeffer’s Lutheran/Heideggerian language 
stands as a potential opportunity to further elaborate on the nature of Christ-Reality. The 
idealist temptation of the transcendental subject, however, is to rush through even this 
opportunity and press quickly on to epistemological considerations. It is well and good to 
articulate the Christ-Reality’s relation to empirical existence, but how will we distinguish a 
particular moment that is-in-reconciliation from a particular moment that is-under-judgment? 
Is that not the more interesting question? Perhaps, although we should already be circumspect 
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about a Bonhoefferian answer. The general trajectory of Bonhoeffer’s thought has been to 
establish the pro-me Incarnation as the ground of all thought, and yet to insist on its 
transcendent alterity even in our midst. These two impulses are inseparable, as if one only 
notices presence in the dust cloud left by the person’s vanishing. We are bereft without the 
transcendence of the God-human, and bereft in attempting to appropriate the God-human. We 
have only thought to ask the question because the very thing needed to answer it has slipped 
our grasp. Nonetheless, it is to this epistemological problem that we will tentatively turn in 
the next section.  
 
 
5.3 Presence and futurity—the epistemological problem 
Above the door to his prison cell at Tegel, Bonhoeffer found a previous occupant had 
scribbled a cryptic reminder, full of hope and despair in equal measure. “In a hundred years,” 
the graffito read, “everything will be over.”52 Bonhoeffer interpreted this adage as the former 
prisoner’s “attempt to cope with this experience of empty time,” an experience which had 
very much become his own.53 Bonhoeffer reflected often on the nature and phenomenology of 
time, never more so than during the lonely hours of his early days at Tegel, separated from his 
family and his new fiancée, awaiting a trial that never seemed to arrive, smoking cigarettes, 
“passing time—killing time,” combing his memories and finding himself alternately filled 
with gratitude, remorse, and self-pity.54 He wrote brief notes for “a small study on the ‘sense 
of time’” he planned to write but never completed.55  
 
Raised in a German epoch very much convinced of its own historical significance, Bonhoeffer 
could not help but weave his theology together with temporal categories like ‘history,’ ‘past’, 
and ‘future’. These categories were no mere abstractions; their real psychological effects were 
manifest in the surrounding culture—in the nationalist romanticism surrounding the 
propaganda of a pre-Christian Germanic past and the millenarian promise of a Thousand-Year 
Reich.56 In a very practical sense, the ambiguous meaning of the single statement on his cell 
wall carried within it the twin temptations Bonhoeffer feared—either losing hope in the face 
                                                            
52 DBWE 8, 80. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid., 71-2. 
55 Ibid., 79. 
56 For further exposition on the intellectual forces at work in Bonhoeffer’s context, see Fritz K. Ringer, The 
Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890-1933, 2nd ed. (Hanover: Wesleyan 
University Press, 1990). For further reading on the popular understandings of history current during the same 
era, see George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964). 
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of history’s uncaring march or retreating into an eschatological fantasy disconnected from the 
present.57 Rejecting both, Bonhoeffer opted for what has been described as a “timeful 
understanding of the Christian life.”58 Immersed in the present moment, Bonhoeffer sought 
“the very narrow path . .  . of taking each day as if it were the last and yet living it faithfully 
and responsibly as if there were yet to be a great future.”59 
 
Among the themes that recur across Bonhoeffer’s corpus, his understanding of time is one of 
the most difficult to systematise. It surfaces often, even at times playing a seemingly critical 
role in his thought, yet its final form remains ambiguous. Rather than attempt to look at 
Bonhoeffer’s understanding of time comprehensively, this section will take a few hints from 
his language with a view to considering how temporality might inform an understanding of 
the Christ-Reality’s epistemological availability in the present. 
 
Even prior to writing Sanctorum Communio, the young Bonhoeffer wrestled with the question 
of eternity’s relationship to history. Although the precise genealogy is uncertain, some 
combination of influences from Luther, Kierkegaard, and 19th-century post-Hegelian debates 
about the nature of history informed Bonhoeffer’s understanding of time. As early as 1925, 
Bonhoeffer wondered whether “Luther develop[ed] an independent dualistic view of history,” 
meaning a view of salvation history that placed it in distinct parallel with the history of the 
empirical world.60 Bonhoeffer understood Luther as having done so and soon took on this 
view as his own.61 Bonhoeffer’s understanding of this ‘dualism’, however, did not imply that 
God’s history ran forever at a distance from the world’s history. God’s history was irruptive, 
piercing empirical history in the Kierkegaardian øjeblik—the decisive moment of eternity’s 
appearing in experience. Consequently, eternity retained autonomy, such that “God’s 
kingdom does not grow organically before our eyes,” and yet “at every moment the judgment 
of God is present in history through the word of God.”62 Curiously, Bonhoeffer attributed this 
latter insight to the 19th-century historian Leopold von Ranke, who had famously argued in an 
1854 lecture that “jede Epoche ist unmittelbar zu Gott.”63 Bonhoeffer includes this quote in a 
1925 paper written under the direction of Reinhold Seeberg.64 As a testament to his own 
commitments, however, Bonhoeffer immediately adds, “und das heiβt doch auch: jeder 
                                                            
57 DBWE 8, 50. 
58 Vosloo, “Feeling of Time,” 338. 
59 DBWE 8, 50. 
60 DBWE 9, 145. 
61 Ibid., 320. 
62 Ibid. 
63 DBW 9, 349. 
64 DBWE 9, 320. 
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Augenblick.”65 In that addendum, Ranke’s original intention—to make a post-Hegelian claim 
about the necessary relationship of each age’s Geist to the appearance of the Absolute—falls 
away, replaced by a Bonhoefferian claim about God’s relationship to the moment.66 In this 
respect, Bonhoeffer follows Kierkegaard’s line of critique against the broad post-Hegelian 
trend, the former pair choosing to locate the substance of history in the temporality of Dasein 
rather than in the preeminence of a metaphysical category. Bonhoeffer admits this affinity 
with Kierkegaard in Sanctorum Communio, with the caveat that he rejects Kierkegaard’s 
notion that the concretion of the Augenblick “is an act of the self-establishing I.”67 Bonhoeffer 
desires to hold together the God-human’s freedom to create the decisive moment alongside 
the conviction that it must be a real moment of empirical temporality, not an infinitely 
receding, “supratemporal” flash of eternity, an accusation leveled against Barth, as previously 
noted.68  
 
Here again we see the pattern of two disjunctures emerging in Bonhoeffer’s thought. There is 
the disjuncture between past and future, with the past already captured by the empirical 
experience of idealist self and the future retaining the free alterity of truly unknown 
transcendence. There is also, however, the disjuncture between eternity and empirical history 
or, more accurately, between true history—the temporal life of Christ-Reality—and our 
experience of history-under-judgment. At first glance, these two disjunctures appear to be 
separate spectra along which Bonhoeffer is trying to locate his understanding of time—
historical past versus historical future, eternity versus temporality. 
 
As his thought on this point develops, however, what emerges, unsurprisingly, is a 
redefinition of time according to the method of promeity. This does not become fully evident 
until his aforementioned 1935 lecture “Contemporizing New Testament Texts.” Permitting 
the God-human freedom of definition means allowing that “God posits the present.”69 
Bonhoeffer argues: 
 
Wherever Christ is expressed in the word of the New Testament, one has 
contemporization. Not where the present registers its own claims before Christ but 
                                                            
65 DBW 9, p. 349. 
66 So thoroughly does Bonhoeffer re-appropriate Ranke’s insight that he will at times ‘quote’ Ranke while 
intentionally or unintentionally replacing Ranke’s words with his own. See, for instance, a 1928 sermon in which 
Bonhoeffer claims, “‘Every moment is in direct relationship with God,’ a great historian wrote.” (DBWE 10, 
528.) 
67 DBWE 1, 57. 
68 DBWE 2, 84. See p. 57, above. 
69 DBWE 14, 417. 
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rather where the present itself stands before the claims of Christ—there one has 
the present. For: The concept of the present is not a temporal determination; 
instead it is [determined] through the word of Christ as the word of God. The 
present is not some temporal feeling, temporal interpretation, or zeitgeist; instead, 
the present is solely the Holy Spirit. Wherever God is present in the divine word, 
there one has the present.70 
 
Even the experience of the now is not a given prior to revelation, but finds itself defined by 
Christ-Reality. The moment of Christ’s being present to us is true present; all other 
experiences of now-ness are an empty husk. Bonhoeffer extends this logic by playing on the 
root of Gegenwart. The present requires something that “is ‘present’ or situated ‘toward’ 
[entgegen] with respect to us—waits there before us.”71 The very quiddity of the temporal 
moment finds itself as a being-in-reference-to-God, a being defined in relation to 
transcendence. As such, “the present is determined externally rather than internally, cannot be 
determined by us, is determined instead by that which approaches us externally, by that which 
approaches, by the future.”72 To be clear, “this future is Christ.”73 
 
Here again, what first appears to be two different axes of concern cutting across one another 
turns out to be two linked expressions of a single logic. The true villain lurking obscurely in 
the background, yet again, is the pretensions of the unchecked epistemological ego. A 
definition of temporality which finds its origin in the pro-me Christ will unsurprisingly stand 
askew from any prior definition indebted to a mere idea. In this respect, historical futurity and 
eternity serve a similar purpose in Bonhoeffer’s understanding. Empirical history—as a mere 
object for critical examination—is easily entrapped by the idealist self. Likewise, the past—as 
the sum of events experienced in a single consciousness—is equally subordinate to the 
meanings imparted by the cor curvum in se. Contrary to mere temporality, then, the 
Augenblick of eternity—as the being of Christ appearing in real temporality—retains the 
freedom of self-definition. And, contrary to the past, the future—as unknown experience, as 
the immersive flow of the encountering presence and presencing encounter of Christ-
Reality—retains true alterity.  
 
                                                            
70 DBWE 14, 417, emphasis in original. 
71 Ibid., 418. 
72 Ibid., emphasis in original. 
73 Ibid. 
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Eternity and historical futurity therefore emerge as equally related to the personal freedom of 
Christ-Reality. As illustration, this mutual relation appears, if somewhat obliquely, in the 
opening pages of Creation and Fall. Reflecting on the words ‘In the beginning, God’, 
Bonhoeffer uses the logic of eternity and historical origin interchangeably. The mysterious 
tohu wa bohu preceding God’s creative act lies outside of human cognition, and in this 
respect, “between the beginning and now there lies the same breach as between now and the 
end.”74 Keeping the prologue of John’s gospel in mind, this mysterious eternity which both 
precedes and succeeds historical temporality is Christ, “the beginning, the new, the end of our 
whole world.”75 Our mere awareness of this beginning depends on Christ, and yet it also 
encounters Dasein, and in this sense it also requires our own already-having-begun. 
Revelation only encounters humans in the middle of our existence, thereby taking for granted 
that, at some point, we began. Consequently, the temporal past of Dasein must stretch back to 
the very same beginning which appears at first glance to be independent, supratemporal. “In 
the beginning—God,” Bonhoeffer writes, can only be true 
 
if by this word God comes alive for us here in the middle, not as a distant, 
eternal being in repose but as the Creator. We can know about the beginning 
in the true sense only by hearing of the beginning while we ourselves are in 
the middle, between the beginning and the end; otherwise it would not be 
the beginning in the absolute sense which is also our beginning.76 
 
The beginning must carry two interrelated senses. On one hand it is the absolute beginning 
which is not only independent of humanity but independent of our empirical notions of 
causality. It must be so if we are to acknowledge the beginning as true beginning, as prior and 
independent of all other ideas and reflection. “The relation between Creator and creature,” 
Bonhoeffer insists, “can never be interpreted in terms of cause and effect, because between 
the Creator and the creature there stands no law of thought or law of effect or anything 
else.”77 Therefore, we cannot allow ourselves to describe God even according to the 
seemingly self-evident language of a ‘first cause,’ because we thereby subordinate God to 
thought. Causality, however much we take it for granted, finds it origin in the epistemological 
subject. The simple appeal it makes to supposedly bare experience is actually the Hegelian 
temptation endlessly whispered in the ear of theologians and philosophers everywhere, to take 
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75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid., 30. 
77 Ibid., 32. 
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“the bold and violent action of enthroning reason in the place of God.”78 Absolute beginning 
must be free even from the notion inherent to the word ‘beginning’, that God is disposed to be 
the ‘uncaused cause’, the first link in the physical chain. 
 
On the other hand, human existence has begun. This is the given of Dasein. And so, however 
mysteriously, this absolute beginning has launched our own existence. The fact that the 
beginning is also our beginning should neither be conceived in contradiction nor in 
combination with its absoluteness. Rather, according to the Bonhoefferian method of 
promeity, our own understanding must shift to accommodate the unity of these facts, facts 
which cannot even be described dualistically as separate facts. We are unable to even ask the 
questions properly so long as we make use of our old categories, since we are helpless to 
conceive of the “infinite”, which by definition “has no beginning,” as a beginning 
nonetheless.79 Thus, our causal language of beginning must be reconfigured, “not to be 
thought of in temporal terms” because “we can always go back behind a temporal 
beginning.”80 The absolute beginning can only be described as a ‘beginning’ “in a qualitative 
sense,” insofar as it denotes “something utterly unique,” something that “simply cannot be 
repeated, that . . . is completely free.”81 
 
Although it lies beyond the purview of Creation and Fall to consider the implications of this 
logic for the future, it is worth considering how the same logic of the prior unity of eternity 
and true historical temporality might be applied to a theological notion of the eschaton. What 
Bonhoeffer appears to be suggesting is that the priority of the Incarnation establishes 
temporality as a feature of reality only insofar as the God-human himself has a personal 
history, moving through time. In this sense, it is Christ who is ‘timeful’. Rather than centring 
our reflection on existing objects—bearers of identity across time with perdurance as one 
feature of their existence—it is the Augenblick of justification which properly perdures into 
eternity, vertically, as it were, as if it a right angle from our own linear progression. It is the 
identity of existing objects which is a mere feature of the moment, and the moment which 
finds its own existence bearing the real being of Christ-Reality. When the Christ-Reality acts, 
it is the moment becoming its true self into eternity, moving towards an utterly free end which 
is therefore not properly an end at all. From the perspective of empirical experience, then, 
what may appear to be mere actualism—the unstable, occasional, flickering appearance of a 
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Real Word to our justified selves in the midst of empirical existence—is actually undergirded 
by the stable relatedness of time to the Incarnation, the present endlessly finding itself 
confronted by eternity, judged or reconciled in its relation to Christ-Reality. Bonhoeffer 
writes in Ethics: 
  
God’s Yes and God’s No to history, as we understand it in the incarnation 
and crucifixion of Jesus Christ, bring a lasting and irremovable tension into 
every historical moment. Through the life and death of Jesus Christ, history 
becomes not the transient bearer of eternal values but, for the first time, 
thoroughly temporal. Precisely in its temporality, it is history affirmed by 
God.82 
 
In places such as this, Bonhoeffer can sound nearly presentist in his concern for the moment, 
but he is not ultimately suggesting that it is only the present which exists. Rather, he is 
suggesting that each moment only becomes itself insofar as it displays the personal history of 
Christ-Reality. It is Christ who is truly historical, and therefore Christ who is truly in the 
present. This is the best way to make sense of Bonhoeffer’s claim that “history in the proper 
sense only begins with sin.”83 Our empirical experience of history is, in Bonhoeffer’s mind, a 
kind of pseudo-history, a collection of disparate events fragmented by our inability to see 
them in their relation to Christ.  
 
Insofar as we still worry about our own identity perduring through time—as Bonhoeffer 
clearly does, particularly in Act and Being—we will not be able to resolve the unity of our 
identity by mere longitudinal observation. There may or may not be anything consistent or 
organic about our own movement through empirical history. We find ourselves as Dasein, 
and therefore already in the middle, looking ahead to the end-which-is-no-end and backwards 
to the beginning-which-is-no-beginning. 
 
In the moment’s relation to Christ, however, it is not only the transcendent Christ but the 
historical Christ-Reality itself which makes a claim on us. Christ-Reality may well be 
revealed not in ecstatic revelation but in the pressing Reality of the moment, if we are able to 
attend to it. Only insofar as we attend to Christ-Reality can we truly be contemporaneous to 
the historical moment, “only where we perceive the claims of history” and are challenged to 
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“accept or reject those claims and allow ourselves to be touched by them in our most 
profound existence.”84 This is the Augenblick in the Bonhoefferian sense—a kind of reversal 
of Kierkegaard’s concern—the moment in which Reality has actualised us. In the 
Bonhoefferian sense we find ourselves transcended by the moment itself, our own security 
hung in the balance by the decisive moment’s offer of judgment or reconciliation. It is in this 
respect, alluding to the true history of Christ-Reality, that Bonhoeffer observes:  
 
Christianity brings a new interpretation of history. History in its essence 
does not enter our system of ideas and values. On the contrary, it sets for us 
our limitations. History in its essence is to be interpreted ontologically. The 
true attitude of man toward history is not interpretative, but that of refusing 
or acknowledging, that is to say, deciding. History is the place of decision, 
nothing else. Decision in its most inward sense is possible only as a decision 
for or against God. This decision is executed in facing Christ. Within the 
world of ideas there is no such thing as decision because I always bear 
already within myself the possibilities of understanding these ideas.85 
 
Only now can it properly be said that “we are already eternal here in the midst of time itself, 
bearing eternity within our breast.”86 The moment stands outside of us, beckoning us. Yet, at 
the same time, our identity is never separable from the moment. It is in the moment that we 
find ourselves being-in-reconciliation or being-under-judgment. In this sense, the moment is 
also a glimpse of the future of our historical lives, a future, however, that is no mere finality, 
but is the encounter with transcendent eternity. 
 
Robert Scharlemann has grasped this aspect of Bonhoeffer’s understanding of futurity with 
exceptional clarity. He writes that,  
 
The idea of God for Bonhoeffer’s analysis is, of course, not simply the idea 
of the unconditioned; it is, rather, the event in which the divine-human 
reality shows itself in the context of human history and makes real a 
possibility not there otherwise.87  
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In this he captures not only the priority of the Christ-Reality, but the free personhood of 
presence which reminds us that Christ-Reality is “not at our disposal but accessible only to 
the extent that it makes itself known in the deed or event that is real as revelation.”88 The only 
caveat to Scharlemann’s analysis is that he—like many others—presumes Bonhoeffer’s 
definition of revelation is identical to Barth’s, and so conceives of the manifestation of this 
“divine-human reality” kerygmatically, as “the idea that is the event of revelation.”89  
Consequently, he writes that: 
 
The future is incorporated in the relation of the hearer to reality; the reality 
comes to the hearer, it is Zu-kunft that never becomes an objective thing but 
remains in the Zukunftigheit, the adventivity, of what is proclaimed. In the 
proclamation something comes to the listening self purely from outside, 
apart from all structured connections.90 
 
There is a great deal that is useful even within this passage: the agency of reality, the alterity 
of revelation, the being of transcendence—all are hinted at in these words. In returning the 
focus to proclamation, however, Scharlemann has no choice but to preserve the aloof 
subjectivity of revelation in Zukunftigheit in order to prevent it from becoming “an objective 
thing.” The question remains whether this is not precisely the token gesture towards 
transcendence which is actually the self-restraint of the conscious ego, thus unmasking itself 
as idealism in disguise—the very thing which Bonhoeffer critiqued in Act and Being.91 By 
instead speaking about the being of revelation, Bonhoeffer is permitting revelation to become 
“an objective thing” for the justified conscience—this is precisely what gives us hope that 
there will be an epistemological answer to our problem, that we can indeed recognise Christ-
Reality for what it is. As long as the kerygmatic paradigm dominates our conception of 
revelation, however, forcing us to resolve transcendence in thought, then there can be no 
distinction between Christ-Reality’s objectivity and Christ-Reality as object. Therefore, we 
can find not sufficient barrier to idealism, and so Christ-Reality’s being must remain in 
Zukunftigheit. What is needed is a real being of transcendence, a true presence, which is able 
to be “an objective thing” without subordinating itself to human reason and thereby becoming 
mere object. The being of revelation is such a thing, in Bonhoeffer’s mind. It does not request 
                                                            
88 Scharlemann, “Authenticity and Encounter,” 255. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid., 263. 
91 See p. 54, above. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 142 
 
that the human mind acknowledge its alterity. As other person, it is able to impose this alterity 
even while being fully present.  
 
What Scharlemann leads us toward, however, is the important issue for the moment. What 
resources might this language of futurity and eternity offer us for the problem of our own 
epistemology? How are we to look at empirical reality and know anything of this Christ-
Reality? What Bonhoeffer’s temporal language suggests is that Christ-Reality has a history of 
its own, which is the Reality of our own history. True history, for Bonhoeffer, is a “qualifier 
to designate God’s actions in time or the events that give a certain concreteness to 
revelation.”92 It is both absolute end and the end of our present temporality, it “takes its 
meaning . . . from its poles of creation and eschatology.”93 This raises the possibility that we 
can identify the intersection of Christ-Reality’s history in our experience, as the moment 
when the world becomes for us what it truly it is, which is also to say, what it will be, as 
reconciled or judged by God. The appearance of history’s future in our midst is equally the 
appearance of eternal transcendence. Bonhoeffer’s logic holds out the possibility that we can 
see the sick healed, the poor fed, the outsider embraced, the sinner forgiven, the prophecy 
proclaimed and identify this as Reality, and therefore as the personal work and presence of 
Christ. Those moments which already are what they will be are nothing short of the empirical 
appearance of the Christ-Reality’s own historical self. 
  
In saying this, we must immediately bear in mind, however, Christ-Reality’s twofold 
appearing in exaltation and humiliation. The possibility of a given moment’s appearing as 
eschatological wholeness must be held together with the possibility of a given moment’s 
appearing as crucified dying. This is one way to make sense of Bonhoeffer’s interest in “the 
powerlessness and the suffering of God,”94 even as he also wants to locate God “in the midst 
of our lives . . . in health and strength and not only in suffering.”95 The moment of the 
innocent’s suffering is also a moment that has become what it will be, a moment revealed as 
evil, an eternally damned moment, and therefore a moment incorporated into the Christ-
Reality’s personal history of suffering. The moment when the prophetic word exposes evil as 
itself, the moment when the weight of oppression on the shoulders of the guiltless becomes 
apparent, the moment when righteousness is truly humiliated—in these moments the suffering 
Christ-Reality is no less accurately manifest than in exalted moments of joy and fulfilment. 
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This does not imply that, in either humiliation or exaltation, there is any necessary reason why 
this appearing will always be obvious to us. Quite the opposite, it is essential to understand 
that continuity persists as being-in-relation-God, but this being contains within it the 
possibility of either being-in-reconciliation or being-under-judgment. The empirical moment 
in which Christ-Reality appears is no less related to Christ-Reality than the moment in which 
he is hidden. The first is a being-in-reconciliation, the second a being-under-judgment, but 
both are a being-in-relation-to. Recall Bonhoeffer’s notion of limitation—that, against the 
totalising self, God’s first gracious act is to limit in order to set the self free from its infinite 
solitude. In one breath, this limitation is judgment—God holding us at a distance—and the 
first step of reconciliation—an opening to loving fellowship with an Other. Applied to reality, 
Bonhoeffer reminds us that, in the future, some things will be redeemed precisely because 
some things are rejected. This notion must be retained against too facile of an assumption that 
the Resurrection’s reconciling work will incorporate all of empirical reality into Christ-
Reality. As an example, Heinrich Ott, once again, has done as well as any of Bonhoeffer’s 
interpreters in grasping Bonhoeffer’s language of temporality, but he also provides an 
example of sliding too quickly into the language of reconciliation. Bearing in mind the 
centrality he places on ethics, we find Ott writing that: 
 
If we speak of God as the final reality to which the responsible existence of 
the Christian has to surrender itself, what is meant by that is not simply that 
beyond this reality which we know is the God who is real in a final and 
absolute sense. Bonhoeffer’s thought is in no way ‘other-worldly’. Rather 
this assertion is to be understood in a strictly ontological way, that God as 
the finally real is the true reality in the reality of this world which we know. 
And this again is not to be understood pantheistically, but in the sense of 
reconciliation.96 
 
There is much to commend this interpretation, but our understanding of Christ-Reality slips 
towards mere immanentism if we understand reality’s being-in-relation-to-God only in terms 
of reconciliation. Ott wants to avoid conflating Christ with given, empirical existence. But by 
exclusively emphasising reconciliation, Ott lends to empirical reality the assumption of 
Christ’s tacit approval, even if he does not strictly give empirical reality the authority to 
dictate Christ’s form. In Ott’s defence, his language slips in this way precisely because 
Bonhoeffer’s later writings placed such heavy emphasis on “the reality of the world 
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reconciled with God in Jesus Christ.”97 As a strategy for extending Bonhoeffer’s logic, 
however, this later language should not be read as a final summation but as a cautionary word 
against those Confessing Christians of the early 1940’s who found it quite easy to condemn 
the world under a totalising judgment and quite difficult to watch for the work of Christ-
Reality in the midst of chaos. Read as another pattern in Bonhoeffer’s language, however, the 
movement of eternity and futurity tells us that the moment-under-judgment is equally related 
to Christ-Reality as the moment-in-reconciliation. One cannot simply watch for the 
appearance of Christ by looking to reality in the barest sense, anticipating that reality will be 
affirmed in reconciliation. If this had truly been Bonhoeffer’s logic, after all, he would have 
been merely another theologian of the Nazi state. Yet, at the same time, one cannot give in to 
the pietist’s presumption, only expecting to find Christ standing in perpetual contrast to the 
world. Instead, it is Christ-Reality which beckons, Reality which makes the moment its true 
self by making it into Christ’s history.  
 
What confidence we have about identifying any particular fact in any particular moment as 
Christ-Reality is only given in the crucifixion and resurrection. On the map of empirical 
history’s timeline, the future is not entirely blank. For Bonhoeffer, both the crucifixion and 
the resurrection are the future which has miraculously become a part of the past, as judgment 
and reconciliation, as paradigmatic moments in the history of Christ-Reality’s humiliation and 
exaltation. The moment which suddenly appears as it will be can be identified by its 
congruence with these events, by sharing some formal similarity with what we already know 
about the historical future based on the past Incarnation. The moment becoming itself is 
Christ-Reality, is the present history of the same God-human, Christus praesens pro me. We 
look for the places where the future is present. But this future is not abstract hope; it is the 
shape of the Christ-Reality as Crucified One, as Resurrected One, a shape “we have heard, we 
have seen with our eyes, we have looked upon and touched with our hands” (1 John 1:1). 
 
This notion of the justification of the Augenblick—as the present moment existing in relation 
to God, but merging into Christ-Reality in becoming what it will be under grace or 
judgment—provides us with both an epistemological grounds to actively look for Christ-
Reality as well as a caution about our eagerness. We are also predicates of the moment. We 
do not stand outside the moment’s relatedness to God.  Judgment and reconciliation affect our 
own understanding; we do not stand beyond them. We may fail to understand even the Reality 
in front of us insofar as our own understanding is at risk of judgment. Nor can we expect our 
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eager observation to be aided by the perdurance across time of Christ-Reality’s appearance. 
Christ-Reality’s appearance is the moment becoming itself; it cannot perdure into the next 
moment, precisely because it is properly a moment. Therefore, we are prevented from 
thinking of Christ’s givenness to empirical existence as in some way permanently imparted to 
or possessed by people, objects, ideologies, or institutions. We ought to find—with respect to 
powers, principalities, and our own selves—that “there is no real epistemological conflict 
between a hermeneutic of suspicion and our sociopolitical usefulness.”98 Each moment will 
occasion its own decision. If this leaves us unsettled about our own continuity, it is only 
because we desire to possess for ourselves what properly belongs to Reality. Even death—the 
most seemingly obvious disjuncture between being and nonbeing—cannot separated us from 
relatedness-to-God, for existence as being-related-to-God “overarches being and nonbeing.”99 
We are fully and permanently reconciled to God in Reality, but the experience of our 
empirical lives includes the suspension of our being in transcendence. We are properly 
defined by a Christ-Reality we cannot possess. The continuity of our empirical selves is owed 
to this fundamental definition, and is manifest in our own perceived distance or nearness to 
God as the experience of judgment or reconciliation, experiences which are equally related to 
God. Christ-Reality appearing in the decision of the moment transcends us; it calls us to 
action that may be utterly beyond us, utterly self-denying. Whether or not this moment 
becomes itself in justification does not call into question our own relatedness-to-God, which 
by grace affirms the futurity of our own reconciliation. It does, however, confront our 
empirical selves with the choice of whether or not to be our true selves.  
 
This raises the last of our problems to be considered: the logic of promeity in its ethical 
aspect. On one hand, this can be conceived as merely another kind of epistemological 
question: how are we to know what we ought to do in order to act in accord with Christ-
Reality? What will become clear in the next section, however, is that this epistemological way 
of putting the question finds itself inverted by Bonhoeffer’s ethical interests. Bonhoeffer is 
eager to act in accord with Christ-Reality; he is much less concerned with our demand for 
knowledge, for a self-justifying certainty. Acting rightly is important, acting assuredly is not, 
nor is proving one’s own righteousness either before or after the act. Thus, it is to this 
narrower question we will thus turn: how can we act in accord with Christ-Reality?    
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5.4 Mystery and commandment—the ethical problem 
Andreas Pangritz has helpfully pointed out the affinities between Bonhoeffer and the Jewish 
theologian Leo Baeck’s work on “the dialectical confrontation of mystery and 
commandment.”100 In these two words, Baeck locates a duality that could also be described 
“as that of humanity’s relationship with God and with the world, of faith and ethics.”101 The 
essence of Judaism, for Baeck, is “that these two experiences have become one, and are 
experienced as one, in a perfect unity.”102 Pangritz hears a resonance in these words with 
Bonhoeffer’s famous dictum from Cost of Discipleship: “Only he who believes is obedient, 
and only he who is obedient believes.”103 
 
Pangritz is correct to see in Bonhoeffer’s work this fundamental unity and yet, Pangritz’s 
work also reveals the difficulty of truly treating two such concepts not as dialectical duality, 
but as real unity. Pangritz sees the application of Baeck’s logic to Bonhoeffer’s work in the 
latter’s notion of the “arcane discipline” from the prison letters.104 Pangritz portrays arcane 
discipline as “a commitment of divine mystery that makes ‘true worldliness’ possible in the 
first place.”105 In attempting to spell this out more clearly, Pangritz quotes Bonhoeffer’s 
assertion from the prison letters, “Our being Christians today will be limited to two things: 
prayer and righteous action among men.”106 Pangritz does not elaborate further, but the 
implication of applying Baeck’s vocabulary to Bonhoeffer is that prayer and righteous action 
should be understood in parallel to mystery and commandment, faith and ethics, obedience 
and belief, responsibility to God and responsibility to world. This reading tacitly accepts two 
spheres of the Christian life—attentiveness on the one hand to the esoterica of devotion 
guarded within the arcane discipline, and on the other hand to righteous collaboration with the 
welfare of the world. 
 
There are two problems here. The first is that it is difficult to know what Bonhoeffer means 
by his spare references to “arcane discipline” and even more difficult to portray it as a 
necessary prerequisite to true worldliness in the way Pangritz suggests.107 Secondly, and more 
importantly, Bonhoeffer does seem to advocate the true unity of mystery and commandment, 
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but it is precisely this unity which prevents us from speaking of them dualistically. Whatever 
importance we may give prayer in the formation of righteous action (or vice versa), we still 
conceive them as separable. In contrast, a more Bonhoefferian approach would be to begin 
again with the Incarnation. There we discover that mystery and commandment are 
intrinsically inseparable. “Because the Son of God became a human being,” Bonhoeffer 
writes, “service to God in worship can no longer be detached from service to sisters and 
brothers.”108 True mystery is the alterity of Christ-Reality which emerges in the decisive 
moment. True commandment is the transcendence which stands outside of us and calls us into 
question. Bonhoeffer preaches in a sermon: 
 
The blissful notion that God once again dwells among human beings, that 
God once again lends meaning to human life, that the world is full of God, 
this notion becomes threatening and frightening precisely because it 
demands responsibility.109  
 
There is no awareness of Christ-Reality that is not mysterious exactly as the barrier of our 
cognition, and no Christ-Reality that does not present us with the chance to join with it or 
work against it. Consequently, there can be no separation of inner and outer, private and 
public, ritual and resistance. Everything that can truly be called prayer will drive us to action, 
because “prayer immediately leads to action” even if only “at the place where it is needed the 
most, myself.”110 Every action in accord with Reality cannot help but be an offering back to 
God of what is already God’s own, as truly ethical action “recognizes itself ultimately as 
being God’s action, the purest activity as passivity to God.”111  
 
Here we return to Bonhoeffer’s confession that the personal God-human is the true actor—the 
one who possesses a personal history as Christ-Reality—and thus the agent and arbiter of 
what is good. In this light, it can properly be said that “the subject matter of a Christian ethic 
is God’s reality revealed in Christ becoming real among God’s creatures.”112 This perspective 
is most often associated with Bonhoeffer’s Ethics manuscript, but it equally grounds Cost of 
Discipleship. There, Bonhoeffer emphasises the disconnect between disciples of Christ and 
the empirical world, not as a rejection of the world, but precisely in order to be more for the 
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world than the world is for itself. These disciples are not pulled from the empirical world into 
a halo of light, disdaining reality, because what separates them is not “some law of piety,” 
“unhappily contemptuous of life.”113 What separates their action from the course of empirical 
history is “life and the gospel itself; it is Christ itself,” the union of life and Christ as Christ-
Reality. Here is where the language of Christ as Mediator finds its full voice in Bonhoeffer’s 
work. “In becoming human,” Bonhoeffer writes, Christ “put himself between me and the 
given circumstances of the world. I cannot go back. He is in the middle.”114 Christ’s 
mediating function is not to serve as a tenuous connection between divine and human, 
uniquely able to translate one reality into the language of another. There are not separate 
realities, but one in Christ, and thus Christ-Reality’s mediating function is to separate us from 
the course of normal existence, pointing out the division between Reality and mere 
appearances. In this sense, Christ’s mediation is disruptive rather than communicative; it is a 
between-ness, a transcendent immanence which brings Reality to us by blocking our path to 
mere empirical reality. “He has deprived those whom he has called of every immediate 
connection to those given realities.”115 This mediated deprivation is not merely obstructive, it 
is reconciling, but reconciling as first limiting, restricting the human ego from its assumed 
mastery of heaven and earth, and only in this way can we say that “he stands not only 
between me and God, he also stands between me and the world, between me and other people 
and things.”116 In the words of Dirkie Smit, “we shall have to become people who can learn to 
live with strangers,”117 and—it might be added—with strangeness, precisely as we find that 
the limitation of immediate transcendence frees us for hospitality. 
 
While it is true that Cost of Discipleship places more emphasis on “the testimony of 
scripture,”118 and “the preaching and sacrament of the church” as “the place where Jesus 
Christ is present,”119 it is nonetheless undergirded by the same assumption that the pro-me 
Christ is real being in the world. “Christ is not dead but alive,” Bonhoeffer writes, “He is 
present today, in bodily form and with his word.”120 With respect to an ethical programme, 
then, Cost of Discipleship joins Ethics in suggesting that the good is conformity to and 
imitation of the Gestalt of Christ-Reality. Cost of Discipleship focuses on that aspect of this 
form which is already known to us in the historical Christ’s commandments; Ethics focuses 
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more on the form of Christ acting freely in the present. The point is the same, however. The 
historical commandments of Christ are nonetheless present because Christ is present. “The 
Christ who is present with us,” Bonhoeffer writes, “is the Christ to whom the whole of 
scripture testifies. He is the incarnate, crucified, risen, and glorified Christ; and he encounters 
us in his word.”121 The present activity of the Christ-Reality is nonetheless in keeping with the 
identity of the Incarnation, and so  
 
the action of the Christian instead springs from the unity of God and world 
brought about in Jesus Christ. However, this unity must not be understood 
as a principle. That would ruin everything. Instead, this unity exists solely in 
the person of Jesus Christ, in whom God became human.122  
 
From the perspective of the ethical subject, obedience to the shape of the historical Christ’s 
action and conformity to the shape of the present Christ-Reality are no different. The way of 
being exemplified by the Sermon on the Mount, for instance, is history’s “hidden life,” 
thought only “visible [in] Christ alone.”123 Cost of Discipleship thus presses the disciple 
towards imitative action, not “interpreting the Sermon on the Mount,” but following after 
Jesus, who “knows only one possibility: simply go and obey.”124 In doing so, the disciple 
“walk[s] behind Jesus.”125 Ethics presses humans to become properly human in imitating 
Christ, for “to be conformed to the one who has become human—that is what being really 
human means.”126 The notion that Christ-Reality possesses its own history, and is free to 
carve its own path through the world, is integral in connecting the ‘discipleship’ of this 
middle period to the ‘responsible action’ of the later period.  
 
The connection is evident in an easily over-looked document that bridges these two phases of 
Bonhoeffer’s theology. His meditation on Psalm 119 was written over the winter of 1939-40, 
a few months into the war, during a time when Bonhoeffer was clearly beginning to wrestle 
with what implications discipleship would have for political action.127 Reflecting on Psalm 
119:1,128 Bonhoeffer conceives of Christian life as an imitative journey: “We are to learn to 
understand ourselves as people who have been placed on the path and now cannot do 
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otherwise than walk the path as well.”129 This path is not circumscribed for us by boundaries, 
but is evident as the footprints in which our own steps must fall. “God’s ways are the ways 
that he has tread before and that we are to walk with him now”—lest we take even these 
footprints as merely ancient rules for a good life. These are fresh impressions in the ground, 
left by the immediately preceding Christ-Reality who is also our guide. “God does not allow 
us to walk a path that he has not walked before and on which he would not precede us.”130 
The language of the early church in Acts reaches fruition here: “the entire gospel message of 
salvation can be called simply ‘the way.’”131 As this way is the way of Reality, and thus of the 
Good, there need be no fear that the path itself is fallen, rather, “whoever is on this way, 
whoever is in Jesus Christ, does no evil.”132 
 
Immediately, of course, there is the danger of defining this Christian good over and against 
the world. The path of Christ-Reality leads to Reality, and therefore to the world’s true self, 
not to some higher plane of existence. “Life is a benefaction from God,” Bonhoeffer reminds 
us, “Life is not a means to an end but is fulfillment in itself. God created us so that we may 
live.”133 If we allow the notion of a path to become fixed, if we lose a sense of its being 
actively and presently walked and therefore established by Christ-Reality, then we once again 
risk subordinating the actual Incarnation to an idea. Nothing could be further from the desire 
of Christ-Reality, who “does not want to see the triumph of ideas over a devastated field of 
corpses. Ideas exist for the sake of life, not life for the sake of ideas.”134 Hence, Christ as 
Mediator disrupts our connection to empirical reality, not in order to extract us from it, but in 
order to more faithfully serve Reality, and therefore to aid empirical reality in becoming its 
true self. “When God’s word first encountered me,” Bonhoeffer writes, “it made me a stranger 
on this earth.”135 And yet this separation still finds me on earth, not as its owner but as its 
guest, and “as a guest, I need to submit to the laws of my shelter. The earth that feeds me has 
a right to my work and my strength. It is not my prerogative to despise the earth that sustains 
my life.”136 The path we walk is necessarily for the sake of reality, as it is set by the very 
movement of Reality. 
 
                                                            
129 DBWE 15, 498. 
130 Ibid., 504. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid., 505. 
133 Ibid., 519. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid., 521. 
136 Ibid., 522. 
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The meditation on Psalm 119 sets the stage both for the later Bonhoeffer’s understanding of 
responsible action as well as for—perhaps unexpectedly—his critique of religion. It serves as 
a reminder that, in the same way that there is a danger of losing the personal freedom of 
Christ-Reality in an excessive immanence in empirical reality, there is the same danger in an 
excessive immanence in religious praxis. Subordinating Christ-Reality to the life of righteous 
piety is no less egocentric idealism than subordinating him to experiential knowledge. “Are 
we praising human sanctity and piety?” Bonhoeffer asks rhetorically, “Are we preoccupied 
with ourselves and our faultlessness?”137  This cannot be permitted, as praise must only be 
given to God, “No other praise can count here.”138 Consequently, a Christian ethic is the 
subversion and ultimate inversion of our epistemological desire to know what must be done. 
The short horizon of our vision is “Jesus Christ walking ahead of me, step by step.”139  This is 
the extent of our knowledge. “Either one moves ahead or one is not with God. God knows the 
entire way; we only know the next step and the final goal.”140 The route cannot be mapped; 
the fixed point of certainty is only the terminus of this history revealed in the Resurrection 
and the dust rising from the feet of the one ahead. In this respect, “the life of whoever has set 
his foot on this path, has become a wandering,” even if it is also guided.141  
 
The path is in one sense narrow, but in another sense it is pluriform: “It is the life under the 
word of God in its utter multitude of forms, in its richness, in its inexhaustible fullness of 
knowledge and experiences.142 The path finds its origin in the free action of the beginning-
which-is-no-beginning and its destination in the reconciled end-which-is-no-end. In between 
it is a manifold, boundless, and unexpected wandering. Echoing the logic of the early theses 
and the language of the Christology lectures, “there is only one danger on this path, namely, 
to want to step back behind this beginning or to lose sight of the goal, which is the same 
thing. In that moment the path ceases to be a path of grace and of faith. It ceases to be God’s 
own path.”143 The path, as person, does not yield up its own internal logic for our perusal, and 
in exactly the moment when we believe we are able to epistemologically extrapolate what 
must be done, we find ourselves moving off to the side, loitering at a human signpost while 
Christ-Reality vanishes ahead. 
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140 DBWE 15, 504. 
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Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 152 
 
Actual ethics therefore subverts our epistemology of ethics. Our normal standards are 
subordinate to the “praxis-logic” of discipleship in the shadow of Christ-Reality.144 Even the 
steps of Christ-Reality may not be obvious to our own intellect under judgment. These 
moments of blind uncertainty can be a “severe trial . . . But if I permit God himself to show 
me the way, then I am completely dependent on the grace that either reveals or denies itself to 
me.”145 Dependence is the one certainty, that “I remain bound wholly to grace in all my ways 
and decisions.”146 Any ethic which presents itself as more certain than this is a “false 
security” attempting to “beguile me out of the living community with God.”147 We are unable 
to guarantee what lies ahead, and equally unable to evaluate what lies behind. Reflection is 
the not the task for the moment, but obedience. Our evaluation of the past easily strays into a 
congratulatory “reflection on our extraordinariness.”148 In this sense, faithfully attending to 
the righteousness of Christ-Reality means no longer attending to any forward-looking 
extrapolation or backwards-looking summation of righteousness as an idea. “Our paying 
attention to our righteousness,” Cost of Discipleship reminds us, “is supposed to support our 
not paying attention to our righteousness.”149 Our discipleship can attend to nothing other than 
Christ-Reality, to the appearing in our midst of the personal presence of reality’s true self. All 
other avenues are closed—abstract principles, philosophical speculation, religious obligation, 
the causal connection of our own action to any particular result, the description of our work as 
righteous or not, the summation of our own natures as good or evil. Nothing can provide a 
ground more fundamental than the personal presence of the Incarnation’s history. “Nothing 
but God makes human action in history good,” Bonhoeffer writes, “God incorporates it into 
God’s own hidden plan that pursues the goal of history as it has been revealed in Christ.”150  
 
As early as 1929, Bonhoeffer already had in mind the very practical consequences of this 
ethical approach. “All we can do,” he writes,  
 
is examine the concrete situation of decision and point out one of the 
possibilities for decision that emerges there. The decision demanded in 
                                                            
144 Botman, “Discipleship as Transformation,” 108. 
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reality, however, must be made in freedom in the concrete situation by the 
individual involved.151  
 
The aim of a Christian ethic is to act in accord with Christ-Reality, to respond in obedience to 
the appearing of exalted or humiliated history in the moment.152 As explained in the previous 
section, this appearing may not be obvious to us and, even when it is, we may not understand 
its connection to the empirical future or the deeper movement of Christ-Reality. “To what 
extent a human action serves the divine goal of history and thus actualizes good in history,” 
Bonhoeffer admits, “is something we cannot know with ultimate certainty.”153 In principle, 
there can be no a priori reason to ascribe Christ-Reality to a particular Gestalt. For example, 
despite the temptation to read Bonhoeffer’s Finkenwalde years as a stark contrast to his later 
participation in conspiratorial resistance—the first an inward, pious, ecclesial phase, the 
second a public, secularised, political phase—there is no a priori reason to dismiss either as 
unresponsive to Christ-Reality.  Reality may equally be as manifest in a meditative retreat as 
in a coup d’état—to assume otherwise is to subordinate Christ-Reality to mere idea. In a 
decisive moment, either may be needed, as “God often demands fast and immediate action, 
yet he also demands silence and contemplation.”154 The moment may demand something 
deeply personal or deeply political, something religious or something secular, something 
traditional or something iconoclastic, something praised or something criminalised—there is 
no way to exclude any option in advance on the basis of a supposed fidelity to the meaning of 
God or the world. “What is important,” Bonhoeffer reminds us, “is not that God is a spectator 
and participant in our life today, but that we are attentive listeners and participants in God’s 
action in the sacred story, the story of Christ on earth.”155 
 
Therefore, what remains for the one wanting to be truly human is to live truly in Reality. This 
Reality is Christ, and as such has a form and yet, as person, this form is present, agential, 
                                                            
151 DBWE 10, 369. 
152 It is this context in which Bonhoeffer’s analogia relationis should be understood. It is a substitute for neither 
the analogia entis nor Barth’s analogia fides, insofar as it is not actually attempting to accomplish what they 
intend to accomplish. The latter pair are analogical ladders upon which truth can be pursued. Bonhoeffer’s 
analogia is an analogy along which life can be lived in accordance with Reality, even if the truth about ends and 
means are not properly understood. It is “the likeness . . . of humankind to God . . . a given relation, a relation in 
which they are set, a justitia passiva! And it is in this relation in which they are set that freedom is given” 
(DBWE 3, 65). Given the possibility of being-free-for-others, the analogy only guides us insofar as it points us 
toward the imitation of Christ, the one truly free-for-others. In this respect, the analogia relationis provides no 
real fodder for the intellect, but the physical shape for action and the hope that we may be released into enough 
existential space for that action to be mimicked. 
153 DBWE 6, 227. 
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appearing in the places we least expect, always redeeming us by transcending us, refusing 
mere conceptualisation. A truly free, truly responsible action in the world will make its best 
effort to imitate the historical Christ, but fully, not merely in what appears to us as his most 
ethically relevant actions—not only as the one who suffers with the oppressed and condemns 
the tyrannical, but as the one who worships, prays, forms community, interprets scripture, 
preaches good news, celebrates the sacraments. We respond to the appearing of this same 
historical Christ in Reality not with philosophising, but with obedience grounded in humility, 
trusting that both our best and our worst find their fundamental continuity in grace. 
 
As a final word for future consideration, however, a Bonhoefferian ethic not only subverts the 
epistemology of ethics, but also inverts it, returning a very different set of parameters which 
may well challenge a fundamental epistemology. “I can know God only if I can effect an act,” 
Bonhoeffer writes, “an act which make me transcend the limits of myself . . . While it is 
obvious that I myself cannot effect such an act, there is, nevertheless, such an act, which is 
executed by God himself, and which is called ‘faith.’”156 For Bonhoeffer, discipleship is an 
epistemological category. Imitation precedes reflection, and discipleship provides its own 
ground for thought. “Following Christ means taking certain steps,” he writes in Cost of 
Discipleship, “The first step, which responds to the call, separates the followers from their 
previous existence. A call to discipleship thus immediately creates a new situation.”157 This 
new situation is a condition for belief, it is the “concrete commandment [that] has to be 
obeyed, in order to come to believe.”158 In 1932, as a young lecturer, Bonhoeffer found 
himself asking, “how can I recognize as truth that of which Christian proclamation 
speaks?”159 Even at that point he believed the answer would not fall among the normal 
semantic interplay of premises and conclusions. Instead, the answer would come:  
 
solely through the free attempt to base one’s life for once completely on the 
word of Christ; for once to live totally with him, to live by following him, to 
hear him, to obey him. Only the one who has completely dedicated his life 
in this way can judge whether Christ speaks and is the truth. And Christ 
gives the promise: Whoever once dares to do that will know the truth. Only 
in living does one know the truth. Only in battle can one test weapons.160 
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More than merely an affirmation of discipleship’s centrality to Christian life, Bonhoeffer’s 
logic of imitation raises a challenge to the assumption of philosophy post-Wittgenstein that 
identity and existence are hermeneutical at their core. Bonhoeffer’s ethical inversion of 
epistemology raises a deeper question about the mimetic origins of knowledge, as a set of 
actions taken up and only subsequently given meaning within a hermeneutical frame. 
Bonhoeffer’s understanding of discipleship as an epistemological category is pre-reflective, 
pre-linguistic; it is the pursuit of the most unmediated imitation possible. In this sense, 
mimesis is still communicative, but not of semantic meaning, principally. Indeed, for 
Bonhoeffer, meaning is a secondary addition which is fraught with the dangers of 
philosophical idealism and—at any rate—is irrespective of conformity to Christ-Reality. 
Potentially, a truly Bonhoefferian epistemology finds itself dependent on ethics, not as moral 
evaluation, but as an action in imitation of some first creative agent or another which only 
later yields anything that can be called knowledge.  
 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
Moved by the histories of those who influenced him the most, the teenaged Bonhoeffer 
attempted to capture in a paper for Karl Holl’s seminar a sense of what distinguished 
extraordinary persons:  
 
One can classify people according to the perspectives listed below. . . The 
first type of person—and these are in the majority—live out their years. . . 
Others have a life history. This means that they have lived and experienced 
with conviction and a sense of direction. Looking back, they see a history 
that defines the center of their lives. The third type, however, is the person 
of history. . . These are people with a concrete calling. Among them, 
religious individuals are unique. . . All of their thoughts and actions are 
aligned with their work, as they feel it should be.161  
 
As the focus of this thesis has been on broader patterns of thought which cut across 
Bonhoeffer’s writings, little attention has been paid to the circumstances of his biography. It 
is impossible, however, not to notice the extraordinary way in which his own thoughts and 
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actions aligned with his work. Perhaps the best case to be made for Bonhoeffer’s 
understanding of Christ-Reality is found not in the sum of his christological arguments, but in 
his relentless regard for the moment, not accepting the simplest interpretation of events, but 
pressing back against his context with a confidence borne of an even deeper encounter with 
Reality.  
 
Writing from the stifling emptiness of prison life, however, Bonhoeffer questioned whether 
his action and work truly revolved around a central meaning, “whether one still sees, in this 
fragment of life that we have, what the whole was intended and designed to be.”162 But even 
this doubt fits Bonhoeffer’s attentiveness to the present Christ-Reality, in his unwillingness to 
issue a final judgment until the personal history of the Incarnation reaches its own summation. 
Bonhoeffer took action in advance of any final analysis, and thus made his best effort to act 
ethically, in accord with Reality, uncertain of what judgment would be made against him, yet 
determined to accept “coresponsibility for the course of history, knowing that it is God who 
placed it upon him” and thus to “find a fruitful relation to the events of history.”163 It is 
difficult—and appeared to be difficult for Bonhoeffer even as he chose it—to reconcile the 
violent assassination of another human with action according to the personal history of Christ-
Reality. It is not difficult, however, to see the form of the Incarnate God-human in the life of a 
man resisting evil totally and relentlessly, even to the point of execution at the hands of his 
enemy. Bonhoeffer intended to be a successful revolutionary, and quite unintentionally found 
himself a martyr. He could never have been the latter had he not intended the former, and thus 
found himself borne along towards a witness he did not choose. He desired to act in accord 
with Christ-Reality, and this desire was consummated in the final testimony of his life, 
whether or not he ever understood this completeness while on earth. 
 
Perhaps, however, it would not have surprised Bonhoeffer to find his personal intentions 
transcended by a meaning he never sought. Such was his faith that, even as he lamented the 
fragmentary nature of his own life, he held out hope that “the various themes gradually 
accumulate and harmonize with one another” so that “the great counterpoint is sustained from 
beginning to end.”164 In the end, then, “it is not for us, either, to complain about this 
fragmentary life of ours, but rather even to be glad of it.”165 The glad hope of the prison letters 
is that this counterpoint may gather to itself the whole history of the world. It is entirely 
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possible that the so-called secular world, of its own right, will find itself singing a haunting 
echo of the cantus firmus, perhaps nearer at times to Reality than even those who call 
themselves Christians. In the modern era, when mystery is associated with religion and 
factuality with empiricism, Bonhoeffer reveals the underlying mistake. Christ is the great 
unveiler, the one who presses us relentlessly towards himself, which is equally to say towards 
Reality. To neglect Reality by retreat into religiosity is mere naïveté, an ethically gross 
superstitionism. At the same time, though, to assume that Reality is fully ours, that it can be 
fully exhausted in our own perceptions and opinions, to assume that the ultimate answer is 
anything other than infinitely approaching, overwhelming the narrow scope of our limited 
view—this is an even greater illusion punctured by Reality. What seems like esoteric mystery 
has nothing to do with faith; what presents itself as bald-faced reality is far more illusory than 
we allow. What is Real turns out to be far more elusive than our common usage suggests, 
precisely because it is a person exterior to ourselves, the Real One.  
 
The limitations upon us—and thus the transcendence at the centre of our empirical lives—
manifests in various ways: from the mystery of sacraments to the encounter with a stranger; 
from our emotionally fragmented confusion to our helpless inability to render a final verdict 
on our natures; from the pressing responsibility of the moment tearing our gaze from 
abstraction to the divine command crashing into our ethical reflection, calling us to a 
suffering we would never choose. These limits remind us—contrary to the serpent’s 
temptation to enthrone ourselves—that we are not God. 
 
Our limitations ought to immediately caution all of us—Christian or otherwise—not to 
summarise the history of Reality while it is still living, not to judge before the time is ripe. To 
speak of Christ at work in the world is perfectly in keeping with the ‘who’ of the Incarnation. 
To speak of Christ’s work as one’s own, however, is to have surpassed the barrier of 
transcendence. Until all is disclosed, the imitation of the God-human’s history, both past and 
future, is—ethically and epistemologically—the grounds from which we must proceed. It is 
our only hope for being able to properly see the world as it will be, to not only be justified in 
fact, but to be awakened in consciousness to the comfort or wrath against a particular 
moment. Ontologically, the revelation of Christ gives us grounds to believe this is possible, 
but only insofar as we attend all over again to this encounter. Our task is to acknowledge a 
history beyond ourselves, more descriptive of our future than the best laid plans of our 
timeline, and to act in freedom for the purpose of making this world truly itself. “It may be 
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that the day of judgment will dawn tomorrow; only then and no earlier will we readily lay 
down our work for a better future.”166 
 
This thesis has been an attempt to lay the groundwork for an understanding of God and world 
which can lead us to this point, to take this Christ-Reality as seriously as possible. The path 
taken to reach this point has been referred to as the method of promeity. The theology of 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer has fuelled this inquiry, providing it force and shape. Originating in 
Bonhoeffer’s central christological claim, applied by Bonhoeffer to various theological 
concepts, and then eventually applied to a fundamental ontology, promeity serves as the 
motivation and method to renew all our concepts by returning them to the revelation of the 
Incarnate God-human. Encountered by this ‘who’ rushing towards us, we acknowledge it as 
both person given to be for us, and thus abiding in presence. Applied to the much-disputed 
question of God’s relationship to the world, promeity leads us to acknowledge the a priori 
unity of the God-human, and thus to redefine ourselves, our world, and our worship according 
to Christ’s own self-disclosure. Promeity, as the methodology of an anti-method, can only 
return us again and again to the beginning, urging us to take this self-disclosure more 
seriously at every point in our theorising. Thus, for one last time, we are left to agree with 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer: 
 
Here at the end we stand again where we stood in the beginning; and that 
cannot be otherwise; for everything is included in God’s revelation in 
Christ, in the justification of the sinner by faith and grace alone. And must 
not the solution of everything be there, where God himself is?167 
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